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Abstract 
 
 
 
This dissertation deals with the ethics of truth telling and deception in medicine. Should 
clinicians tell the truth, even if the truth may cause patients irremediable psychological and 
physical harm? Are lies told with a benevolent intent always blameworthy? Are deception and 
concealment less culpable than lying? Should patients be informed that the medicine they are 
taking “with so many benefits” is just a placebo? How can physicians determine, between two 
alternative verbal disclosures, which one provides the optimal balance between truthfulness 
and beneficence? In this dissertation I endeavour to elaborate an answer to these and other 
questions by setting forth a normative theory of truth telling and benevolent deception for 
medical professionals, and especially for those operating in clinical oncology. Throughout this 
work I defend two main ideas. First, clinicians have a duty of veracity in all their professional 
communications, but in exceptional cases other considerations of beneficence and 
compassion may override this prima facie obligation. Second, clinicians may resort to clinical 
deception only if they have ruled out all other truthful courses of action and would be ready to 
hypothetically defend and actually disclose their behavior in public. This view, I contend, has 
several advantages over competing accounts and provides clinicians with a practical way of 
approaching moral dilemmas about truth telling and deception in clinical medicine. 
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Introduction. 
 
 
 
 
There are only two mistakes one can make along the road to truth;  
not going all the way, and not starting. 
Buddha 
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(i) Truth telling, deception, and moral dilemmas in medicine 
 
The view that doctors must be honest with patients is relatively recent. For instance, 
Hippocrates, the father of Western medicine, taught that doctors must “conceal most things 
from the patient […] Give necessary orders with cheerfulness and serenity […] revealing 
nothing of the patient’s future and present condition”. As the following quote vividly portrays, 
after more than two thousands years doctors were still following these teachings: 
 
A woman with terminal breast cancer asked her doctor why her headaches persisted. 
When the doctor said it was probably nerves, she asked why she was nervous. He 
returned the question. She replied, “I am nervous because all tests have stopped, nobody 
wants my blood, and I get all the pills I want. The priest comes to see me twice a week, 
which he never did before, and my mother-in-law is nicer to me even though I am 
meaner to her. Wouldn’t this make you nervous?” There was a pause. Then the doctor 
said, “You mean you think you are dying?”. She said, “I do”. He replied, “You are”. The 
she smiled and said, “Well, I broke the sound barrier; someone finally told me the truth” 
(Hackett 1976: 372-3, quoted in Jackson 2011, 95). 
 
 This scenario has been fairly typical in oncological settings until a few decades ago, 
when patients who had a terminal prognosis were often left in dark about the severity of their 
clinical condition. This practice was justified according to the same rationale that since 
Hippocrates has provided moral guidance for clinical medicine: “to help, or at least to do no 
harm”. Since knowing the truth may harm patients emotionally, psychologically and even 
physically, for the most part of the history of medicine doctors were expected to conceal bad 
news out of considerations of compassion and nonmaleficence. Yet, –as in the above quote– 
also benevolent lies can sometimes harm by creating a climate of corrosive suspiciousness; 
Tolstoy (2009, 32) has explored this possibility in The Death of Ivan Ilych, as he wrote 
 
The main torment for Ivan Ilych was the lie, that lie for some reason acknowledged by 
everyone, that he was merely ill and not dying, and that he needed only to keep calm and 
be treated, and then something very good would come of it. While he knew that whatever 
they did, nothing would come of it except still more tormenting suffering and death. And 
he was tormented by that lie, tormented that no one wanted to acknowledge what they all 
knew and he knew, but wanted to lie to him about his terrible situation, and wanted him 
and even forced him on the eve of his death, the lie that must needs reduce the dreadful, 
solemn act of his death to the level of all their visits, curtains, sturgeon dinners […] was 
terribly tormenting for Ivan Ilych […] This lie around and within him poisoned most of 
all the last days of Ivan Ilych’s life.  
 9 
 In the case of Ivan Ilych and of the woman in the first quote, the use of benevolent 
deception eventually turned into a double-edge sword: not only it prevented both patients 
from deciding how, where and with whom they wanted to die, but it also colored the already 
dreadful experience of being terminally ill with a further shade of loneliness and doubt.  
 
 Should we thus conclude that lying to a dying patient for “her own good” is always 
wrong? Maybe it is so; but consider the case in which a patient with a ruptured aortic 
aneurysm is rushed to the operating theatre. “The anaesthetist knows the patient’s chances of 
survival are poor. Just as preoxygenation is about to begin, the distressed patient asks ‘I am 
going to be all right, aren’t I, doctor?” (Sokol 2007, 984). What should the unhopeful 
anesthetists reply? If she “tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth”, then she 
might increases the patient’s stress-levels, hence hindering the attempts to save her life. If, 
instead, she replies, “You will be OK!” she would tell a lie. Should the anesthetist be honest? 
Or should we conclude that clinicians ought not to be honest whenever the difference 
between truth telling and lying may turn into the difference between life and death? 
 
 In clinical settings, however, moral dilemmas about truth telling do not always concern 
patient’s wellbeing–at least not directly. Consider the case in which an oncologist must 
disclose to the parents that their only son has suddenly passed away during the night. Upon 
hearing the sad new, the mother asks, “Doc, at least, was he in pain?”. Sadly, the oncologist 
knows that the answer is affirmative but, to spare further and unnecessary suffering to the 
parents, he replies, “No, we sedated him; he just fell asleep”. Is this benevolent lie morally 
permissible? Does clinicians’ duty of veracity entail that they should always negotiate between 
truthfulness and its consequences? Or does it entail that they should always be truthful and be 
ready to help others to cope with the truth in the best and humane way possible?  
 
 Moreover, while all the above questions regard dramatic scenarios, part of the 
difficulty in exploring the nature of clinicians’ duty of truth telling derives from its ubiquity in 
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ordinary situations. Doctors, like everybody else, must often decide over issues of veracity that 
are perhaps less momentous, and yet equally complex from a moral point of view. Consider 
this case, in which the provision of an inert placebo leads to the following dilemma: 
 
CG is an 89-year-old female nursing home resident with carcinoma of the breast […] GC 
believes her cancer has spread to her bones despite evidence of the contrary. During the 
admission process, the hospice nurse noted that GC was taking “Cebocap” for pain, 
which was written by her primary care provider. The nurse was unfamiliar with this 
medication and looking it up found that it contains “no active pharmaceuticals”–that is, it 
is a placebo. The patient states, “I can’t live without my pain medication”, stating that is 
quite efficacious for her bone pain. In the hall, the patient’s daughters tell the nurse that 
they know their mother is taking a placebo and do not want it changed. Nor do they want 
their mother told. 
 
 
 Should the hospice nurse tell the patient that she is taking a placebo? On the one 
hand, she knows that the patients and her caregivers are fully satisfied with her current regime; 
on the other hand, instead, she fears that patient’s autonomy is threatened by the 
administration of the deceptive and inert pill (Baumrucker et al.  2011, 284). This dilemma is 
further complicated by a series of new researches on placebo effects that suggest that there is 
a chance for this patient to experience real pain if she has sufficiently strong expectations in 
this sense (Colloca et al. 2008). If the doctor withdraws the placebo, CG is likely to be in real 
pain, and this would require the doctor to prescribe her real analgesics with all their real side 
effects. Hence, should the doctor tell the truth about the placebo or not? Is the “white lie” 
associated with the administration of deceptive placebos ever justifiable in clinical contexts? 
 
  As Bok (1978) noted, although we are to some extent all familiar with duplicity in our 
everyday and public life, the morality of truth telling is elusive, and sometimes it can be very 
difficult to decide what we ought to do. Moral dilemmas about veracity are even more 
problematic in clinical contexts, where the choice between truthfulness and falsehood may 
become the choice between life and death, compassion and cruelty, relief and suffering. Do 
clinicians have a duty to tell the truth? And if so, what should clinicians do when this duty 
conflicts with their other obligations of beneficence and nonmaleficence? Is benevolent 
deception ever permissible in clinical medicine? And if so, how can it be morally justified? 
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(ii) Objectives, summary of the main claims, and plan of the work  
 
The objective of this work is that of elaborating a well-crafted theory of how we ought to 
think about clinicians’ duty of truth telling in clinical contexts. This theory aims at satisfying 
two general desiderata. First, it must provide clinicians with a set of theoretical tools useful to 
identify and analyze all the different moral dilemmas that may arise in relation to clinicians’ 
duty of veracity. Second, this theory must provide clinicians with an adequate set of theoretical 
resources to handle and possibly resolve these moral dilemmas, hence deciding what ought to 
be done in each specific case. Mine is thus essentially a theoretical endeavor: although I 
occasionally discuss empirical studies, I do so only to support or specify the main claims that I 
articulate in the form of a series of logically concatenated, and hopefully correct, arguments.  
 
 Throughout this dissertation I draw extensively from examples in oncology. While the 
following account may be applied to other areas of clinical medicine, oncology provides a 
vantage point for elaborating a normative theory of clinical truth telling for two 
complementary reasons. First, oncologists face on a daily basis an ample range of moral 
dilemmas about issues of veracity and falsehood. Any theory of truth telling that serves well 
the needs of oncologists will also serve well the needs of all other medical professionals. 
Second, historically oncology has been the area of medicine that has shaped the most public 
attitudes toward truth telling in medicine. It has been for oncology that the ethics of clinical 
truth telling has been first explored in depth; and it has been in oncological settings that 
researchers have first inquired to see whether public attitudes toward clinical truth telling were 
or not shifted in consequence of the rise of individual autonomy in bioethics (see 1.1).  
 
 This dissertation places itself within the field of clinical ethics, as it focuses squarely on 
the moral implications that truth telling and deception have in and for the doctor-patient 
relationship. While my view has implications also outside the domain of clinical medicine, in 
this dissertation I limit my analysis only to moral dilemmas arising in this latter context. Thus, 
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I do not discuss–at least not directly–the moral implications of truth telling and dishonesty in 
research and public health ethics. Also, I do not discuss other issues that, while legitimately 
belonging to medical ethics, would have extended too much the breadth of my inquiry. These 
other issues include–among other things–patients’ obligations of truth telling toward doctors; 
clinicians’ obligation of veracity toward scientific institutions and insurance companies; and 
the ethics of scientific fraud or misconduct.  
 
 In the following pages I defend two main claims. First, I contend that other accounts 
in medical ethics have severe shortcomings that might lead clinicians to evaluate the moral 
permissibility of a deceptive act in suboptimal and biased ways. Second, I identify the source 
of these theoretical and practical limitations in the way in which other account under-theorize 
the morality of deception in medicine. As I hope to demonstrate, without a thorough 
understanding of the morality of deception and truth telling in general it is not possible to 
elaborate a satisfactory account of clinician’s duty of veracity in clinical medicine.  
 
 Unlike other accounts, in what follows I combine theoretical tools from medical ethics 
and moral philosophy to elaborate an “exceptionalist”, “balanced”, and “procedural” view of 
the moral permissibility of clinical deception built around the concept of “public justification”.  
 
 This view is “exceptionalist” because it conceptualizes clinician’s obligation of veracity 
as a prima facie duty that allows for qualified exceptions; it is “balanced” because it recognizes 
in the preservation of patients’ trust and in the respect of patients’ autonomy two equally 
important concerns for evaluating the morality of a deceptive act; it is “procedural” because it 
indicates a three-tier process whereby clinicians can articulate their reasons in less biased ways; 
and, finally, it is grounded in the concept of “public justification” because it revolves on the 
idea that deception in clinical contexts is morally permissible only if those who are proposing 
it would be ready to hypothetically defend and actually reveal their deceptive act in public.  
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 This dissertation is divided in two parts. In the first one I set forth my answer to this 
general questions: Do clinicians have a duty to tell the truth to their patients? And if so, what 
does it mean for clinicians to respect this duty of veracity? This first part represents the 
theoretical core of this dissertation and is further divided in five chapters.  
 
 Chapter one introduces the view that clinicians have a prima facie duty of veracity in 
their professional communications. Here I synthetically reconstruct how honesty and veracity 
have emerged in contemporary biomedical ethics, analysing four classical arguments about 
clinicians’ duty of veracity. I then propose to conceptualize this duty as a prima facie duty 
composed of two prima facie obligations: the duty not to lie and deceive, and the duty to 
inform patients in order to respect their individual autonomy. 
 
 In chapter two I explore different ways in which clinicians can violate these prima facie 
obligations by deceiving, lying, and keeping someone in the dark, discussing whether these 
different ways of being dishonest have intrinsically different moral weights.  
 
 In chapter three I inquire into the reasons why deception is prima facie wrong in 
medicine. Here I analyze two arguments according to which deception is prima facie wrong 
because it disrespects patients’ autonomy and because it threatens patients’ trust. Then, I 
clarify the relationship between these two rationales, arguing that they both provide necessary 
conditions for having a meaningful therapeutic relationship. Finally, I introduce and discuss 
the moral phenomenon of the “discrepancy of the perspectives”, that is, our tendency to 
differently appraise the moral implications of the same deceptive act depending on which of 
the two perspectives we assume: the one of the deceiver or the one of the deceived. 
 
  In chapter four I analyze the limits of other accounts that have been elaborated to 
deal with the moral implications of deception in clinical medicine. Here I explain why all 
positions based on a categorical ban of deceptive practices are unsatisfactory, and why the 
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dominant perspective in today medical ethics–i.e. Beauchamp and Childress’s “justified hard 
paternalism”–is inadequate if applied to moral dilemmas over issues of clinical deception.  
 
 Finally, in chapter five, I advance my proposal that deception in clinical settings is 
ethically justifiable in exceptional cases, provided that the following conditions are met: that 
other truthful courses of action have been ruled out; that the proponent would be ready to 
defend her conduct in public; and that the deceptive act is publicly disclosed. Whenever these 
conditions are in place, I argue, benevolent deception may be morally permissible. 
 
 In the second part I apply and further extend the theoretical framework previously 
elaborated to determine how clinicians’ prima facie obligation of veracity ought to be specified 
in the light of new discoveries about placebo and nocebo effects. This second part is divided 
into two chapters. Chapter six discusses the ethics of deceptive placebos in clinical contexts. 
After providing a synthetic reconstruction of the main coordinates of the debate, I analyse a 
series of arguments that have been used to argue for or against the clinical use of deceptive 
placebos, finding them all wanting. I then explain why my perspective provides a better 
starting point to conceptualize the ethics of clinical placebos in clinical settings.  
 
 Finally, in chapter seven, I discuss the ethics of using doctor-patient communication in 
non-deceptive ways to modulate patients’ health-outcomes through placebo and nocebo 
effects. Here I introduce the concept of “therapeutic communication” (TC) and then I 
identify in veracity, helpfulness, and pragmatism three morally relevant coordinates for the ethics of 
TC. I conclude by presenting two cases in which the implementation of techniques of TC may 
grant clinicians with a low-risk and cost-effective way of providing superior care to patient 
without the need of resorting either to deception or to physical placebos. 
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Part I 
Veracity and Deception in Clinical Ethics 
 
 
 
It is commonly assumed that clinicians have a moral duty to tell the truth about patients’ 
diagnoses, prognoses, and the risks and benefits of the treatments they administer. However, 
even if one concedes that clinicians have a duty of veracity in their professional 
communications, one may still disagree on what counts as “deception” or “lying” in particular 
circumstances; on why dishonesty in medicine is morally blameworthy; on whether there are 
morally justifiable exceptions to the duty of veracity, and on how they can be identified. 
 
 In the first part of this dissertation I outline my theory that it is morally permissible 
for clinicians to make exceptions to their duty of veracity. While this position is per se not 
controversial, my proposal significantly differs from other accounts in two crucial respects. 
First, I combine theoretical tools from both medical ethics and moral philosophy with the aim 
of taking into account the morality of deception from a broader theoretical perspective. This 
approach, I maintain, allows for identifying both the theoretical limits of other positions as 
well as the possible strategies to overcome such limitations. 
 
 Second, my proposal requires that clinicians resorting to clinical deception ought to 
articulate their reasons not only at the level of their private consciousness–a process that is 
likely to lead to biased moral judgments–but also at others “levels of publicity”, asking which 
deceptive act, if any, would conceivably withstand a process of public justification. As I 
demonstrate in the next chapters, by applying this perspective it is possible to avoid many of 
the shortcomings hindering other accounts while at the same time allowing clinicians to take 
better moral judgments about whether deception is morally permissible in clinical contexts. 
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1.  Veracity as a Prima Facie  Duty 
 
 
 
 
It is always the best policy to speak the truth,  
unless, of course, you are an exceptionally good liar. 
Jerome K. Jerome 
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(1) Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the view that clinicians have a prima facie duty of veracity in their 
professional communications. Section (1.1) provides a synthetic reconstruction of how 
honesty and veracity have emerged in contemporary biomedical ethics. Then, section (1.2) 
discusses and refutes four classical arguments according to which clinicians’ duty of veracity 
(1.2.a) is unrealistic because the “whole truth” cannot be known, communicated and 
understood; ought to be limited because (1.2.b) patients do not want to know the truth or 
(1.2.c) they can be harmed by the truth; (1.2.d) should be absolute because lies and deception 
are always morally wrong. Next, section (1.3) introduces Ross’s concept of prima facie duty, 
while section (1.4) proposes to conceptualize clinicians’ obligation of veracity as a prima facie 
duty composed of a prima facie obligation not to lie and deceive; and of a prima facie obligation 
to inform patients as to respect their individual autonomy.  
 
 
(1.1) Deception and veracity in medical ethics: from paternalism to autonomy 
 
Honesty, veracity and truthfulness are very recent additions to medical ethics. Traditionally, 
medicine has been focused on beneficence and non-maleficence. On the classical view, words 
had the power to increase and alleviate the suffering of patients just like physical and 
pharmacological interventions. Accordingly, their provision was equally disciplined by a 
commitment to “help and do not harm”. In those cases in which the truth was judged 
unbearable, too distressing or in conflict with healing, physicians and healers were usually 
permitted–and often expected–to act paternalistically. For the greatest part of the history of 
medicine, thus, untruthfulness, concealment, and benevolent deception were considered 
legitimate tools of the healing arts on a par with physical remedies.  
 
 It is therefore unsurprising that ethical, legal and deontological codes have ignored 
truthfulness and veracity until a few decades ago. A drastic change occurred after the 
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Nuremberg trial, when the principle of respect for autonomy was introduced to protect 
persons from medical abuses and exploitation (Faden and Beauchamp 1986). With the 
following emergence of informed consent as the new legal and ethical hallmark of the patient-
doctor relationship, truthfulness became a pivotal requirement in medical settings (Bok 1978, 
233).  
 
 The rise of truthfulness and autonomy in contemporary biomedical ethics has 
proceeded at different paces in different cultural contexts: in countries centered on family and 
community values like Japan and Italy the paternalistic practice of withholding a cancer 
diagnosis has remained unquestioned until very recently;1 in the Anglo-American context, 
instead, changes have been more dramatic. A 1961 study found that 88% of American 
physicians avoided disclosing a cancer diagnosis (Oken 1961); in 1979–after only eighteen 
years–another study found that only 2% of doctors declared to withhold information from 
their patients (Novack et al. 1979).2 
 
 Ethical codes and guidelines have been less reactive in incorporating explicit 
references to veracity. The Hippocratic Oath does not mention an obligation to veracity; nor 
does the 1948 Declaration of Geneva by the World Medical Association (WMA). The 
American Medical Association (AMA) Principles of Medical Ethics did not contain a 
reference to honesty until its 1980 revision. Today, however, deceiving and lying to patients is 
                                                   
1 The global shift from a paternalistic model centred on beneficence to one centred on the respect of individual 
autonomy is yet to be completed. For example, in many countries clinicians can still withhold relevant 
information for paternalistic reasons, and the so-called “therapeutic privilege” is still a frequently used option. In 
Italy, for example, the 1989 Deontological Code stated, “the physician might evaluate, specifically in relationship 
with the patients’ reactions, the opportunity not to reveal to the patient or to mitigate a serious or lethal 
prognosis” (Codice Deontologico, 27). Similarly, in 2003, the Brazilian Code of Medical Ethics stated that “it is 
prohibited for the physician not to let the patient know the diagnosis, outcomes and risks and aims of the 
treatment, except when direct communication to them may cause harm, and one must in this case make the 
communication to the legal persons in charge” (Da Silva et al. 2003). These differences are likely to depend on 
cultural variables. As noted by Surbone (2006, 945), in family and community-centred societies “the world 
autonomy was typically perceived as being synonymous with isolation rather than freedom”. For an informative 
account of the evolution of public attitudes towards truth telling see also Surbone et al. (2004).  
2 Importantly, in 1973 in the US passed the Patient Bill of Right, in which it was stated, “the patient has the right 
to obtain from his physician complete current information concerning his diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis in 
terms the patient can reasonably be expected to understand” (American Hospital Association 1973, 41; quoted in 
Jackson 2001, 23). 
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considered unethical because it threatens the professional and social status of medicine, it 
compromises the bond of trust between doctors and patients, and it infringes on the respect 
for patients’ individual autonomy and right to informed consent (Beauchamp and Childress 
2009; Bok 1978; Jackson 2001). Significantly, the WMA code of medical ethics now states that 
a physician shall “deal honestly with patients and colleagues, and report to the appropriate 
authorities those physicians who […] engage in fraud or deception” (2006). In many countries, 
the use of benevolent deception may now lead to lawsuits for medical malpractice.  
 
 Thus, today it is assumed that clinicians ought to be honest in their professional 
communications with patients. Does this mean that lies and deception always morally wrong 
in medicine? Are there excusable exceptions? To begin answering these questions we shall 
now first look at four classical arguments concerning clinicians’ duty of truth telling. 
 
 
(1.2) Challenging the view that clinicians have a duty of veracity 
 
To understand what clinicians’ obligation of veracity entails, in this section we shall analyze 
four classical arguments that have been used to hold that such duty should (i) be abandoned 
because the “whole truth” cannot be known, communicated and understood; limited because 
(ii) patients’ do not want to know the truth or (iii) they could be harmed by the truth; or (iv) 
made absolute because lies and deception are always morally wrong. Charting the limits of 
these classical arguments will help setting the stage for the subsequent exploration of the 
morality of deception in clinical medicine.  
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(1.4.a) First argument: clinicians cannot tell the truth because the truth cannot be told 
 
The first argument is that an obligation of veracity entails insurmountable epistemological 
difficulties: in order to have a duty of truth telling–it is argued–one must first be able to know 
what the “truth” is and to fully communicate it. Translated in the terms of contemporary 
epistemology, to “know what the truth is” amounts to have either a satisfactory theory and/or 
a criterion for recognizing the truth, and the capacity to know it. However, since it is 
impossible to know what the “truth” is, then it is absurd to impose on anyone a duty of 
veracity. The following quote, taken from an influential 1935 article, perfectly summarizes this 
argument and its implications for the doctor-patient communication:  
 
Above all, remember that it is meaningless to speak of telling the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth to a patient. It is meaningless because 
it is impossible–a sheer impossibility. […] Since telling the truth is 
impossible, there can be no sharp distinction between what is true and what 
is false. 
 […] Far older than the precept, “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth,” is another that originates within our profession, that has 
always been the guide of the best physicians, and, if I may venture in 
prophecy, will always remains so: So far as possible, do not harm. You can 
do harm by the process that is quaintly called telling the truth. You can do 
harm by lying. […] But try to do as little harm as possible (Henderson 1935, 
quoted in Bok 1978, 12). 
 
 The conclusion of this argument is that doctors could not–and thus should not–have a 
duty of veracity toward patients. This argument is based on two assumptions. The first is that 
a duty of truth telling presupposes that clinicians can effectively know what “the truth” is; the 
second is that by “the truth” what is meant is a state of complete and certain information. 
Despite its philosophical tone, this argument points to very practical difficulties. It can hardly 
be disputed that one can know, communicate or understand the “whole truth”. However, 
from this conclusion it does not follow that imposing on clinicians a moral obligation of 
veracity is unrealistic. In fact, this argument is based on two fundamental misunderstandings. 
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 First, it confounds clinicians’ duty to provide accurate and complete information to 
patients with an unrealistic duty to provide complete and certain information. But, of course, 
physicians are under no obligation of disclosing to patients every irrelevant detail concerning 
their clinical situation and care (e.g. the color of their bandages), nor of being open about 
everything that is passing in their minds, (e. g. their musical preferences).3 Rather, clinicians 
have an obligation to disclose information that can be useful to improve patient’s care and are 
needed to respect patients’ autonomy.  
 
 In this sense, to be “valid” patients’ consent should be “sufficiently capacitated, 
informed and voluntary consent” (Eyal 2011), not absolutely or completely informed. As 
Beauchamp and Childress (2009, 101) observers, “to restrict adequate decision making by 
patients and research subjects to the ideal of fully or completely autonomous decision making 
strips their acts of any meaningful place in the practical world, where people actions are rarely, 
if ever, fully autonomous”. On each occasion, information should be tailored to match 
patients’ specific needs, responses, and views. This can be challenging; but no challenge 
provides a justifiable excuse for doctors not to engage in truthful communication (Bok 1978). 
Not matter how hard communication and mutual understanding may appear, clinicians must 
always try to convey to patients adequately complete and relevant information.4  
 
 Second, the first argument mistakenly conflates truth with truthfulness (Bok 1978, 6-13). 
As an epistemic concept–and in a very simplified sense–“truth” refers to our knowledge and 
                                                   
3 Clinicians have no duty of absolute openness or candour (Jackson 2001; Beauchamp and Childress 2009). 
Sometimes doctors must withhold information to protect confidentiality and privacy. The attitude to be 
completely open about one’s thoughts, feelings, preferences, etc. is rather to be conceptualized as part of the 
virtue of candour. For a discussion of this distinction, see Jackson (2001, 35-36) and Bok (1989).  
4 Furthermore, this argument is frequently taken as the starting point to argue that a commitment toward truth 
telling entails two unsolvable difficulties. The first is that the “whole truth” cannot be communicated. In fact, 
telling “the whole truth” about anything (e.g. a medical diagnosis) would imply a description of every detail, no 
matter how small or insignificant, about something arguably connected with everything else. Clearly, this task is 
impossible because it would require an infinite amount of time. The second issue is that patients cannot 
understand the whole truth. Medical information is too technical and complex to be understood by patients who 
are emotionally stressed, scientifically illiterate or cognitively impaired. This poses a genuine difficulty on how 
physicians can fulfil their obligation of truth telling as well as a challenge for the theory of informed consent 
(Joffe and Truog 2010). In order to be valid an act of consent needs to be informed. Bu since it is impossible to 
fully inform someone about something–it is argued–then no consent can ever be fully valid.4 
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beliefs. As a normative concept, instead, truthfulness refers to our intention to communicate to 
others what we believe is true or false. The two concepts are necessarily related and yet 
distinct. It is possible to communicate false information in a perfectly truthful way (e.g. 
someone stating that “the earth is flat” in the 13th century). Likewise, it is possible to be 
truthful about one’s own ignorance (“I do not know what is your condition”) or uncertainty 
(“I am not sure when it will heal”). Truthfulness as a normative concept is thus logically 
independent from truth as an epistemic concept. Hence, one can debate over the moral 
implications of truthfulness without first solving the philosophical quandaries related to the 
concept of “truth”.  
 
 Therefore, the first argument is based on two fundamental misunderstandings. Even if 
the “whole truth” cannot be known, communicated and understood, clinicians may still have a 
duty of veracity. This duty should not be confounded with an absolute duty to inform. While 
in many cases fulfilling an obligation of veracity implies fulfilling also an obligation to inform 
(and vice versa), this should not necessarily be the case. Thus, in order to justify the view that 
doctors do not have duty of truthfulness, one cannot resort to the argument that the old 
precept of telling “the truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth” imposes insurmountable 
epistemic and practical obstacles.  
 
 
(1.4.b) Second argument: patients do not want to be told negative truths 
 
The second argument is that most patients do not want to be told bad news. Ptacek and 
Eberhardt (1996) define a “bad news” in medicine as information that “results in a cognitive, 
behavioral or emotional deficit in the person receiving the news that persists for some time 
after the news is received”. Indeed, medicine is fraught with potential bad news, especially in 
areas such as obstetrics, pediatrics, intensive care, and oncology. A cancer diagnosis is the 
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paradigmatic example of a bad news that patients may not want to be told. In these cases–the 
argument goes–fulfilling an obligation of truthfulness would run against patients’ preferences 
and would thus not respect their autonomy. Thus, the obligation of veracity should be limited 
only to those cases in which it is safe to assume that patients would want to know the truth. In 
all other cases it is better to let the physician decide what can be disclosed and to whom it 
should be disclosed (e.g. a family member instead of the patient).5 
 
 This consequentialist argument is premised on the assumption that patients do not 
want to know bad truths. Obviously, people do not have univocal preferences toward truth 
telling in medicine (Surbone 2004; Surbone et al. 2006). Thus, the claim underpinning the 
second argument is that, in general, the majority of patients do not want to receive bad news. If 
this were true, then it would be questionable to adopt veracity as clinician’s default attitude. 
But is this the case? In the last decades researchers have conducted a series empirical studies 
and qualitative surveys which clearly indicate that now the vast majority of people prefer to 
know the truth even when it is extremely bad. The data are especially telling for oncology. 
Increasingly, people express the preference to be told any kind of medical information, 
including cancer diagnoses. For example In a study of acute ill patient in central Israel, 
researches found that “most patients did want information about a serious diagnosis: three 
quarters of the patients studied preferred to be told the truth if they had cancer [78%], and 
86% preferred to be told the told of a severe degenerative disease with an adverse prognosis” 
(Schattner and Tal 2002, 67). These and other studies underscore the global trend of a more 
favorable attitude toward truth telling in medicine (Surbone 2004). 
 
 Thus, although personal and cross-cultural differences may still persist, today it seems 
that the majority of patients want to be told the truth even when the truth is bad. These 
studies support the conclusion that doctors withholding or distorting information on the 
assumption that patients do not want to know them would do more harm than good. 
                                                   
 
 24 
Consequently, it is reasonable for physicians to adopt as a default attitude that of being honest 
with their patients even in the case of the breaking of bad news. 
 
 
(1.4.c) Third argument: telling negative truths may harm patients  
 
The third argument is that veracity may harm patients. Receiving a cancer diagnosis may result 
in severe emotional, psychological and even psychical distress. Accordingly, the third 
argument holds that clinicians must not disclose the truth because the truth may have severe 
consequences for patients’ health and wellbeing. In these cases, recurring to benevolent 
deception or concealment is morally acceptable. This argument is similar to the previous one 
because: it aims at limiting the application of clinician’s obligation to veracity to a class of 
cases, rather than arguing against it; it identifies in this class of with the one of the provision 
of bad news; and it takes a consequentialist perspective by assuming that in the majority of the 
cases breaking bad news causes more harm than good to patients. 
 
 The main reply to this argument points to the difficulties in predicting future 
consequences. As Samuel Johnson said “I deny the lawfulness of telling a lie to a sick man for 
the fear of alarming him […] you are to tell the truth […] you are not sure what effects your 
telling him that he is in danger may have” (Boswell 1997, 89; quoted in Beauchamp and 
Childress 2009, 289). However, evidence does not support the conclusion that veracity causes 
more harm than good. Given current attitudes toward truth telling, if the claim that truth-
disclosure leads to severe harm in the majority (or a significant number) of patients were true, 
then we would expect to observe a huge number of these cases.  
 
 Despite a few instances in which truth telling may indeed results in severe harm, in the 
vast majority of the scenarios this seems to be not the case. While the initial shock of receiving 
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a bad news may produce an intense emotional reaction, these effects tend to fade over the 
medium and long term. With enough time and support, most of the people seem able to cope 
even with the most terrible news (Kübler-Ross 1975). Also, the obligations of veracity and to 
inform patients do not imply that communication should avoid taking the appropriate 
measures to minimize the negative impact of bad news. Physicians may adopt different 
techniques to be truthful without incurring in the iatrogenic effects of “truth-dumping”.6 For 
example, truth can be revealed gradually or in staged way.7 Moreover, sometimes it is not the 
sudden confrontation with a bad truth that harms, but the slow and corrosive presence of an 
ongoing suspicion–as Tolstoy reminds us in The Death of Ivan Ilych. Doubting that doctors, 
nurses and family members are lying about one’s critical clinical condition may be more 
destructive than being exposed to the truth once every adequate precaution has been taken.8 
 
 Second, veracity may have positive consequences that outweigh the negative ones. A 
growing series of empirical and qualitative studies suggests that, despite the initial burden, 
people who are told the truth have better outputs as for satisfaction, compliance etc. (Surbone 
2006). Third, there are other independent reasons for why people may want to know the truth, 
even when it is bad. In the case of a lethal cancer diagnosis, for example, being told the truth 
allows patients to come to terms with their condition, to prepare for their death, and to spend 
some quality-time with their loved ones. These are all legitimate reasons for which people may 
want to be told the truth regardless of its consequences.9  
                                                   
6 Bok (1978, xxiii) attributes this term to the psychiatric Will Gaylin, who commented, “Advocates of greater 
tolerance for lying sometimes ask what the world would be like if we told nothing but the truth without cease. 
Surely, they ask, judicious ling has to be seen as preferable? To pose the question thus is to assume that we 
operate, in this world, with only two alternatives: lying or constant, no-holds-barred truth telling. Yet there is 
something peculiarly wizened and humourless in such a supposition. It leaves no room for discretion, for the 
ability to discern what is and is not intrusive and injurious while navigating in and between the worlds of personal 
and shared experience. Part of the learning to deal respectfully with children as with adults is to become aware of 
all the ways of doing so honestly yet without ‘truth-dumping’”. 
7 For an account and an example of “staged truth telling” see Beauchamp and Childress (2009, 291). 
8 Another possible reply may follow the deontological argument for which patients’ right to truthfulness is 
grounded on a different sort of entitlements related to the respect of their personal dignity and autonomy. We 
shall return to consider this deontological approach to clinical truth telling in the next chapters.  
9 In the past doctors used to have a different opinion on this matter. Consider for example what John Gregory 
(1725-73) said concerning exceptional situations: “it would be very wrong to acquaint the patient that he was 
really on the point of death, as this would hasten his death so much the sooner, now this may be a very 
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 Therefore, the claim that breaking bad news to patients is likely to cause more harm 
than good is unfounded. While there are certainly harmful consequences deriving from 
breaking bad news to patients, it seems that in most of the cases recurring to appropriate 
techniques of information disclosure can adequately prevent or mitigate irremediable harm. 
Moreover, the positive consequences of being told the truth may sometimes outweigh the 
negative ones, while the withholding of the truth may harm in the form of a corrosive 
suspiciousness. Lastly, there are also compelling non-consequentialist reasons for why patients 
may prefer to be told the truth. Therefore, unless convincing evidence exists that disclosing 
bad news causes more harm than good in the majority of the cases, we shall refute the third 
consequentialist arguments against clinicians’ obligation of veracity. 
 
 
(1.4.d) Fourth argument: lies and deception are always immoral 
 
The analysis of the first three arguments reveals that lies and deception may often do more 
harm than good. Hence, other things being equal, there are good reasons to maintain that 
veracity should be clinicians’ default attitude in professional contexts. The next logical step is 
to ask whether lying and deception are justifiable in certain cases or are instead always wrong. 
The fourth argument takes this latter option, and maintains that lies and deception are 
immoral without exception. On this view, clinicians’ duty of veracity is an absolute duty: 
clinicians should never deceive or lie to patients. 
 
 Invariably, every view supporting a categorical prohibition of lying must deal with a 
variant of the “murderer at the door” example. Image that a murderer–who is looking for a 
person that you are sheltering in your home–, knock at your front door and asks: “Is X in 
                                                                                                                                                          
important time for to acquaint his friends, as some minutes longer in life, might do a deal of service to the family, 
therefore a lie in this case may be justifiable” (McCullough 1998, 75, quoted in Jackson 2001, 14). 
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your house?”. If you endorse a categorical prohibition to lie, then you should answer “Yes”.10 
As a result, your friend will likely be killed. But how can this choice be morally justified? Why 
should we prefer not to lie in such critical circumstances given the terrible consequences that 
would ensue?  
 
 While it is tempting to refute the fourth argument simply as “unreasonable” and 
“absurd”, reconstructing its background is important for two reasons. First, it helps to 
illuminate certain aspects of the morality of lying and deception. Second, it is useful because 
the claims that are still used to defend the deceptive use of placebos in medicine bear striking 
similarities with the rhetorical strategies that have been used in the past to qualify the 
categorical prohibition not to lie in the face of the “murderer at the door” example. 
 
 Within the Western tradition, the view that one shall never lie dates back to Biblical 
times (Bok 1978). The moral problems of lies have occupied generations of theologians 
because some biblical figures–God included–seem to deceive other to achieve their objectives. 
How should, then, the ninth commandment “not to lie” be understood? Is there a difference 
between a lie told to injure someone and one told to save 1000 innocent children?11  
                                                   
10 Of course, there are other options besides responding to the direct question of the “murderer at the door”. 
For example one could remain silent, or provide only evasive questions. Kant (1949, 346-50), for example, in 
defence of his approach, does discuss some of the consequences of telling a lie or the truth at the “murderer at 
the door example”. For the sake of the argument, I shall not consider these other possibilities here. 
11 The following story perfectly exemplifies the kind of examples used in moral philosophy to introduce similar 
dilemmas: “In a little frame cottage just of Milwaukee Avenue, the Jewish community on Friday knocked a tiny 
bit off its debt to Zofia Kukla, Chicago’s version of Oscar Schindler […] During the Holocaust, she hid several 
Jewish families as Nazi herded Poland’s Jews to the gas chambers of Auschwitz and Treblinka. Her own family, 
of course, was imperilled by her actions. ‘What I did, I did only because I couldn’t live with the thought that 
someone else’ death could be on my hands,’ Kukla said. ‘They still come to me in the night, the people I couldn’t 
save’. When the Nazis occupied Poland during World War II, Jews were rounded up in the rural areas and 
distributed as slave-labourers to local peasants […] But in mid-war, having established the extermination camps, 
the Nazis issued new orders that Jewish farmhands were to be surrendered. Many of Kukla’s neighbours in a tiny 
village near a city of Bialystok complied, but not Zofia and her husband, Franceszek. At gunpoint, they rescued a 
Jewish family from Nazis. Other refugees showed up at the Kukla’s small farm, until they were sheltering about a 
dozen in space hastily dug under the floor of their dairy barn. The Germans suspected as much, and a Polish 
collaborator brought Nazi troops to Kukla’s house, even as two additional refugees were crouching in the attic. A 
German officer put a gun at Zofia’s head, but she denied hiding Jews. Then he took a crucifix from the wall and 
told her to swear upon it. ‘I know it’s a sin to lie upon a cross’, Kukla said. ‘But I know that human life is more 
important’. […] several of her guests had died from the privation and disease bred in their cramped quarters. But 
other survived” (Grossman 1995; quoted in Carson 2010, 86). 
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 St. Augustine’s reply to these questions set the standards for centuries. According to 
St. Augustine, lies are always culpable. By saying one thing while “having in the heart” 
another, liars subvert the very purpose of language that God donated to mankind. Hence 
every falsehood is a sin. Yet, not every sin is equally culpable, because some are more culpable 
than others. Augustine provided an eightfold divisions that ranked lies from those more 
culpable (lies told in the teaching of religion) to the less culpable (lies that injures not one, and 
profits someone in saving him from defilement of the body).12 Lies are all sins, but some are 
less serious than others, because they are done with a beneficial intention and have beneficial 
effects.  
 
 Under this view, however, lying to the murderer at the door would still be a sin. As 
such, it must be avoided and it can never be excused or recommended. To circumvent this 
conclusion, in the following centuries three strategies have been attempted to further qualify 
St. Augustine’s theory.13 The first, proposed by Aquinas in the Summa Theologica, has been that 
of allowing for a class of lies to be pardonable. Building on Augustine eightfold distinction, 
Aquinas distinguished three kinds of lies: the officious lies, which are told to save someone from 
injury; the jocose lies, which are told in jests; and the mischievous lies, which are told to hurt 
someone. According to Aquinas, only the latter kind cannot be pardoned. The interpretation 
of this doctrine has led to further controversies: once the categorical ban is removed, it has 
been argued, there is no way of stopping lies from spreading.14 
 
                                                   
12 St. Augustine’s complete classification of lies is as follows: (i) lies told in teaching religion; (ii) lies which hurt 
someone and help nobody; (iii) lies which hurt someone but benefit someone else; (iv) lies told for the pleasure 
of deceiving someone; (v) lies told to please others in conversation; (vi) lies which hurt nobody and benefit 
someone; (vii) lies which hurt nobody and benefit someone by keeping open the possibility of their repentance; 
(viii) lies which hurt nobody and protect a person from physical 'defilement' (St. Augustine 1952). 
13 In reconstructing the history of this argument I follow the excellent account provided by Bok (1978). 
However, I disagree with her on the way in which we shall reply to Kant’s argument. While she maintains that 
Kant’s argument should be rejected because it leads to unsound conclusions, or because it has never been 
advocated without further qualifications, I think that it is possible to reply by taking seriously the challenge of the 
categorical imperative, hence arguing that a world in which the procedural methodology that I will defend is 
thought as a universal maxim of conduct is not necessarily contradictory; see chapter 5. 
14 In a letter to Cosentius, St. Augustine noted, “little by little and bit by bit this evil will grow and by gradual 
accessions will slowly increase until it becomes such a mass of wicked lies that it will be utterly impossible to find 
any means of resisting such a plague grown to huge proportions through small additions. Hence it has been most 
providentially written: ‘He that contemneth small things, shall fall by little and little’” (included in Bok 1978, 254). 
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 The second strategy was the one of “mental reservations”. St. Augustine’s defined a lie 
as the telling of something while having something else in one’s heart. This definition is based 
on the difference between what is stated and what is known.15 One can state things in speech 
as well as in thought. However, this difference matters only for humans: God knows 
everything and thus for Him it is irrelevant whether one states a falsity in words or thought. 
Accordingly, one can avoid lying to God by “adding” a proper qualification in his own mind 
to what he has just said. In the middle age, these techniques of “mental reservation” were used 
to take oaths or in court, where people swore on God’s name and expected to be punished if 
they had lied. But “mental reservations” can be used also medicine: if a patient with a cancer 
diagnosis asks, “Doc, are my lab tests normal?”, a doctor can confidently reply, “Yes, it is 
everything OK” and than add in his own mind the mental reservation “… for a patient who 
has your type of cancer”. As noted by Bok, and however strange it may sound, as late as in 
1968, a Catholic book of medical ethics still recommended the practice of mental reservations 
to complement the use of benevolent deception (1978). 
 
 A third strategy to qualify the categorical prohibition of lying was the one advocated, 
among others, by Grotius. Grotius defined a lie as a falsehood told to someone who has a 
legitimate right to the truth.16 On this view, a falsehood is not morally culpable whenever it is 
told to someone who has not such a right. In fact, not everyone has a right to the truth: one 
can lose it because he has harmful intentions toward others (the murderer in the example); 
because it is socially agreed that he has no such right (e.g. children or insane persons); or 
because he has voluntarily waived it, as in the case of two persons contracting at the market. 
According to this view, it could be moral to say a falsehood to a murderer in the example. In 
fact, because of his bad intentions, in these circumstances the murdered has no right to 
truthfulness, and so one could say a falsehood without saying a lie. 
                                                   
15 St. Augustine, in his essay “Against Lying”, however, defines a lie as a falsehood told with the intent to deceive; 
see St. Augustine (1952). 
16 Grotius did not speak of a “right to truth” but of a right to “the liberty of judgment”, i.e. to expect from other 
truthful communication as to being able to decide. See Hugo Grotius (1952, chapter 1). 
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 After Grotius, Immanuel Kant heavily influenced the debate on the morality of lies. 
Criticizing the view advanced by the French philosopher Benjamin Constant–which was 
similar to Grotius’s–, Kant objected that “truth is not a possession the right to which can be 
granted to one and denied to another [….] the duty of truthfulness […] makes no distinction 
between persons to whom one has a duty and to whom one can exempt himself from this 
duty; rather, it is an unconditional duty which holds in all circumstances” (Kant 1949, 249). 
According to Kant, “by a lie a man throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a 
man” (Kant 1949). Like St. Augustine, Kant’s viewed lies as always culpable. Differently from 
St. Augustine, however, Kant does not distinguish between lies that are less culpable than 
others. Irrespectively from their consequences, on Kant’s deontological view “Truthfulness is 
statements which cannot be avoided is the formal duty of an individual to everyone, however 
great may be the disadvantage accruing to himself or to another” (Kant 1949, 254).  
 
 By saying that “truthfulness is a formal duty” Kant meant two things. The first is that 
such duty can potentially be generalized without contradiction as a universal maxim of 
conduct. Following O’Neill’s (2002) interpretation of Kant’s categorical imperative, this is 
tantamount to image a world in which everyone tells always the truth, and asking whether this 
world can be imagined without logical contradiction.17 Though only a few would desire to live 
in a world where everyone always tells the truth, this does not lead into contradiction.18  
 
 Of course, always telling the truth would lead to many consequences, but there seems 
to be nothing logically wrong in hypothesizing a world where everyone is honest. 
                                                   
17 Kant gave several different formulations of the categorical imperative (CI). The second formulation of the CI 
is that “we should not treat others just as means in themselves and not as ends” is equally famous, and influential, 
as the first. It should be noted, however, that Kant never said that we should never treat others like means, but 
only that we should never treat them only as means. The difference is crucial. For saying that we should treat 
other only as means implies that, to some extent, it is possible to see other as means to achieve our ends. For 
example, if you are waiting at the postal service for retiring a package, the person who would handle you that 
package is for you a “means” to achieve your goal (retiring the package). What we should not do in any case on 
Kant’s view, is to consider this person just a means and not also as an ends in her/himself; for only in this latter 
case we would not be dealing with a person at all. For a similar perspective see Jackson (2001) and Carson (2010). 
18 It should be noted that Kant does distinguish between a duty not to lie and a duty to tell everything. For 
example, while he argued that all lies are morally wrong, he was not against the keeping of secrets, on which he 
noted “No man in his true senses … is candid” (1979, 224, quoted in Jackson 2001, 46).  
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Contrariwise, image a world in which everyone lies. Since lies are told to gain some sort of 
advantage and control over others, in order to be effective they require the trust of others. 
Like parasites, lies can thrive only at the expenses of a trusting host. But if everybody lies all 
the time, then nobody will eventually trust anyone. And without trust, no lie can be believed. 
Hence, to elevate lying at the level of a general maxim of conduct is a self-defeating endeavor. 
Consequently, telling lies and deceiving others should not be part of our morality. In fact–and 
this is the second element–on Kant’s view every moral obligation is absolute. There cannot be 
a conflict of duties, because duties that pass the test of the categorical imperative cannot 
conflict with one another. Accordingly, “to be truthful (honest) in all declarations […] is a 
sacred and absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited by no expediency” (Kant 1949). 
 
 Kant’s argument provides the most powerful case for the categorical ban of all lies 
(and deceptive practices) in the history of moral philosophy. It has the merit of underscoring 
how unpleasant would be to live in a world where everyone is always ready to lie whenever the 
odds are in her favor. Certainly such world would not provide an ideal environment for 
medicine as a practice meant not only to foster patients’ health but also to respect their 
autonomy and dignity. It also empathizes the central role trust plays in everyday life and 
medicine, and how lies and deception might easily and irremediably jeopardize it. However, 
whenever it is taken in its original formulation, Kant’s deontological view is problematic, 
almost impossible to live by, and rarely (if ever) advocated as a sound perspective to be 
adopted in medical ethics without qualifications.19  
 
                                                   
19 I am not aware of anyone who is defending Kant’s approach on lying in contemporary ethics. There are, 
however, a few authors who have tried to elaborate a Kantian view which, in principle, can be applied also to 
biomedical contexts. For example, Korsgaard (1996) proposes an elaboration of Kant’s position according to 
which we should never lie without exception, because otherwise we would be treating others as pure means to 
our ends, rather than as ends in themselves. However, she argues that such duty holds just in “ideal situations”. 
When instead we are facing a “non-ideal situation”–e.g. if we are confronting something like the “murderer at the 
door”–then we can depart from this rule only insofar as doing so would restore the ideal conditions (for a 
criticism of this “double level theory” see Jackson 2001, 60-64). Notice how this position represents another 
way–“a Kantian way” indeed–of qualifying an absolute prohibition to avoid its counterintuitive consequences. 
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 In particular, the view that our duty to veracity should be absolute, contrasts with our 
current understanding of the goals of medicine and of medical ethics. Today we care both for 
the health of patients and for their dignity and autonomy as persons. For the greatest part of 
the history of medicine veracity has been considered entirely subordinate to beneficence. With 
the rise of autonomy, as we have seen, veracity has come to be recognized as a fundamental 
requisite of doctor-patient communications. However, this does not imply that the primary 
end of medicine has become that of fulfilling an obligation of veracity. Rather than replacing 
the obligation of beneficence with the one of veracity, the contemporary understanding of 
medical ethics is that the latter view ought to be considered as an expansion of the former 
one. The resulting plurality of duties inevitably leads to moral dilemmas. Taking the duty of 
veracity as absolute leads to counter-intuitive cases, which do not fit with our intuitive view of 
the goals of medicine. Consider the following example: 
 
He was 90 years old. As a young man he had been decorated for courage in battle, but as 
he got older his great fear was that he might one day develop cancer  
 […] A biopsy specimen of an ulcer on his lip confirmed squamous cell carcinoma. No 
need for surgery or admission to hospital. After a short course of radiotherapy it would 
heal, and probably never cause him any further trouble. "It’s not cancer, is it?", he asked, 
his eyes moist with tears. And emphatically, without the slightest hesitation or 
qualification (which would have been fatal to effective reassurance), I assured him that it 
was not. Was this a blatant, but some would say justifiable, lie? On the contrary, was it 
not the truth? He had what the medical profession calls cancer. He did not have what he 
meant by cancer. He did not have a shameful, painful, fatal disease that would soon 
spread. Or anything like it. For him it was more truthful to say that it was not cancer than 
it would have been to say that it was. 
 I do not believe that anyone, no matter how good a communicator and no matter how 
much time spent over it, could have told this man that it was cancer, but curable, without 
leaving him with a false impression. Would it not have been somewhat foolish and 
arrogant to have attempted, at this stage in this man’s life, to change his long-held view of 
what was meant by the word? Speaking to him in his own language (a mark of respect, 
not of paternalism) he did not have what he had always dreaded. He was not being 
shielded from the truth. He was being given the truth. Does firm, unhesitating, pragmatic 
common sense of this kind still have a place in medical practice? Or is it now becoming 
impossible given the current, rather rigid, unimaginative, time consuming, and sometimes 
self-defeating attempts to explain everything to everybody? (Brewin 1994: 1512). 
  
 Siding with the author, I maintain that the use of a lie or concealment in this case is 
ethically justifiable. In this situation, an absolute duty to veracity leads to an inhuman idea of 
medicine, one for which the respect to one’s duty is more important than caring for 
vulnerable people. There are situations in which clinician’s duty to beneficence should 
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override those of veracity. The crux of any account of the ethics of veracity in medicine is, of 
course, that of explaining why these cases are justifiable exceptions, and how can they be 
distinguished from other cases that are not. In order to clear this point, we need to look closer 
at why lying and deception are morally problematic in everyday life and in medicine. 
 
 
(1.3) Ross’s concept of prima fac ie  duty 
 
According to what we have seen so far, it is reasonable to hold that clinicians should adopt as 
their default attitude veracity rather than duplicity. Usually, in today medical ethics, this idea is 
further specified in the view that clinicians have a prima facie obligation of veracity (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2009; Carson 2010; Jackson 2001). This view is heavily informed by Ross’s 
proposal–advanced in his classical The Right and the Good–to distinguish between prima facie and 
actual duties. A prima facie duty is an obligation that must be fulfilled unless it conflicts, on a 
particular occasion, with an equal or stronger obligation (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 15; 
Ross 1930; Ross 1939).20 Thus, to say that clinicians have a prima facie obligation of veracity 
entails that, others things being equal, honesty and truthfulness are always to be preferred to 
lying, deception and malicious concealment.  
 
 This obligation, however, is not absolute because in some cases different prima facie 
obligations might legitimately conflict. For example, in the case of a police officer inquiring 
about a patient, the prima facie duty of veracity may conflicts with prima facie duty of protecting 
patients’ privacy. In these cases it arises a moral dilemma, and the series of reasons supporting 
each conflicting duty have to be specified and balanced one against the other to decide which 
one prevail in these circumstances (Beauchamp and Childress 2009). In these cases, Ross 
                                                   
20 In The Right and the Good, Ross states, “I suggest ‘prima facie duty’ or ‘conditional duty’ as a brief way of referring 
to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper) which an act as, in virtue of being of a 
certain kind (e.g. the keeping of a promise), of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the 
same time of another kind which is morally significant” (1930, 19-20). 
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stated that we have to determine our actual duty or obligation. Actual duties or obligations are 
those duties and obligations that we ought to perform after all things have been considered. 
 
 Throughout this dissertation I shall argue in favor of the view that clinicians have a 
prima facie duty of veracity. On this view, deception can be justifiable in exceptional cases. 
While this position is almost uncontroversial, there exists considerable debate on how it ought 
to be specified.21 For example, one may disagree on what counts as “deception” or “lying”; on 
why dishonesty in medicine is morally blameworthy; on how exceptions can be distinguished 
from the cases in which an obligation to veracity should be morally binding; and on how such 
exceptions ought to be justified. 
 
 
(1.4) Veracity as a prima fac ie  duty 
 
According to Beauchamp and Childress (2009, 288), veracity “refers to the comprehensive, 
accurate, and objective transmission of information, as well as to the way the professional 
fosters the patients’ or subject’s understanding”. This definition is too general and keeps 
implicit the relationship between the obligation of telling the truth and the obligation of 
providing necessary information to patients. 
 
 To reach a better definition, let us start by noting how the general commandment 
“Tell the truth!” is ambiguous and can be understood in two different senses (Bok 1978; 
                                                   
21 Not everyone agrees that clinicians have a prima facie duty of veracity. For example, Jackson (2001) takes a very 
different view, maintaining that doctors have an absolute duty not to lie, but that they have no duty, no even of a 
prima facie nature, not to conceal and deceive. Her argument is premised on a broad definition of deception that 
includes all practices finalized at instilling in others false beliefs, including some trivial and socially acceptable 
ones as make-up or clothes that make us look slimmer. Consequently, she argue, it is unrealistic to claim that all 
these cases should be seen as exceptions to some prima facie rule. I find this perspective unconvincing and 
eventually confusing if applied to medicine. In fact, it is clear that we do not count s culturally accepted practices 
like wearing make-up as instances of morally problematic deception, and that they are “deceptive” in a sort of 
indirect or very trivial way. At the same time, we count most other cases of deception, for example the provision 
of deceptive placebos in medical settings, as being ethically problematic. By allowing every kind of deception to 
be intrinsically unproblematic, Jackson’s view has the undesirable consequence of blurring the moral issues 
associated with this latter category of cases. For a more detailed response to this view, see (4 4). 
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Jackson 2001). In the first sense, it can be understood as meaning: “Do not lie!”; that is, as a 
negative obligation of not telling falsehoods. In the second sense, instead, it can be 
understood as meaning: “Tell the truth!”; that is, as a positive obligation to disclose 
information. These two obligations are strictly interrelated and therefore often confounded. 
Clearly, a duty to inform someone is premised on the assumption that the information that 
will be provided will not be false or misleading. Likewise, in order not to convey false ideas, 
sometimes we need to qualify our statements, providing more information to other speakers.  
 
 These two complementary obligations can and should be distinguished. In fact, health 
professionals do not have an obligation of “complete candor” or “absolute disclosure”. 
Clinicians must disclose to patients only the information relevant to respect their autonomy 
and to achieve a valid informed consent. Accordingly, I shall henceforth distinguish between 
two complementary prima facie obligations: the “duty of truthfulness” and “duty to inform”.22  
 
 The prima facie negative obligation of “truthfulness” implies that, other things being 
equal, clinicians must refrain from lying and deceiving. On this view, lying and deceiving are 
both ways of violating the obligation of truthfulness, and thus of violating the more general 
obligation of veracity. The prima facie positive obligation of “the duty to inform” patients, 
instead, implies that, other things being equal, clinicians must disclose all the relevant 
information required for respecting patients’ autonomy and to achieve a valid informed 
consent. On this view, the duty to inform is thus conceptualized as a narrower specification of 
the general principle of respect for patients’ autonomy (Jackson 2001; Beauchamp and 
Childress 2009; Beauchamp 2010; see chapter 3).   
 
                                                   
22 On this distinction see also Jackson (2001) and Carson (2010). Carson proposes a similar distinction by 
distinguishing between “negative honesty” and “positive honesty”.  
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 To sum up, in what follows, I shall conceptualize clinicians’ duty to veracity as a prima 
facie duty composed of two other prima facie duties: the negative obligation of “truthfulness” 
and the positive obligation of “informing patients” by providing all the relevant information.  
 
 
(1) Summary  
 
In this chapter I have discussed four classical arguments against clinicians’ obligation to 
veracity in medicine, concluding that they are all wanting. It not the case, since the “whole 
truth” cannot be known, communicated and understood, that physicians should always act 
paternalistically and decide what ought to be disclosed to patients. Also, there are good 
reasons to think that today the majority of people prefer veracity to benevolent deception, and 
that people receiving an honest disclosure of medical information are generally better off than 
those that are left in the dark–even in the case of bad news such a cancer diagnosis. Hence the 
two consequentialist arguments aimed at limiting the scope of the obligation of veracity fail. 
Finally, Kant’s deontological ban of all lies is problematic because clinicians do confront 
genuine moral dilemmas with conflicting duties. Hence, while there are good reasons to 
support the idea that clinicians have a duty to veracity, it seems also that under particular 
circumstances we should allow for qualified exceptions. I have then proposed to conceptualize 
clinician’s duty of veracity as a prima facie obligation, arguing that this obligation can be further 
specified as the conjunction of two more specific prima facie duties: the negative obligation of 
truthfulness, and the positive obligation to inform patients.  
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2. Lying, Deception and Concealment 
 
 
 
Half a truth is often a great lie. 
Benjamin Franklin 
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(2) Introduction 
 
This chapter explores different ways in which clinicians can violate their prima facie duty of 
veracity. Section (2.1) introduces and distinguishes between three general ways in which 
someone may be dishonest in communication by (a) deceiving; (b) lying; (c) and keeping 
someone in the dark by interfering, withholding, concealing relevant information, or telling 
half-truths. Section (2.2) discusses how different forms of dishonesty may often lay on a 
practical continuum; then section (2.3) discusses whether these different ways of being 
dishonest have intrinsically different moral weights.  
 
 
(2.1) How to be dishonest in professional communication 
 
After distinguishing between the duty of truthfulness and the duty to inform patients we are in 
a better position to understand what the duty of veracity entails in clinical contexts. The next 
logical step is to look at the ways in which clinicians may fail to respect this prima facie duty. 
When and how can doctors be dishonest in professional communication? Answering this 
question is not trivial, in part because the prima facie “duty to inform” entails that it is possible 
to violate the duty of veracity without lying and deceiving. As I will show, there are ways in 
which one can intentionally be dishonest without stating any falsehood or without 
instilling/failing to remove a false belief in others. To unpack this important claim, in this 
section we shall focus on defying the concepts of (a) deception; (b) lying; (c) and keeping 
someone in the dark by interfering, withhold, concealing information, and telling “half-
truths”.  
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(2.1.a) Two ways of violating the duty of truthfulness 
 
A minimal requirement for any theory of veracity is that of defining the concepts of “lying” 
and “deception”. This is not an easy task: lies and deception are ubiquitous in our private and 
public life, and they are often intermingled (Bok 1978). They also come in many forms. 
Indeed, the moral landscape of lies and deceit is ample and variegated. Accordingly, scholars 
have proposed several ways of conceptualizing “lying” and “deception”. However, two 
general distinctions are relevant in any account: (a) the one between deception and the 
provision of false information; (b) and the one between lying and deception.  
 
 
(2.1.b) Distinguishing deception from the provision of false information 
 
The first relevant distinction is between deception and the provision of false information. 
There is a wide consensus that deception can be generally defined as “intentionally causing 
someone to have a false belief that the deceiver believes to be false” (Carson 2010, 46; Gold 
and Lichtemberg 2014; Chisholm and Feehan 1977; Bok 1878). On this account deception 
requires two conditions. The first is the intention of instilling a false belief in the mind of 
someone (the intentionality condition); the second is that the deceiver must know that such 
belief is false (the epistemic condition) (Gold and Lichtemberg 2014). More technically, “A 
person S deceives another person S1 if, and only if, S intentionally causes S1 to believe X (or 
persist in believing X), where X is false and S knows or believes that X is false [or, 
alternatively, S does not believe that X is true]” (Carson 2010, 50).  
 
 Suppose that you are taking an exam, and that you are afraid of not completing your 
assignment on time. Suddenly, the professor asks you “What time is it?”. To buy a few 
minutes, you reply “5.50’” whereas your watch indicates “5.55”. In this case you are deceiving 
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your professor because you are intentionally reporting a wrong timing in order to instil a false 
belief into her mind. Now image that you are in the same scenario, but that you are unaware 
that your watch is 5 minutes late. Again, you reply “5.50”, and so you will again instil a false 
belief into the professor’s mind. However, this time you would not be deceiving the professor, 
as you have no intention of instilling a false belief, but only providing a false information. 
 
 On this account, thus, every deceptive act implies three logical subjects: a deceiver (S), 
a deceived (S1), and a belief (X) that the deceived comes to entertain because of the 
intentional behaviour of the deceiver (Bok 1978, 13; Carson 2010). Importantly, this definition 
admits that it is possible to deceive someone with actions as well as with omissions. For 
example, image that you and I want to attend a concert. I know that the tickets auctions will 
start at 9.00 a.m., and that only a few tickets will be available. If you tell me “I will try to get a 
ticket when the auction starts, at 10.00 a.m.”, I might consider not to telling you that the 
auction will start at 9.00, and not at 10.00, simply because I want to increase my chances of 
buying the few available ticket. By omitting this information, and thus by letting you retaining 
a belief that I know is false, I would act on the intention to mislead you, and thus I would be 
deceiving you (Bok 1978; Chisholm and Feehan 1977; Carson 2010).23 Therefore, this view of 
deception is based on three elements: (i) the intentionality condition; (ii) the epistemic 
condition; (iii) and the recognition that both acts and omissions may count as deceptive.  
 
 
(2.1.c) Distinguishing deception from lying 
 
The second cardinal distinction is between lying and deceiving. Following the previous 
definition, it is possible to deceive others in different ways trough disguise, body language, 
speech, and even by remaining silent. What is important is to act “on the intention of mislead 
                                                   
23 This example is adapted from Gold and Lichtenberg (2014), see note 28. 
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someone”, not the means whereby we achieve this end. But which of these instances of 
deception also counts as a lie? The answer to this question is notoriously controversial. There 
is substantial agreement that a lie has three universal features: (i) it is a false statement (Carson 
2010; Bok 1978; Chisholm and Feehan 1977);24 (ii) the liar believes such statement to be false, 
probably false, or at least not believing it to be true (Carson 2010; Bok 1978; Chisholm and 
Feehan 1977); (iii) this statement must be stated, asserted or communicated to someone else, 
usually in the form or verbal or written signs (Bok 1978; Chisholm and Feehan 1977).25 So, if 
you just think of replying “5.50” to the professor in the example in order to finish your exam, 
but then you say nothing, then you would not have lied because you have not stated anything.  
 
 But image a clinician who prescribes a placebo to a patient under the name of “extract 
of falsissima credulonis”. If the patient asks to the doctor “Doc is this a placebo?”, and the 
doctor answers “No, it is not”, according to this definition the doctor would be lying to the 
patient. In this case the doctor is telling a lie (“No, it is not”) with the clear intention to 
deceive the patient (i.e., to instil in his/her mind the false belief that this treatment is not a 
placebo). Does this mean that lies are just a subclass of deceptive practices? Is the “intention 
to deceive” a universal feature of lies? On this point scholars have taken different positions: 
some maintains that lies are a subclass of deceptive practices (Bok 1978), while others disagree 
(Carson 2010). Let us call the former view the “broad view” and the latter one the “narrow 
view”. Supporters of the narrow view maintain that it is possible to tell a lie without the 
                                                   
24 The view that lies need to be false statements is problematic in the face of statements that are known by the 
liar to be false, but that in fact are true. Consider the case in which you answer to the murderer at the door “I saw 
Fred running into the woods”. By saying so you intend to save Fred who is hiding in your home. However, 
fearing to be discovered, Fred has left his hideout and without warning you has really headed toward the near 
woods. As a consequence, your statement was true and it was not, technically, a lie. This objection is easily 
overcome by those views for which a lie entails the “intent to deceive”. However, it is more problematic for the 
view proposed by Carson (2010), according to which lies do not require the intent to deceive, but the intent to 
warrant the truth of what one is saying. On a possible reply to this objection see Carson (2010, 42). 
25 This is not, however, the only way in which one can understand the meaning of the term “lie”. Another option 
is to define every act of deception a “lies”. This is, for example, the position of Ludwig, who defines a lie as “any 
type of behaviour that deviates from the truth” (1965, 4, quoted in Jackson 2001, 43). This broad view has the 
defects of obscuring the fact that, other things being equal, we tend to assign different moral weights to lies and 
to deceptive practices. Similarly, Ekman uses the two concepts as synonymous, as he defines a lie as “one person 
intends to mislead another, doing so deliberately, without prior notification of this purpose, and without having 
been explicitly asked to do so by the target” (1985, 28; quoted in Jackson 2001, 43). According to Ekman, even 
the concealment of one owns emotion amount to an act of “lying”. Again, this is a too broad definition, as we do 
not usually associate the attitude of being a reserved or introvert person with the character of being a liar. 
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intention to deceive others. Carson (2010, 20) has argued that there are cases in which the 
intent to deceive is not required to tell a lie: 
 
Suppose that I witness a crime and clearly see that a particular individual 
committed the crime. Later, the same person is accused of the crime and, as 
a witness in court, I am asked whether or not I saw the defendant commit 
the crime, I make the false statement that I did not see the defendant 
commit the crime. I fear of being harmed or killed by him. However, I do 
not intend that my fake statements deceive anyone. (I hope that no one 
believes my testimony and that he is convicted in spite of it.) Deceiving the 
jury is not a means to preserving my life. Giving false testimony is necessary 
to save my life, but deceiving other is not; the deception is merely 
unintended “side effect”.  
 
 This example demonstrates that the usual “dictionary” definition of a lie as “any 
intentional deceptive statement which is stated” (Bok 1978; Chisholm and Feehan 1977; 
Jackson 2001) do not cover all the relevant cases.26 Aside from their truth-value, statements 
may also have a performative function, as in the case of the witness example. Therefore the 
“broad view” is wrong: the intention to deceive is not a necessary requirement of all lies. To 
account for the cases in which we agree that someone is lying, as well for those cases in which 
a lie is stated without the intention to deceive, Carson (2010, 39) has proposed the following 
definition of “lying”: 
 
A person S tells a lie to another person S1 iff: 1. S makes a statement X to 
S2, 2. S believes that X is false or probably false (or, alternatively, S does not 
believe that X is true), and 3. S intends to warrant the truth of X to S1.27 
 
 By saying that “X intends to warrant the truth of X to S1”, Carson means that the liar 
not only tells a statement that she knows to be false, but also that she does so under the 
promise, oath, or the tacit agreement that she guarantees that what she is saying is true. On this 
view, the key moral problem of telling a lie is that in stating something that we know is false 
we contravene to the basic contract between speakers according to which veracity is the 
default attitude in communication. This implicit requirement may, in certain contexts, become 
                                                   
26  For example, Jackson (2001, 48) defines a “lie” as “the asserting of what one believes to be false in order to 
deceive someone”.  
27 Carson gives several other definitions in his elaborated account; see Carson (2010), chapter 1. 
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an explicit one, for example in the form of professional oaths, code of conducts and ethical 
guidelines. It is because we normally expect doctors to tell the truth (i.e., to warrant the truth 
of what they say), that when we discover that they have told us a lie we feel betrayed.  
 
 In the rest of this dissertation I shall maintain that not all lies require “an intention to 
deceive”. This view entails that lying and deception differ in two respects. First, lies require 
stating something false, while deception does not necessarily require a statement: it is perfectly 
possible to deceive others without using words, for example through messages in Morse 
code.28 Likewise, suppose that, after completing a lobectomy, a surgeon realizes that she has 
operated the wrong lung. Suddenly, the patient wakes up and asks, “Doc was everything Ok?”. 
If the surgeon nods empathically and smile, then she would deceive the patient. If, instead, she 
replies, “Yes, everything was just fine” then she would lie. Second, deception always requires 
the “intention to deceive”, while lies can be used also to accomplish different performative 
functions.29 However, it is important to underscore that lies without the intention to deceive 
are just borderline cases, and that normally lies are told with the clear intent of deceiving 
others. The following diagram depicts what has been said so far: 
 
                                                   
28 On the possibility of using language to deceive other without lying, consider the following example by Gold 
and Lichtenberg (2104, 220) “It is 20:55; I am rushing with a friend of mine towards the cinema to purchase the 
last two tickets for tonight’s last show. We were earlier surprised to find out that tonight, as an exception, the last 
show will start at 21:00 instead of the usual 20:00. In front of us in the elevator, we meet a couple planning to see 
the same movie. We know that if they arrive at the box office before us and purchase the last two tickets, we will 
miss the movie. But they turn to us and ask if we know when the last showing of the movie begins. My friend 
replies: ‘Usually the last showing starts at 20:00’. They thank us politely and leave the elevator at a different floor. 
My friend winks at me while trying to conceal his satisfaction. Was my friend lying? We think not, since he did 
not provide any false information. The statement ‘Usually the last showing starts at 20:00’ is true. However, he 
was certainly deceptive, since he intentionally and successfully caused our competitors for tickets to believe that 
the movie started at 20:00. Indeed, only by inserting this false belief into the couple’s minds were we able to 
achieve our goal—purchasing the last two tickets”. 
29 Carson (2010, 55) adds a third, more contentious condition for distinguishing between lies and deception, 
namely that the words “deception” connotes success because “an act must actually mislead someone (cause 
someone to have false beliefs) it is to count as deception. Many lies are not believed and do not succeed in 
deceiving anyone”. I think that this point is mistaken: deception can be intended without being successful. In the 
example of the doctor who has performed a wrong lobectomy, she could try to nod emphatically and smile, but 
it is now guaranteed that this will cause the patient to have a false belief; the patients notes something suspicious, 
perhaps precisely because the doctor does not answer, and doubts that everything went as planned. 
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(2.1.d) Four ways of violating the duty to inform 
 
Using lies and deception in medical settings violates clinician’s negative obligation of 
truthfulness. However, the obligation of veracity entails also “the duty to inform patients”. 
Hence, it is possible to be dishonest–contravening to the duty of veracity–without violating 
the obligation of truthfulness. This claim, however, requires further qualifications: How is it 
possible to be dishonest without lying and deceiving others? Following Carson (2010), we 
shall now consider four related ways in which it is possible to violates the duty of veracity 
without necessarily violate the duty of truthfulness; they are: (i) keeping someone in the dark 
by distraction; (ii) keeping someone in the dark by withholding information; (iii) keeping 
someone in the dark by concealing information; (iv) telling “half-truths”. 
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 45 
(2.1.e) “Keeping someone in the dark” by malicious concealing 
 
The first way in which someone (S) may violate a duty to inform is when S acts deliberately to 
prevent someone else (S1) from learning the truth about X. There are different ways in which 
someone can achieve this objective which, in part following Carson (2010), I shall generally 
label henceforth as “keeping someone in the dark” about something X.30 We shall now 
consider three specific ways in which someone S can deliberately act as to prevent someone 
else S1 to know the truth about X. In all these situations S does not need to state a falsehood 
or to instill in S1 a belief that s/he holds as false in order to be dishonest with S1.  
 
 The first way is when S acts as to materially prevent S1 from learning the truth about 
X, even when such truth is potentially available to S1. Suppose that you are reading the 
informed consent form to enrol in a placebo-controlled trial. It is a complex text full of details 
and technical jargon, but in which it is clearly stated that this trial is considerably risky, and 
that there is a 75% chance of receiving a placebo instead of an active medication. As a 
researcher in this study, I am afraid that if you read carefully these details you might 
reconsider your participation.  
 
 Hence, in order to distract your attention, I start with you a conversation about other 
topics, for example your favourite holydays destinations. By deviating the conversation and by 
giving you the impression that there is no time to read everything, you sign the module 
without reading it with the necessary attention. In this case, you retain your initial and true 
                                                   
30 It is unclear whether the cases of withholding and concealing information should be seen as instances of the 
more general case of “keeping someone in the dark”. For example, Carson (2010, 54) proposes the following 
tentative definition for “keeping someone in the dark”:  A person S keeps another person S2 in the dark about X 
(where X is something that S knows and S1 doesn’t know) if, and only if, either: 1. S actively and intentionally 
prevents S1 from learning about X, or 2. fails to inform S1 about X when either: (i) S knows that S1 wants the 
information in question and S can easily give it to S1, or (ii)  S occupies a role or position in which he is expected 
to provide S1 with the sort of information in question. Through condition (2.ii) this definition seems to include 
all those cases in which clinicians are said to “withhold information” from patients. On this point Carson’s 
treatment of the relationship between keeping someone in dark, concealment and withholding of information is 
unclear. I propose instead to consider the three cases in which someone disturbs the acquisition of-, conceal, or 
withhold information from someone else as special cases of a unique kind: “keeping someone in the dark”, i.e. 
the intentional attempt by someone (S) to prevent someone else (S1) from discovering the truth about X.  
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belief that clinical trials are risky, thought this belief is vague and not well circumstantiated. To 
act in this way violates the duty to inform participants in clinical research–i.e. a failure to 
respect the duty to inform. In this case my conduct is dishonest, and yet I have not acted as to 
instil in you a false belief, or to make you retain a false belief that you already had.31 This 
example shows that it is possible to be dishonest in professional communication without 
deception or lying, for preventing someone from discovering the truth about X is not the 
same “as causing her to have or retains a false belief about X” (Carson 2010, 54). 
 
 The second way is when S intentionally withhold some information that prevent S1 to 
learn the truth about X. Image that we are in the same scenario, but this time I am not 
disturbing you in any way while you are reading the informed consent form. The form 
describes the relevant side effects of the experimental medication to be tested. However, I 
also know that a newly published study suggests that this treatment may have additional side 
effects. This information could not be included in the disclosure form because of time 
constrains. Again, fearing that you might not want to proceed upon learning this news, I 
decide not to disclose you what I know about the new study. This time I am not preventing 
you from understanding information that is already available to you, but I am instead failing to 
add more relevant information. Still, I am not telling a falsehood and, since you already had the 
belief that “clinical trials are always risky”, I am not instilling in you a false believe or failing to 
correct one. Yet, my conduct is clearly in contrast with my obligation to inform you in a way 
adequate to respect your autonomy and right to inform consent.  
 
 A third way in which someone S may prevent S1 from learning the truth about X is 
when S actively conceals some information about X to S1. Recall again the same scenario, but 
a few days later. Following the recommendations of the ethical committee, the module has 
been updated as to list among the possible side effects those discovered by the recently 
published study. However, since I think that the language in which they have been described 
                                                   
31 This example has been adapted from Carson (2010). 
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is too scary, unbalanced and might frighten possible participants, before printing the module I 
delete some parts of the description of the newly discovered side effect. This time I am 
neither just interfering with your understanding of the available information about X, nor I am 
just withholding information about X, but I have instead intentionally done something as to 
hide from you information about X. Also in this case I will clearly violate my obligation to 
provide you comprehensive and adequate information about the treatment that you are about 
to receive as part of the trial, but technically I am neither deceiving nor lying to you.  
 
 These three examples show that it is possible to “keep someone in the dark” without 
lies and deception but in such a way as to violate the prima facie duty to adequately inform 
patients. But of course, it is also possible to keep someone in the dark through lying and 
deception, as it is possible to use all the ways of keeping someone in the dark with the clear 
intent to deceive. To see how this can occur it is sufficient to replace, in the three scenarios 
discussed above, the prospective patient in the trial who already knew that such trials are 
“always risky” with another patient who believes instead that clinical trials have only a 
therapeutic aim and therefore trial participants do not risk any side effect. Since I know that 
this latter belief is false, any deliberate attempt of keeping you in the dark about the truth of X 
(i.e. that clinical trials are risky, and this one in particular), would qualify as a failure to correct 
your false belief, and thus as an act of intentional deception by omission.  
 
 Finally, another way of preventing someone from learning the truth about X is to 
engage in selective disclosure. Through selective disclosure I may convey you only “half 
truths”, hence distorting the way in which you could interpret or understand some 
information about X. Image that I am willing to prescribe you a certain “natural treatment” 
that I invented. In constructing my case, I introduce in my disclosure procedure vague 
references to the efforts of Big Pharma to silence all studies on the efficacy of natural, readily 
available products. While in the right context these claims may not be false, by using them in 
this particular context I clearly intend to put a “spin” in my story, presenting my “natural” 
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remedy as a powerful product publicly unknown because of the efforts of big corporations. 
Despite I am not stating anything false, the way in which I construct my story may still lead 
you to entertain or reinforce some false belief. Again, also this time I may or may not deceive 
you depending on your previous beliefs. If you already believed in what I kept implicit in my 
story, then you might not entertain any new false idea after our colloquium. In this case, I 
would be neither deceiving nor lying to you, and yet I would still not fulfill my obligation of 
providing you with an adequate, balanced and objective process of information disclosure. 
 
 
(2.2) Deception, lies, concealment and the “spill over problem” 
 
Distinguishing between different ways in which we can be dishonest in communication is 
important because we tend to attribute to them different moral weights (see next section). 
However, it also important to underscore that in practice people engaging in dishonest 
communication usually resort to more than one technique. Dishonest communication often 
occurs in a continuum of more or less explicit deceptive behaviours. Consider the infamous 
case of the Tuskegee syphilis study. This well-know example of medical abuse was possible 
only because the participants were not informed of being part of a scientific study for which 
they would have not received already available effective medications (Jones 2008). But in order 
to run the experiment, the various health-professionals had to recur to something more than a 
simple lie. Rather, during the decades in which the study was conducted, they had to set up a 
complex system where lies, deception, concealment, withholding of information, half-truths, 
etc. were all necessary and functional tools to pursue their agenda. 
 
 Rarely lies and deceptive practices are unique events. More often than not, a lie calls 
for more lies, while a vaguely deceptive practice may easily lead to stating an open lie. A classic 
example of this “spill over problem” is the one of a physician deceptively prescribing an 
impure placebo–e.g., an antibiotic for a viral infection (see chapter 6). Since this is a “real” 
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medicine, in presenting it to the patient an open lie is not required: a vaguely deceptive 
description will suffice. However, if the patient asks the direct question, “Did you prescribe 
me a placebo?” the physicians would be forced either to disclose the truth (“Yes, I gave you a 
placebo”), or to state an open lie (“No, I did not give you a placebo”). Image the case in 
which, in order to protect the initial deception, the doctors tells a lie but the patient keeps on 
asking questions on the compositions, published studies, physiological mechanisms, adverse 
effects, branding, etc. of the pill. Again, the physician would be forced to tell a lie to “shore 
up” the previous lies. The more lies will be told, the more lies will be needed. As noted by 
Bok, “the first lie must be thatched with another or it will rain through” (1978, 25). Thus, 
while it is useful to distinguish between lies and deception from a technical point of view, it 
should be stressed that in real cases lies, deception, selective concealment and other practices 
of dishonest communication often occur and thrive together, easily spilling one into the other. 
 
 
(2.3) Are lies more culpable than other forms of deception? 
 
Dishonesty in professional communication can take different forms to violate the prima facie 
duty of veracity. Some of them require stating something with an intention to deceive; others 
require instead simply omitting some information. But do different dishonest practices have 
also different moral weights? Is the stating of an open lie more culpable than the intentional 
withholding of relevant information?  
 
 Scholars have endorsed different views concerning this issue. The prevalent position is 
that, other things being equal, lies are in general more blameworthy than other deceptive 
techniques.32 This “gradualist” position has been defended, among others, by Beauchamp and 
Childress (2009, 289), who write, “deception that does not involve lying is usually less difficult 
                                                   
32 Jackson (1991) has defended the view that we should sharply distinguish between lies and deception: “while 
doctors generally speaking should no truck with lying, deliberate deception need not in general pose a significant 
threat to trust”; I strongly disagree with this position for reasons that I explain in (4.2).  
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to justify than lying, in part because in many contexts in health care it does not threaten as 
deeply the relationship of trust […] Underdisclosure and nondisclosure of information are 
usually still less difficult to justify”.  
 
 The view that lies are more blameworthy than other dishonest practices fits well with 
the adopted definition of a lie as a false statement of which we “intend to warrant the truth”. 
In fact, since lies always require a statement, lying always entails an explicit commitment to 
warrant the truth of what we are saying. Comparatively, this commitment is certainly less 
explicit when we engage in other deceptive practices like the concealment of relevant 
information. This would explain why lies are generally perceived as more difficult to be 
justified: because of our public commitment in upholding their truth, lies corresponds also to 
an explicit request of trust by other persons. And the more trust we place in others, the 
greater is the negative impact if we discover that we have been betrayed. 
 
 However, while this view may hold in general, it should not be taken without 
qualifications. First, because of the “spill over problem” even a trivial act of deception can 
easily lead into an open lie. Second, in certain situations omitting one piece of information 
may damage autonomy and trust just as much as the stating of open lie. Likewise, an open lie 
can instead be easily pardoned depending on the specific circumstances. Image that your 
clinicians, upon being improperly questioned by your elderly mother about his personal life, 
answers, “Oh, it is everything OK”. Yet, you know that recently he got divorced. He just 
stated an open lie, but it is hard to see how such a lie would irremediably damage our trust in 
his therapeutic competences and moral integrity. Dishonesty is always context and audience-
sensitive. Therefore, though in general it is easier to pardon a vague deception than an openly 
stated lie, often the two go hand in hand, and depending on the particular circumstances the 
former can be more harmful and blameworthy than the other. 
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(2) Summary  
 
In this chapter I have distinguished different ways in which clinicians can violate the prima facie 
duty of veracity through deception, lying, keeping someone in the dark, and telling half-truths. 
It is possible to being dishonest without stating a lie or technically deceiving someone. 
However, despite these analytical distinctions, in practice it is often hard to sharply separate 
one act of dishonesty from another, as they easily tend to “spill” one into the other. 
Furthermore, the relative moral weight of an act of deception, concealment and lying is always 
situational: normally lies are more difficult to justify than deception and concealment, but in 
many contexts the reverse may instead hold true. 
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3. Deception, Autonomy and Trust  
 
 
 
Whatever matters to human beings, trust is the atmosphere in which it thrives.  
Sissela Bok 
 
 
If truth is the first casualty, trust is the second. 
Roger Higgs 
 
 
A liar should have a good memory.  
Quintilian 
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(3) Introduction 
 
This chapter inquires into the reasons why deception is prima facie wrong in clinical contexts. 
The view that I will defend is that clinical deception is prima facie wrong because it threatens 
the fiduciary pact between doctor and patient, which is also a precondition for respecting 
patients’ autonomy and for constructing a positive therapeutic relationship. We shall begin by 
analyzing two arguments that have been used to maintain that deception in medicine is 
morally problematic because it disrespects patients’ autonomy and because it threatens the 
bond of trust between patients and clinicians. Then, we shall clarify the relationship between 
the preservation of trust and the respect of patients’ autonomy. Finally, we shall introduce and 
discuss the moral phenomenon of the “discrepancy of the perspectives”. 
 
 
(3.1) Deception in clinical medicine 
 
The view that clinicians have a prima facie duty of veracity is grounded on the recognition that 
there exists an initial imbalance between truthfulness and falsehood: other things being equal, 
we should always prefer the former to the latter. But why is falsehood less desirable than 
truthfulness as a default attitude? Why are lies, deception, and other dishonest practices more 
worrisome than truth telling and veracity? Why are dishonest clinicians morally blameworthy?  
 
 Answering these questions is important not only to understand why we should avoid 
duplicity in medicine, but also to shed light on the implications that might follow from 
condoning exceptions to the duty of veracity. Scholars in medical ethics have identified two 
main arguments supporting the view that clinicians’ dishonesty is prima facie wrong: the first 
concerns the infringement of patients autonomy; the second the breaching of patients trust. 
As the following schema depicts, both arguments moves from diverse premises, but they 
share the same conclusion 
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• Clinicians must respect 
patient’ autonomy 
 
• Clinicians must preserve 
patients’ trust 
• Deception disrespects 
patients’ autonomy 
 
• Deception threatens patients’ 
trust 
 
  
                              Clinicians should not deceive patients 
 
 Before analyzing these arguments in more details, however, two clarifications are in 
order.33 First, there are more then two arguments that can be used to defend the view that 
clinicians should be honest in their professional communication. Other possible arguments, 
for example, may conclude that dishonesty ought to be avoided in medical contexts because 
of economic or legal reasons, or simply because it corrupts the character of those practicing it. 
These other possibilities notwithstanding, in this chapter I shall focus only on the two above 
arguments because they are the most relevant ones from a moral point of view and for the 
contemporary debate in medical ethics.  
 
 Secondly, “autonomy” and “trust” are magmatic concepts that resist univocal (and 
clear) definitions. As we shall also see in the next sections, different authors have defended 
significantly different views of how we should conceptualize clinicians’ duty of respecting 
patients’ autonomy, of how clinicians could preserve patients’ trust, and accordingly of how 
the morality of clinical deception ought to be conceptualized. Clearly, depending on the 
meaning assigned to the terms “autonomy”, “trust” and “deception” it is possible to interpret 
the above arguments in different ways, or to agree with them but then to draw entirely 
different inferences as to what we ought to do in the face of moral dilemmas involving clinical 
deception.34 In this respect, the limited aim of this chapter is only that of discussing a distinct 
set of argumentations that are at the core of the present debate in medical ethics.  
                                                   
33 Following the view that I have adopted throughout this dissertation, all duties in this schema (of respect for 
autonomy, of preserving trust, and of not deceiving–i.e. of veracity) have to be understood as prima facie duties.  
34 For example, the conception of “relational autonomy” proposed by some feminists (Ells 2001; McLeod and 
Sherwin 2000) is only partially represented in what I will discuss in this chapter. Similarly, Rawlinson (1985) has 
defended a view for which each disease impairs patients’ autonomy to some extent and therefore it is sometimes 
permissible for doctors to deceive patients if this would conceivably restore their long-term autonomy. 
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(3.1.a) Deception and the principle of respect for autonomy 
 
The first argument deals with the principle of respect for autonomy and is grounded in the 
claim that dishonesty impairs patients’ autonomous agency: 
 
Respect for Autonomy 
(i) Clinicians must respect patients’ autonomy 
(ii)  Deception disrespects patients’ autonomy 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Clinicians should not deceive patients 
 
 
 Autonomy is one of the key notions in contemporary law, politics, and philosophy, 
and it “is almost certainty the most important value ‘discovered’ in medical and research 
ethics” in the last forty years (Beauchamp and Faden 1986, 18). While autonomy is not a 
monolithic concept, the dominant perspective in biomedical ethics conceives it as 
encompassing “self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and from 
certain limitations such as an inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice” 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 99). The concept of autonomy is usually clarified with a 
reference to Greek city-states: an agent is autonomous if she acts according to a self-chosen 
plan just like an independent government establishes its confines and sets its policies. Today 
respecting patients’ autonomy is an acquired value in medicine, and especially in Western 
industrialized contexts (Beauchamp and Childress 2009; Asai and Kadooka 2013; Surbone 
2006).35 Accordingly, in these contexts, premise (i) is considered uncontroversial. 
 
                                                   
35 An important issue here regards the relation between dishonesty and patients’ right to informed consent. In 
this chapter I will not address this issue directly, as I will instead focus more on the principle of respecting 
patients’ autonomy. However, since the patients’ right to informed consent is usually grounded on the principle 
of respect for autonomy, from a moral point of view, the latter issue can be seen as a specification of the former. 
There are other reasons that support the practice of informed consent, and other scholars–such as Onora 
O’Neill–have proposed to ground informed consent in other theoretical principles rather than the (sole) principle 
of respect for individual autonomy. On the relationship between informed consent and the principle of 
autonomy see (Beauchamp and Childress 2009); on O’Neill critique see O’Neill (2002); on a possible reply to 
these positions see Beauchamp (2010); for a detailed analysis of the position that trust provides a better starting 
concept than autonomy to ground informed consent see, instead, Eyal (2012). 
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  Premise (ii) requires instead more clarification. In what sense can deception disrespect 
patients’ autonomy? To answer this question it is useful to note that, similarly to the principle 
of veracity, also the principle of respect for autonomy can be stated as the conjunction of a 
negative and of a positive obligation (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 100). As a negative 
obligation, clinicians have a duty not to infringe on patients’ liberty, that is, on their ability to 
act free from external constrains. In this respect, a paradigmatic example is that of a Jehovah 
witness who refuses a life-saving blood transfusion because of her/his religious beliefs. In this 
case, to coercively administer the blood transfusion would infringe on patients’ liberty, for 
patients who are competent have a right to veto medical interventions that contrast with their 
values–even if such refusal may lead to severe health consequences such as death. 
 
 As a positive obligation, instead, clinicians have a duty to promote patients’ 
autonomous decision-making by providing all the necessary information and by fostering their 
understandings.36 This duty, inspired by a Kantian conception of autonomy as the capacity to 
act according to a self-chosen plan, implies that respecting patient’s autonomy requires the 
actual aid of the clinician, for many “autonomous actions could not occur without others’ 
material cooperation in making options available. Respect for autonomy obligates 
professionals in health care and research involving human subjects to disclose information, to 
probe for an ensure understanding and voluntariness, and to foster adequate decision making” 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 104).  
 
 In this sense, respecting patients’ autonomy means enhancing patients’ autonomous 
agency. The concept of “autonomous agency” may be further unpacked in two conditions: the 
                                                   
36 Beauchamp and Childress (2009) do not distinguish between autonomy and liberty, as they regard them as two 
sides of the same coin: the principle of respect for patients’ autonomy. However, to avoid terminological 
confusion, I prefer here to adopt the perspective proposed, among others, by Coggon and Miola (2011, 525), for 
which it is important to distinguish “between autonomy as it refers to matters concerning the freedom of the 
will, and as it relates to political freedom within a society to act unencumbered by the interference of third parties 
or the State…For our purposes, autonomy relates to free will, so an “autonomous agent” is someone with free will, 
and liberty relates to freedom to act without the interference of third party”. Thus, a prisoner may enjoy a high 
level of autonomy whilst having extremely limited liberty, and a person with a low “mental age” will have a low 
level of autonomy whilst potentially having a great deal of liberty”. See also Dworkin (1998) and Jennings (2007). 
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one of (i) intentionality and the one of (ii) understanding. According to the first condition, an 
autonomous act is such only if it is intentional. Hence, someone who is sleepwalking cannot 
be considered autonomous. According to the condition of understanding, instead, persons 
“understand if they have acquired pertinent information and have relevant beliefs about the 
nature and consequences of their actions” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 127). An adequate 
understanding requires not only the ability to comprehend information, but also the 
availability of such information. How can someone refuse an intervention if one does not 
know that she is receiving one? Consider the following account from an oncologist in 
Northern Italy: 
 
During my first year of oncology fellowship in Italy in 1983, a middle-aged businessman 
was told he had gastritis, when dying of cachexia from end-stage carcinoma; a young, 
divorced housewife was told she had arthritis while receiving palliative radiation therapy 
for chemotherapy-resistant metastatic breast cancer; and a college student was told he 
had drug-induced hepatitis, but he was indeed progressing toward liver failure from 
widespread hepatic involvement with lymphoma (Surbone 1992, 1661). 
 
 In all these cases, the patient’s family (or at least one family member) was informed of 
the truth. And yet, this practice prevaricated patients in a way that is incompatible with the 
respect of individual autonomy (but see Surbone 1992). By providing false diagnostic 
information, none of those persons had the opportunity to decide how to spend the last 
moments of their life, or how to settle their affairs. Perhaps more importantly, none of the 
above patients had a saying on what kind of cures she or he wanted to receive. In the case of 
terminally ill oncological patients this issue is even more pressing, as today there exist several 
different options that might be simultaneously implemented, such as palliative care. The 
decision on when and if someone is willing to switch from therapeutic to palliative 
chemotherapy, for example, may hugely impact the quality of life of terminally ill patients.37 
                                                   
37 The idea that respecting patients’ autonomy entails something more than simply refraining from lying and 
deceiving it at the core of any attempt that identify shared-decision making as a desirable goal of any therapeutic 
relationship. I agree with Jackson (2001, 10-11) that it is not true that in the past patients were forced to take 
medicines or undergo surgery; although in different ways, consent has always been part of the medical practice. 
Rather, what is new in the contemporary insistence on autonomy is “the idea that patients should be encouraged 
to participate in reaching decisions as to what treatments or procedures are appropriate for them. It is this right 
to participate in deciding what is appropriate that spurs the call for full and frank information-giving”. Without 
veracity one cannot have substantially autonomous agents, and thus shared-decision making. As noted by Joffe 
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 Thus, through deception, clinicians may prevent patients from achieving an adequate 
understanding of their clinical situation, thus impairing their capacity for autonomous 
decision-making. Hence, the first argument concludes, if clinicians have a duty of respecting 
patient’s autonomy, and if deception disrespects patient’s autonomy, then clinicians should 
have duty of not deceiving patients. 
 
 
(3.1.b) Deception, trust, and professional trustworthiness  
 
The second argument concerns the trust between doctor and patient, and is often based on 
the claim that dishonesty threatens patient’s trust: 
 
Trust 
(i) Clinicians must preserve patient’s trust 
(ii)  Deception threatens patient’s trust 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Clinicians must not deceive patients 
 
In the last years several authors have emphasized the role of trust in medicine (Bok 1978; O’ 
Neill 2002; Jackson 2001; Jones 1996; Hardin 1996 and 2002). However, as Baier (1995) 
noted, in moral philosophy there have been a ‘strange silence” on this topic. This is surprising 
given the central role that is normally attributed to trust in our private and public life:  
 
Everyday life is a catalogue of success in the exercise of trust. Our dealings with 
friends and enemies, neighbors and strangers depend on it, whether in homes, 
streets, markets, seats of government or other arenas of civil society. Would you 
ask a stranger the time unless you could normally count on a true answer? Could 
you use the public highway without trusting other drivers? Could an economy 
progress beyond barter, or a society beyond mud huts, unless people relied on one 
another to keep their promises? Without trust social life would be impossible 
(Hollis 1998, 1; quoted in Jackson 2001, 132). 
                                                                                                                                                          
and Troug (2010, 349), however, the concept of “shared decision making” is often unclear; “Wide agreement on 
this label […] masks deep uncertainties about its precise meaning. The term is often used without definition or 
further explanation, and likely means different things to different authors”.  
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 Trust is fundamental in any cooperative endeavor, and it is so pervasive in our lives 
that it is as if we “inhabit a climate of trust as we inhabit an atmosphere, notice it as we notice 
air, only when it becomes scarce or polluted” (Baier 1995, 98). Trust is important because it 
sets our default attitude towards others’ behavior, reducing the complexity of our decisional 
landscape (Luhman 1979, 30).38 So, unless we have reasons to suspect otherwise, we expect 
that people who are asked about the time will reply truthfully; that those who make promises 
will keep them; and, more generally, that in normal situations others “will play by the rules” 
(O’Neill 2002, 14). Truthfulness, honesty, and fidelity are not always what we get, but they are 
what we expect form others. If this were not the case, then we will need to suspect of every 
sentence, reply, statement, etc. made by others; as a consequence, cooperation and social life 
would become impossible. In this general sense, “to trust someone” entails both an 
expectation and a positive attitude about others’ behavior and motives of actions.39  
 
 While trust is important in any cooperative endeavor, it is especially important in 
medicine because of the peculiarity of the doctor-patient relationship. To fully unpack this 
latter claim, however, it is necessary to introduce four important considerations about the 
specific nature of the trust- relationship occurring between doctors and patients. 
 
 First, trust must be distinguished from trustworthiness.40 As Hardin (1996, 28-9) 
noted, “trust by itself […] constitutes nothing […] without [trustworthiness], there is no value 
in trust”. Following McLeod, trust can be defined, “as an attitude that we have towards people 
                                                   
38 Luhmann (1980, 30) observed, “Trust then is the generalized expectation that another will handle his freedom, 
his disturbing potential for diverse action in keeping with his personality, or rather in keeping with the personality 
which he has presented and made socially visible. He who stands by what he has consciously or unconsciously 
allowed to be known about himself s worthy of trust” (quoted in Pellegrino1991, 71). 
39 Trust may involve both cognitive and non-cognitive components; as Jones (1996, 5) noted, “Trusting is 
composed of two elements, one cognitive and one affective or emotional […] Roughly, to trust someone is to 
have an attitude of optimism about her goodwill and to have the confident expectation that, when the needs 
arise, the one trusted will be directly and favourably moved by the thought that you are counting on her”. On the 
same issue see also Miller (2000), who builds on the previous work of Baier (1995) and Jones (1996). 
40 There are many kinds of trust-relationships, as the verb “to trust” can be used in expressions that do not 
involve, strictly speaking, individual agents. Consider the following expressions: “I trust myself”; “she trusts the 
stars”; “society trusts the market”; “citizens must trust their government”; “Othello trusts Iago”. The 
paradigmatic example of a trust relationship, however, is the last one, i.e. a relationship involving only two 
individuals: the “trustor” (e.g. Othello) and the “trustee” (e.g. Iago). I shall consider only trust-relationships of 
this latter kind; more specifically, I shall consider only the trust grounding the doctor-patient relationship.  
 60 
whom we hope will be trustworthy, while trustworthiness is a property, not an attitude” 
(McLeod 2011). Ideally, those who are trusted are also trustworthy, but this is not necessarily 
the case. Trust can be misplaced, as for example when a patient trusts a quack. Vice-versa, 
someone may instead fail to trust someone who is trustworthy–as when nobody trusted 
Cassandra’s prophecies. In general, trust is “well placed” or “warranted” whether those who 
are trusted are also trustworthy (McLeod 2011).41 
 
 The distinction between trust and trustworthiness adds a layer of complexity to the 
moral analysis of trust-relationships in clinical settings. To some extent patient’s trust depends 
on the clinician’s trustworthiness, but it not reducible to it. Patients can be partially or wholly 
unreasonable, and so they can unreasonably mistrust a clinician who is instead perfectly 
trustworthy. One thing is clinicians’ trustworthiness per se, quite another is clinicians’ perceived 
trustworthiness for patients. Thus, it is perhaps more precise to say that “clinicians have an 
obligation of being trustworthy” rather than saying that “clinicians must preserve patient’s 
trust”–as this latter variable may be partially or wholly beyond clinicians’ control.42  
 
 Second, clinicians’ trustworthiness flows from their status as socially recognized 
professionals.43 Though patients may know their doctors quite well, the doctor-patient 
                                                   
41 In the last decades scholars have begun to provide increasingly sophisticated analyses of trust and 
trustworthiness (Hardin 2002; Mcleod 2011). Scholars have recognized other distinctions that are of importance: 
(i) trust entails that someone who trusts (the trustor) become vulnerable to those who are trusted (the trustees): 
trust in invariably risky, and exposes the trustor to the possibility of betrayal (Hardin 1986; Miller 2000); (ii) trust 
implies that the trustor thinks well of the trustee, at least in certain respects; (iii) trust implies that the trustor 
thinks that the trustee is competent in certain respects. In the case of the doctor-patient relationship, for 
example, to trust the doctor the patient must think that this doctor is competent, at least in some area of 
medicine. Finally, it is unclear whether a defining feature of trust relationships is that the trustor thinks that the 
trustee has some kind of motives (which can range from self-interest to moral commitments) to be trustworthy. 
On this latter point there exists considerable disagreement, see McLeod (2011) and Hardin (2002). To these 
features, Jones (1996, 15) added that “any adequate account of trust should be able to explain at least the 
following three fairly obvious facts about trust: that trust and distrust are contraries but not contradictories, that 
trust cannot be willed, and that trust can give rise to beliefs that are abnormally resistant to evidence”. 
42 By the expression “bond of trust” I refer to the mutual relationship of trust between doctor and patient. Of 
course, this relationship entails not only a trusting patient and a trustworthy doctor, but also a trusting physician 
and a trustworthy patient. As this dissertation is in medical ethics, however, I will focus my analysis only on to the 
side of this relationship concerned with the clinician’s obligation of being trustworthy. However, I will also use 
the more general expression “bond of trust between patient an clinician” whenever we need to refer to the 
broader context in which mutual relationships of trust thrive in clinical settings.  
43 As Sokoloswki noted (1991, 31) “the relationship between professional and client is a fiduciary relationship. 
The client trusts the professional and entrusts himself or herself–not just his or her possessions–to the 
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relationship may and should take place also between strangers.44 This is what has been defined 
as the “elegant anonymity [of] professional trustworthiness; if I get sick away from home and 
must go the emergency room of an hospital, I can in principle trust doctors and nurses I have 
never met before…because they are presented as members of the medical profession, persons 
who are certified by the profession and who can, prima facie, be taken as willing to abide by its 
norms” (Sokoloskwi 1991, 31). Without the general trust that patients have in clinicians’ 
professional trustworthiness, therapeutic relationships between strangers would be impossible. 
This is even truer in contemporary clinical settings, where the care of a single patient is now 
entrusted to large teams of doctors, nurses, and technicians.45  
 
 Thirdly, clinicians’ professional trustworthiness entails an explicit moral commitment. 
Unlike other relationships based on trust between peers and other professions, the doctor-
patient relationship is structured around a power-asymmetry. In clinical settings patients are 
“condemned to a relationship of inequality with the professed healer, for the healer professes 
to possess precisely what the patient lacks–the knowledge and the power to heal” (Pellegrino 
1981, 161). Every doctor-patient relationship is thus characterized by an asymmetry of power 
and knowledge. This power-asymmetry allows doctors–among others things–to examine, 
touch, manipulate, cut, and even replace parts of the patient’s body in ways that would be 
considered unacceptable outside therapeutic relationships.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
professional. The professional is presented as trustworthy not primarily in the way a friend is found to be 
faithful, by having proven himself or herself in many situations, but by having been certified as a professional.” 
For a proposal on how to conceive this relationship in the clinical practice see Joffe and Troug (2010). 
44 Patients may know their doctors very well, thus turning their relationship of interpersonal trust into a relationship 
of personal trust. In the latter case, the doctor is not a stranger, and the patient may have different expectations 
and attitudes toward the professional’s trustworthiness, for example by supposing that due to their long 
established acquaintance the doctor would be willing to do for her something that other doctors would instead 
not be prepared to do (e.g. prescribing an off-the-counter medication). While these latter kinds of relationships 
are common in clinical settings, they introduce too many variables and are by definition personal and therefore 
hardly generalizable; thus I shall not consider this kind of trust-relationships here.  
45 Zaner (1991, 49) observed that for patients trust is unavoidable, and that “[p]atients must trust not only 
physicians, researchers, administrative personnel, manufacturers. They also have no choice but to trust a great 
many things: the material used to repair body parts, bandages, drugs, surgical equipment, and the like. They also 
have to trust numerous procedures; sterilization, the administration of anaesthetics, surgical techniques, referrals, 
the preparation of drugs, and so on”. However, for the sake of clarity and simplicity, henceforth we shall focus 
only on the most clear-cut and general case: a relationship of trust between one generic doctor and one generic 
patient, assuming that they have never met before. 
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 Furthermore, patients are by definition in a vulnerable condition: they seek the aid of 
clinicians only when they are in need of help and are unable to care for themselves. The trust 
in clinicians’ professional trustworthiness is the precondition of any therapeutic relationship 
and, at the same time, what exposes patients to some risks. As noted by Pellegrino, trust is 
always a double-edged sword, and “to trust and entrust is to become vulnerable and 
dependent on the good will and motivations of those we trust. Trust, ineradicable as it is, is 
also always problematic” (Pellegrino 1991, 69). 
 
 To counterbalance this power asymmetry, clinicians are demanded to respect a certain 
code of moral conduct. In this sense, the “fiduciary pact” between doctor and patient can be 
conceptualized as being grounded in a relation of reciprocity: society grants medical 
professionals their education, an high social and economic status, and the possibility of 
disposing of the power and authority which are intrinsic in therapeutic relationships; in 
exchange, clinicians must abide to a publicly agreed set of legal, institutional, and moral rules 
which regulate their behavior as they operate as medical professionals (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2009). At their core, these deontological constrains entail at least two elements: (i) a 
commitment toward technical competency; (ii) and the adherence to a public code of conduct 
inscribed in international and national declarations, ethical guidelines, professional codes of 
conduct, oaths, etc., and grounded in common morality (Pellegrino et al. 1991). 
 
 Fourth, clinicians’ professional trustworthiness has an interpersonal as well as a public 
dimension. Whenever a patient looses trust in the professional status of a specific doctor, 
there might follow severe consequences for the quality of the doctor-patient relationship and 
for patients’ care. Patients who distrust their physician may not undergo medical or diagnostic 
procedures they need; deliberately withhold information that might instead be useful to 
optimize their care; discontinue treatments and impair compliance; rely on other more exotic 
forms of medical assistance that may be more hazardous and safe than conventional medical 
care; and may look elsewhere to find health-related information. Without a minimum trust, 
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any clinical encounter becomes scarcely more useful than taking a bunch of random pills. 
Trust is thus required to achieve the very ends of medicine. 
 
 There is, however, also a more public dimension that pertains to clinicians’ 
professional trustworthiness, which depends not only on the individual attitudes of each 
patient but also on the attitudes of society–or of specific subpopulations toward medical 
professionals in general (Wood et al. 2006). This public aspect of clinicians’ trustworthiness is 
what allows the “elegant anonymity” of medicine, and is also the precondition for any other 
individual therapeutic relationship.46 Without the trust of the public in clinicians, both clinical 
research and care delivery could not exist. As for clinical research, societal trust is pivotal in 
securing the enrolment of patients and healthy volunteers in clinical trials (Kass 1996). 
Without social trust as a guarantee that researchers would not exploit patients, medical 
knowledge cannot advance without becoming unethically coercive and manipulative.47 
Protecting and fostering clinicians’ professional trustworthiness is also crucial for delivering 
public health interventions, especially within problematic cultural and economic contexts. 
 
 Thus, to fulfill its very ends medical professionals must operate in a climate of 
minimal trust. This trust depends on the interplay of individual and public attitudes toward 
clinicians’ professional trustworthiness. Therefore, to fulfill and foster the ends of the 
medicine “The medical profession must strive to preserve the trust patients holds in their 
physicians. It cannot abandon ethical standards […] Individual physicians must work to forge 
strong alliances with their own patients, and the medical profession with the public, to 
preserve the integrity of the profession” (AMA 2001). 
 
                                                   
46 Clearly, the interpersonal an public dimensions of professional trustworthiness are intermingled and they 
mutually affect one another: someone who distrusts Western medicine would likely distrust any individual 
physician trained in Western medicine; likewise, discovering that a single physician has been for years very 
dishonest may cast doubt on the honesty of the entire medical profession as a social and institutional enterprise. 
47 Public trust is so important to pursue clinical research that it has been observed a direct correlation between 
the perceived trustworthiness of medical professionals in certain populations and the availability of scientific data 
concerning the efficacy and safety of licensed drugs in such populations (Wood et al. 2006; Freimuth 2001). 
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 How does deception threaten physicians’ professional trustworthiness? In chapter (2) I 
have argued that speakers subscribes to an implicit promise of being truthful in their 
interpersonal communications, “warranting the truth” of their statements. This implicit 
promise is what motivates our general trusting attitude toward others in most of our social 
interactions. Liars infringe on this implicit pact in order to manipulate others. In clinical 
settings doctors using deception are similarly culpable of breaking this implicit promise about 
the social attitudes that we should have in our communications. In addition to this, however, 
clinicians make also an explicit promise of being truthful in their communications with their 
patients by taking explicit oath and by promising to abide to certain professional codes. By 
violating these implicit and explicit promises to be truthful, dishonest clinicians infringe on the 
fiduciary pact that justifies their status as medical professionals.  
 
 This violation of the fiduciary pact between medical professionals and society is 
problematic due to the power-asymmetry entrenched in the doctor-patient relationship. In 
fact, dishonest physicians set themselves apart from the very conditions that allow them to be 
in a position of authority and control with respect to a vulnerable patient in need of help. 
Every time clinicians deceive a patient they also set a dangerous precedent (Jackson 2001). 
They provide the impression that they are not fully committed to the professional and moral 
requirements to which they are supposed to abide in a reciprocal exchange for their social 
status and power. If a clinician can decide to “opt out” from the moral commitments entailed 
by the fiduciary pact with society, then who can guarantee that she will abide to all the other 
moral commitments? Who can trust a clinician who is known to be a liar, as she explains why 
a particular surgical procedure has did not succeed, and has led to medical complications? 
What guarantee do we have that she will not concoct an excuse simply to pursue her ends? 
 
 To sum up, the ability of clinical medicine to pursue its ends depends at least in part 
on patients’ trust in clinicians’ professional trustworthiness, i.e. in patients’ belief and 
optimistic attitude toward the fact that clinicians and others involved in their care will be 
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sufficiently competent and morally committed as to pursue their best (medical) interests. 
Therefore, the second argument contends, if clinicians must strive to preserve and foster their 
professional trustworthiness, and deception threatens their professional trustworthiness, then 
clinicians must not deceive their patients.  
 
 
(3.2) Deception, trust and autonomy 
 
Dishonesty in the doctor-patient communication is morally problematic because it disrespects 
patient’s autonomy and jeopardizes the fiduciary pact on which any meaningful clinical 
encounter is premised. Together, these two rationales provide the basis to support the view 
that, other things being equal, honesty in professional communication should be always 
preferred to dishonesty as clinician’s default attitude. In this section we shall take a closer look 
at these two rationales, first exploring their relationship with nonmaleficence and then their 
mutual interdependence. 
 
 
(3.2.a) Deception and nonmaleficence  
 
While autonomy and trust-based arguments are both recurrent throughout the literature in 
medical ethics about deception, their relationship is seldom–if ever–clarified. For one thing, 
however, it is clear that both arguments can be reinforced by consequentialist considerations 
of nonmaleficence. While the infringement of patient’s autonomy and the breaching of the 
bond of trust between doctor and patient provide by themselves sufficient reasons to make 
deception prima facie wrong, they are even more problematic whenever they lead to harm and 
exploit patients for reasons unrelated with the promotion of their health and wellbeing. Of 
course, not every deliberate act of dishonesty has a malignant intent, as deception can be also 
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“benevolent” or “well intentioned”. Consider the case of a deceptively administered placebo 
given to an anxious patient. In this case, the act of dishonesty can be criticized using 
autonomy or trust-based arguments, but not considerations of nonmaleficence, as this 
benevolent deception is done for the good of the patient and may not harm (but see 6.9.b). 
 
 The situation is different whenever deception is used to harm and exploit patients. In 
general, there are two ways in which someone can force someone else to act against her will: 
coercion and malicious manipulation (Bok 1978). Coercion implies threats or violence, as 
when someone is coerced into lending over his pocket under the threat of physical harm. 
Manipulation, instead, entails the malicious use of lies, deception or concealment in order to 
make someone acts against his or her will.48 For instance, in Shakespeare’s Othello, Iago 
intentionally leads Othello into believing that Desdemona has cheated on him with Cassio. By 
instilling a series of false beliefs in Othello’s mind, Iago manipulates Othello’s in order to 
fulfill his own plan: taking over Cassio’s place as lieutenant. Shakespeare’s play underscores 
the coercive power that manipulation confers to those who are dishonest and the grime 
consequences that might follow for those who are manipulated.  
 
 Often, coercion and manipulation go hand in hand, as those who commit wrong 
deeds usually do not want others to discover what they have done. For example, murderers 
may deceive others to keep their plans secret, to cover up their traces afterwards, and to 
escape justice once caught by lying in the court during the trial. In these cases, the primary 
crime committed is the murder, but lies and deception are what facilitate and makes it is 
possible to commit and sometimes to get away with it. 
 
                                                   
48 In (7.4) I will distinguish between skilful and malicious manipulation. In this chapter, however, I shall speak 
only of manipulation in the former, negative, sense. 
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 In the history of medicine there are many cases in which the interplay of coercion and 
manipulation has led to abuses, exploitation and harm.49 The infamous Tuskegee syphilis study 
is, again, a paradigmatic case of how dishonesty may lead to abuses that result in disastrous 
consequences. From 1932 to 1972, American researchers form the Public Health Service 
conducted a nontherapeutic study on untreated syphilis on over 400 black men. Not only 
none of these men was informed of being enrolled in a clinical trial but, in order to preserve 
the scientific validity of the study, they were left untreated even after an efficacious remedy for 
syphilis had become available. Untreated syphilis–it is worth underscoring–is a horrible disease 
that may lead to severe pain, scars, organ and tissue damages, mutilations, fever, headaches, 
tumors, ulcers, paralysis, insanity and death (Jones 2008). Obviously, it was only due to the 
lies, deceptive practices, and the strategic concealment of relevant information that this study 
had the possibility to be settled up and continued for forty years. 
 
  The case of the Tuskegee Study well illustrates how the breaching of the bond of trust 
between researchers and society, as well as the low moral significance attributed to others’ 
autonomy, can sometimes be conductive to unethical cases of abuses, harm and exploitation. 
Therefore, aside and together with other considerations of respect for patient’s autonomy and 
trust, an additional reason to avoid dishonesty is that it may often enable and be conductive to 
other kind of unethical conduct. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
49 The medical experiments conducted by Nazi and Japanese researchers on prisoners of war during the Second 
World War involved the use of physical coercion and threats. Against their will, hundreds if not thousands of 
persons were forced to take part in human experimentations that were often deprived of a sound scientific 
rationale and had no concerns for the their psychological and physical integrity (Jones 2008). Likely, in many of 
these cases, the use of lies, deception and concealment facilitated or made possible these abuses–as when medical 
experiments are presented as being for therapeutic rather than for purely scientific purposes. 
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(3.2.b) Trust and autonomy 
 
Clarifying the relationship between the rationale grounded in the respect for patient’s 
autonomy and the one grounded in the preservation of patient’s trust is problematic. Most 
scholars tend to endorse only one of the two, and thus to problematize the morality of 
deception either by underscoring its implications for patients’ autonomy (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2009; Asai and Kadooka 2013; Foddy 2009) or for trust (Bok 1978; Jackson 2001). 
Even when both rationales are recognized, their relationship is often left unqualified, with one 
of the two taking the upper hand over the other. So how should we conceive the relationship 
between the respects of patient’s autonomy and the preservation of trust in relation to the 
ethics of deception in medicine? Are concerns about the respect for patient’s autonomy as 
important as those about trust, or should we assign a qualified priority to one of the two?  
 
 Based on what we have so far seen, I defend a position based on two key-ideas. First, 
both rationales provide independent and yet equally necessary conditions for the pursuit of 
clinical medicine as an ethical, useful and meaningful enterprise. Respecting patient’s 
autonomy and preserving trust are two fundamental conditions without which any medical 
encounter would at best be sterile and at worse unethical. The first and most important goal 
of clinical medicine is to provide care for vulnerable patients: disrespecting patient’s autonomy 
or failing to live up to the duties entrenched in the fiduciary relationship between clinicians 
and patients are both ways in which a clinician would fail to properly care for her patients.  
 
 Thus, in evaluating the morality of a deceptive act in clinical contexts, it is theoretically 
possible that considerations based either on the respect for patient’s autonomy or on trust 
may independently provide two sufficient rationales to conclude that such an act of deception 
is unethical and ought therefore not to be performed. In most of the situations, however, 
trust-based and autonomy-based considerations are likely to be both relevant and interwoven.  
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 The second idea, then, is that while the respect for patient’s autonomy and the 
preservation of trust are both necessary conditions to pursue the ends of medicine, the latter is 
the only one which can be also a sufficient condition for fulfilling such ends. While respecting 
patient’s autonomy is important in most situations, preserving trust is, instead, always 
important. Two reasons support this claim.  
 
 First, not every therapeutic encounter occurs between two competent and fully 
autonomous agents. Children, elderly persons, people with mental disabilities or impaired 
cognitive abilities, are all typical examples of vulnerable patients that may lack the capacities 
for autonomous decision-making. In these cases, it would be inappropriate to reason in terms 
of respect for autonomy (though there might be surrogate decision-makers). But whenever we 
can suspect that a patient is not competent and autonomous, preserving the bond of trust 
might still remain crucial for the success of the therapeutic encounter. Therefore, in evaluating 
the possibility of deceiving patients the preservation of trust would always be important, while 
the respect of patient’s autonomy would represent a concern only in those cases in which 
there is either a fully competent patient or surrogate decision-makers. 
 
 The second reason is that, even in those cases in which the respect for patient’s 
autonomy and the preservation of trust are equally important, fostering trust is often a 
necessary precondition for fostering autonomy. As we have seen, the principle of respect of 
patient’s autonomy can be conceptualized in the terms of two complementary prima facie 
obligations: that of not infringing patient’s liberty, and that of promoting patient’s 
autonomous decision-making. In order to respect the negative obligation of liberty, there is no 
need of building a fiduciary relationship between clinician and patient. Indeed, the lack of trust 
may be one of the most common rationales for which a patient may decide to seek another 
medical opinion–hence ditching her present doctor.  
 
 70 
 Consider the case in which a patient is fully convinced that her doctor is manipulating 
her in order to sell expensive drugs that she does not need. She decides to change doctor out 
of her distrust in that particular physician. Assuming that she is a competent agent, then, and 
in order to respect her autonomy, the doctor has simply to let her consult another 
professional, even if the clinicians did in fact behave properly. In this scenario, the doctor may 
still respect patient’s autonomy even in absence of a fiduciary relationship–indeed even in the 
presence of open distrust.  
 
 On any account, however, this clinical encounter is far from being an ideal one in 
which a patient and a doctor cooperate to achieve an improvement in patient’s health and 
wellbeing. The patient has not received the help she needed, and the doctor has failed to 
provide medical care to someone who likely was in need of it. Both have lost time, probably 
money, and certainly their positive mood. Respecting patient’s autonomy by refraining from 
infringing on patient’s liberty is thus always important, but not sufficient to fulfill the positive 
ends of medicine. To achieve this latter aim something more is required, namely, the positive 
enhancement of patient’s autonomy.  
 
 In order to respect patient’s autonomy in this broader sense, however, a relationship 
based on mutual trust is always necessary because “for a person to be appropriately 
‘informed’, much less uncoerced and free in giving consent, trust remains the sine qua non for 
the professional’s disclosure of pertinent information, as well as for the actions proposed and 
carried out. Professional trustworthiness is still a critical issue in constant needs of warranting 
trust in every individual encounter” (Zaner 1991, 56). Therefore, not only preserving trust can 
be legitimately expected to be important in more situations than those in which respecting 
patient’s autonomy would provide an equally compelling prima facie rationale to avoid 
deception (because not every patient is competent), but also in those cases in which the 
respect of patient’s autonomy entails the positive empowerment of patient’s agency, fostering 
trust remains a precondition for fostering autonomy.  
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 To sum up, often the primary concern while evaluating the moral implications of 
dishonesty is the infringement of the fiduciary pact between doctor and patient and thus the 
possible loss of clinician’s perceived trustworthiness. While concerns about autonomy and 
beneficence are always important, often it is the possible breach of the bond of trust the 
primary moral concern that ought to be considered while evaluating dishonesty in clinical 
contexts. Respecting patient’s autonomy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
success of every therapeutic relationship, while preserving and fostering the bond of trust may 
be–and often is–a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve meaningful and positive 
therapeutic relationships. 
 
 
(3.3) Deception and the “discrepancy of the perspectives”  
 
Every act of deception requires someone who deceives and someone who is deceived. While 
from a logical point of view they are equally important, from a moral point of view there is 
usually a capital difference in how the two may appraise the moral implications of the same 
deceptive act. Dan Ariel (2012, 31), in his book The Honest Truth about Dishonesty, illustrates this 
point with the following joke: 
 
Eight-year-old Jimmy comes home from school with a note from his teacher that says, 
“Jimmy stole a pencil from the student sitting next to him.” Jimmy’s father is furious. He 
goes to great lengths to lecture Jimmy and let him know how upset and disappointed he 
is, and he grounds the boy for two weeks. “And just wait until your mother comes 
home!” he tells the boy ominously. Finally, he concludes, “Anyway, Jimmy, if you need a 
pencil, why didn’t you just say something? Why didn’t you simply ask? You know very 
well that I can bring you dozens of pencils from work”. 
 
 This joke underscores how we tend to appraise the morality of the same deceptive act 
in different ways depending on whether we are the ones who commits it or the ones who are 
subjected to it. Sissela Bok has defined this phenomenon as the one of “discrepant 
perspectives” in reference to lies, but her conclusions can be easily generalized to all other 
instances of deception (1978, 17-31). In this section I will build on Bok’s analysis to show how 
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the phenomenon of the “discrepancy of the perspectives” may introduce a structural bias 
whenever we ought to identify and weight the reasons in favor or against a deceptive act. To 
do so, let us briefly explore how the deceiver and the deceived may come to articulate 
differently their views with respect to the same deceptive act. 
 
 Let us first take a closer look at the perspective of the deceived. Usually, people who 
discover that others have deceived them about something important feel betrayed and coerced 
(Bok 1978). Image that you discover you have a rare genetic disease but that your parents have 
concealed this information. Suddenly, the symptoms begin to appear and, after the first 
medical consultation, it is clear that your life will never be same: the disease will progress 
rapidly, and your entire life-plan needs to be reconsidered. Contrary to your expectations, you 
will not marry, change job, or travel. Moreover, you do not know if you have already 
transmitted the disease to your kids; because you were left in the dark, you could have harmed 
others without intention. It is hard to see how one would not feel unjustly manipulated in this 
situation. Moreover, that those who lied were the parents may aggravate the situation: the 
more we trusted those who have deceived us, the more we feel betrayed by them. 
 
 Deceiving over such important matters is not easy to excuse, not even when others 
declare that they have acted “for our own good”. In the previous example, our parents could 
justify the deception by saying that they wanted us to live a happy life until the onset of the 
disease. Though comprehensible to some extent, one can always object to this decision is 
unjustly paternalistic. When we assume the perspective of the deceived, we tend to blame 
others not only for the consequences of the deception, but also because they have prevented 
us to act as we would have done if had we know the truth. Even if the final outcome was “for 
the good”, in these situations we may nonetheless feel wronged because we were spoiled of 
our capacity for self-determination. This may lead the deceived to disvalue what has been 
achieved through the act benevolent or paternalistic deception. By contrast, it is usually hard 
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for those who act paternalistically to image what it feels like to be manipulated, and thus to 
assess all the consequences of their actions from the point of view of those subjected to them. 
 
 Of course, the situation is even worse when we also find ourselves worse off because 
of the deceivers’ behavior. In these cases the blame for their betrayal is summed to the 
perceived disrespect for our autonomy and to the costs and negative consequences that we 
suffered because of the deception. This deception must not regard important issues to be 
morally problematic, or to have significant consequences. As noted in previous chapters, lies, 
deception and concealment often lay on a continuum. Sometimes lies are just trivial, and the 
acts of deception amounts to nothing but a white lie. Yet, by assuming the perspective of the 
deceived, also the most trivial of the lies may induce the most corrosive of the suspects. As 
noted by Bok, “since we, when lied to, have no way to judge which lies are trivial ones, and 
since we have no confidence that liars will restrict themselves to just such trivial lies, the 
perspective of the deceived leads us to be way of all deception” (Bok 1978, 21).  
 
 Finally, the perspective of the deceived is not just an individual affair. Everyone who 
bears the consequence of an act of dishonesty may come to share the same point of view. The 
consequences of discovering that a beloved relative has died because of a medical error, which 
then clinicians have tried to hide, are likely to invest not just the closest caregivers, but also 
everyone who was sufficiently attached to that unfortunate person. And if the case is made 
public, other people may as well assume the “perspective of deceived”, generalizing from that 
particular case to their own particular situation. 
 
 By contrast, those assuming the deceiver’s perspective have usually very different 
concerns. People can deceive because they have selfish interests, for the fun and pleasure of it, 
for the good of others, or to achieve greater goals. In any case, “[liars] share with those they 
deceive the desire not to be deceived. As a result, their choice to lie is one that they would like 
to reserve for themselves while insisting that others must be honest. They would prefer, in 
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other words, a “free-rider” status, to get all the benefits of lying without the risks of being lied 
to (Bok 1978, 23). (Would the parents in the previous example be happy to discover that their 
son has deceived them on something of comparable importance?) To justify their free-rider 
status, the deceivers may invoke different personal or professional reasons, like physicians and 
healers in the past who reserved from themselves the possibility to lie to patients while 
pretending from them a full commitment to truthfulness. Usually, the deceivers tend to 
disguise their selfish motives of action as altruistic ones, claiming that the deception was not 
meant for their private good, but for those of the deceived.  
 
 While assuming the perspective of the deceiver, people tend to judge themselves in a 
benevolent and optimistic way, detailing all the circumstances that justify their behavior while 
downplaying the costs and risks of their decisions for others. As Bok notes, “The most serious 
miscalculation people make when weighing lies is to evaluate the costs and benefits of a 
particular lie in an isolated case, and then to favor lies if the benefits seem to outweigh the 
costs. In so doing they risk blinding themselves to the effect that such lying can have on their 
integrity and self-respect, and to the jeopardy in which they place others” (Bok 1978: xix). For 
example people tend to judge the same situation quite differently depending on whether they 
are the cheaters or the ones that have been cheated on.  
 
 To see how the “discrepancy of the perspectives” can lead to suboptimal moral 
decisions, consider the example of a fictional court of law that is called to decide about a 
criminal accusation. There are only three persons who are participating in the trial: the victim, 
the judge, and the indicted. The trial is organized in three moments: first it is randomly 
selected whether it is the victim or the indicted the one who will first present her version of 
the facts, then there is the actual exposition, and finally the judge emits a verdict. The judge is 
called to decide only after she has heard both the perspective of the victim and the one of the 
indicted, and has had the opportunity of appraising and pondering their respective force.  
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 Now, consider what would happen if either the indicted or the victim would assume 
the role of the judge: would the final verdict be equally impartial as when it is pronounced by a 
non-interested party? Probably not, for this is precisely why an impartial judge is needed in the 
first place. If those who are indicted become the judges, then they will tend more often than 
not to excuse themselves and to assign to themselves lighter punishments with respect to 
completely impartial judges. Likewise, if the victims become the judges, then they will tend 
more often than not to condemn the indicted and to assign them heavier punishments with 
respect to what impartial judges would tend to do. In both cases, the final verdict is likely to 
be skewed in one sense or the other. Arguably we are not very impartial as we are called to 
decide upon matters in which we have high and potentially conflicting personal interests. 
 
 These biases would become even worse if either the victim or the indicted assume 
both the role of the judge and that of their counterpart. In this scenario, not only one would 
emit the verdict while being in “conflict of interests”, but such a conflict would also not be 
mitigated by hearing the other’s reasons, that is, either the reasons of those who have 
committed something blameworthy or the reasons of those who have been subjected to those 
culpable actions. Bok’s intuition about the “discrepancy of the perspective” is that whenever 
we are privately evaluating the morality of a deceptive act the same considerations apply; and 
it is thus safe to assume that neither those who deceive nor those who are deceived can be 
considered as fully impartial and fair judges of such an action: the deceivers will tend to excuse 
their behavior, while the duped will tend to magnify the moral blame of the deception. 
  
 How could the “discrepancy of the perspective” influence the way in which we should 
evaluate the morality of a deceptive act in clinical settings? Based on what we have seen in 
previous chapters, there are at least three levels at which this phenomenon may introduce a 
bias in our moral judgments. First, it may influence the way in which we recognize that we are 
lying, deceiving and concealing information to others; that is, it may influence our awareness 
about our own dishonesty (Ariel 2012). Secondly, it may distort our moral evaluations.  
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 According to the Rossian theory hat I have assumed, once two prima facie obligations 
are in conflict we need to determine what is our actual obligation in those specific 
circumstances. To do so, we have to balance the reasons supporting the case for one 
obligation with those supporting the case for the conflicting one, determining which one 
overrides the other all things considered. Here the discrepancy of the perspective may 
introduce a twofold bias: it may lead us to cherry-pick the reasons in favor or in support to a 
given deceptive act; and it may lead us to assign skewed weights to the reasons that are in 
conflict with our interests with respect to those that are contrary to them. Either way, we are 
likely to take biased decisions as to which obligation should be our actual duty in any one case. 
 
 In sum, the moral phenomenon of the “discrepancy of the perspective” points at a 
structural unbalance between the ways in which those who deceive and those who are 
deceived may appraise the consequences, severity, and respective weights of the same 
deceptive act. If this is correct, then it follows that, while evaluating the morality of a 
deceptive act, considering only one of the two sides is never enough, for each is likely to be 
biased and limited. Therefore, to take more fair and impartial judgments, for each act of 
deception we must always consider both the deceiver and the deceived’s perspective. 
 
 
(3) Summary  
 
In this chapter I have discussed two arguments supporting the view that dishonesty is prima 
facie wrong in clinical contexts: the first concerns the principle of respect for patient’s 
autonomy; the second concerns the preservation of trust between doctors and patients. Then, 
I have argued for the view that both rationales provide necessary conditions for having a 
positive clinical encounter, but that in many cases trust is to be expected as the sole sufficient 
condition. Moreover, following Bok’s account, we have also seen how we have a structural 
tendency in our judgments to evaluate the same deceptive act differently depending on 
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whether we assume the deceiver or the deceived’s perspective; and thus how the “discrepancy 
of the perspectives” may introduce a structural bias in our moral justifications. 
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4. Deception and Moral Justification  
 
 
 
When regard for truth has been broken down or even slightly weakened,  
all things will remain doubtful.  
St. Augustine 
 
 
Is it good for us professional men to have our reputations rest on the expectation of not being 
found out? 
Richard Cabot 
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(4) Introduction 
 
This chapter analyzes the limits of other accounts that have been elaborated to deal with the 
moral implications of deception in clinical medicine. Section (4.1) identifies six different 
positions depending on whether (i) one assumes trust, autonomy or both as the main 
rationale(s) to avoid deception–hence distinguishing between “autonomy-based”, “trust-
based”, and “balanced” positions–, and on whether (ii) one allows or not for qualified 
exceptions to the duty of veracity–hence distinguishing between “categorical” and 
“exceptionalist” positions. Section (4.2) sets forth the view that all categorical positions equally 
fail in providing an adequate theoretical framework to think about the morality of deception in 
medicine. Section (4.3) explains why the dominant perspective currently endorsed in medical 
ethics–i.e. Beauchamp and Childress’s “justified hard paternalism”–is problematic because it 
does not take into adequate consideration some key features characterizing the morality of 
deception. Finally, section (4.3) inquires into the limits of the categorical trust-based account 
elaborated by Jackson (2001), showing how it misconstrues the moral phenomenon of trust 
 
 
(4.1) Dishonesty in medical ethics: six possible positions 
 
So far I have defended a position according to which we should allow for some exceptions to 
clinicians’ duty of veracity: while truthfulness is extremely valuable in medical contexts, 
sometimes there are greater values at stake which might compel clinicians to resort to 
dishonesty. But how can we distinguish those cases in which situational dishonesty is morally 
permissible from those in which we should instead stand firm by the duty of veracity? The 
answer to this latter question largely depends on the position that one assumes as to why 
dishonesty is morally problematic in the first place.  
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 In the previous chapter I argued that there are at least two equally necessary and 
independent reasons to conclude that dishonesty is undesirable in medicine: one regards the 
respect of patient’s autonomy, and the other the preservation of the bond of trust between 
doctors and patients. Though almost any view acknowledges the importance of these two 
rationales, there are significant differences as to the weight that various accounts assign to 
them. In particular, within contemporary medical ethics, there exists a relevant difference 
between those perspectives that assign a theoretical priority to the rationale grounded in the 
principle of respect of autonomy and those that, instead, assign a priority to the rationale 
centered on trust. Accordingly, a first major difference is between “autonomy-based” and 
“trust-based” views. Clearly, another logical possibility is that of recognizing both rationales 
are equally necessary and important; in this latter case I shall speak of “balanced” perspectives. 
 
 The second difference regards whether one allows for exceptions to the duty of 
veracity. Here there are but two possibilities: “categorical” positions that do not allow for 
exceptions; and “exceptionalist” positions that, instead, do allow for exceptions and regard the 
duty of veracity to be a prima facie duty. With these differences in mind, it is possible to capture 
most of the positions now uphold in medical ethics within the following schema: 
 
 
(I) 
Categorical 
Autonomy-based 
 
 
(III) 
Categorical 
Trust-based 
 
 
(V) 
Categorical 
Balanced 
 
(II) 
Exceptionalist 
Autonomy-based 
 
(IV) 
Exceptionalist 
Trust-based 
 
(VI) 
Exceptionalist 
Balanced 
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 In the next chapter I will articulate a balanced exceptionalist view (vi in the above 
schema). This view is “balanced” because it identifies in the preservation of patient’s trust and 
in the respect of patient’s autonomy two equally important aspects hat should always be 
considered while evaluating the moral implications of a deceptive act; and it is “exceptionalist” 
because it allows for qualified exceptions to the duty of veracity, which is then conceptualized 
as a prima facie duty and not as a categorical obligation.  This position, I will argue, is superior 
to other solutions because it avoids some of their major limitations while having some 
significant advantages.  
 
 To unpack this latter claim in this chapter we shall analyze some of rival solutions that 
other scholars have set forth to deal with the morality of deception in clinical medical. We 
shall review the positions (I), (II), (III), and (V), underscoring in each case their possible 
limitations. We shall proceed in the following way. First, I shall criticize all categorical views 
(I-III-V) insofar as a commitment to absolute veracity expose them to the same general 
critiques. Then, I shall criticize the dominant approach in contemporary medical ethics (II): 
the autonomy-based exceptionalist position elaborated by Beauchamp and Childress in their 
classical Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Finally, I shall refute some of the arguments that support 
another alternative that is currently gaining momentum in medical ethics: the categorical trust-
based position (III) defended, among others, by Jackson (2001). 
 
 
(4.2) The limits of categorical positions 
 
According to categorical positions, dishonesty is never justifiable in clinical settings. In 
general, there are two classical critiques advanced to categorical views: one concerning the 
legitimacy of the conflicts of duties arising in medical contexts, and the other related to the 
practical difficulty of specifying the limits of a categorical ban of dishonesty. As we have 
 82 
already discussed the main arguments underpinning these two critiques in previous chapters, 
here we shall only recapitulate their main tenets. 
 
 The first critique is that clinicians’ obligation of veracity may legitimately conflict with 
their obligations of beneficence or nonmaleficence (see 1.4.d). As in the case of the “murderer 
at the door”, sometimes it is highly counterintuitive to argue in favor of a categorical duty of 
veracity. Likewise, in medical contexts clinicians must often face what seem to be legitimate 
moral dilemmas involving a conflict of obligations. A typical example is when oncologists 
must disclose bad prognostic news to highly vulnerable patients. While there are several ways 
in which the impact of bad news can be mitigated, sometimes a clinician may suspect that by 
disclosing the truth she will irremediably harm her patient in a way that is incompatible with 
the provision of care and with the respect of the patient’s dignity. In these cases it arises for 
clinicians a moral dilemma involving, on the one hand, their duty of veracity and, on the other 
hand, their duties of beneficence and nonmaleficence. Though these cases may be rare, in 
such exceptional circumstances it is generally recognized that the clinician may justifiably opt 
for paternalistic deception. For this reason, categorical positions are rarely upheld in medical 
ethics without important qualifications. 
 
 Another challenge faced by categorical views is that of specifying the limits of their 
categorical ban. In fact, whenever this ban is extended to every kind of dishonest practices 
including deception and concealment, categorical positions seem to become too demanding. A 
duty of absolute honesty entails not only that clinicians must never lie, but also that they must 
never deceive. In difference to the definition of lying, however, the one of deception is much 
broader and it far from clear that all acts of deception should be considered morally 
problematic. Recall that deception is generally defined as “intentionally causing someone to 
have a false belief that the deceiver believes to be false” (Chisholm and Feehan 1977; Carson 
2010, 46; Gold and Lichtenberg 2014, 220). According to this definition someone wearing 
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black clothes to look thinner would be technically deceiving others, as this would qualify as an 
attempt to instill a false belief about his or her real body-shape.  
 
 This conclusion, however, is highly counterintuitive, as there seems to be a relevant 
moral difference between someone who is deceiving a person about her previous studies (e.g. 
by exercising the medical profession with a fake medical degree), and someone who is instead 
wearing the clothes that she thinks would look best on her (see below). In fact, we may rightly 
feel betrayed by the first person–i.e. the fake doctor–and not from the second, as in common 
circumstances we do not expect others to look “exactly as they are” in order to be moral 
agent. Likewise, people using make-up are generally not accused of misleading others about 
their real appearance. Thus, whenever a duty of honesty includes all possible forms of 
technical deception, it leads to counterintuitive consequences.  
 
 One possibility to escape this objection is to limit the categorical ban only to lies. 
Given that analysis done in chapter (2), however, also this theoretical option seems to run into 
insurmountable difficulties: in practice there is no sharp moral difference between lies and 
deception, as they are always context-dependent and audience-sensitive. Lies are generally 
more culpable than deception, but there are clear cases in which it is precisely the reverse. 
Sometimes an act of deception can disrupt trust and disrespect patient’s autonomy more, or at 
least equally, as the telling of an open lie; in other contexts, instead, lies may not be morally 
problematic, as when someone replies “Good” to the generic question “How are you today?” 
even if she is not feeling perfectly right.  
 
 Furthermore, supporters of a categorical ban on lies tend also to endorse a too relaxed 
view concerning the moral relevance of deception. In fact, in order to justify the limitation of 
the categorical ban only to lying, these views must emphasize the moral differences between 
lying and deception. Though these difference may appear clear in ad hoc fictional scenarios, 
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they are generally more blurred in real contexts where lies and deception tend instead to “spill 
over” one into the other (see 2.2). On this issue I side with Bakhurst (1992, 63) who noted, 
 
the claim that there is a general, morally relevant difference between lying and intentional 
deception is false […] the resulting position trivialises the moral significance of deception, 
and encourages a form of medical paternalism, where doctors may, ‘for the patient’s well-
being’, control the ‘dosage’ of information the patient receives, so long as they do not lie. 
This seems a position designed to satisfy no one: while advocates of paternalist medicine 
will resist the restriction against lying (if paternalism is justified why be weak-kneed about 
it?), its opponents will charge [those defending this position] with supporting practices 
that, however well intentioned, are ultimately degrading to patients. 
 
 Thus, limiting the categorical ban to lies seems to introduce theoretical difficulties that 
are at least as problematic as those that such proposal was meant to resolve in the first place.  
 
 In sum, categorical positions run into two general difficulties. First, they are ill suited 
for medical contexts where the primary duty of the clinician is not toward veracity but toward 
helping vulnerable patients. Other things being equal, doctors should be truthful to their 
patients. However, sometimes things are not equal, and therefore clinicians have to choose 
between conflicting duties. Second, there are several practical and theoretical difficulties that 
arise from the very idea of applying a perspective that is “categorical” to something that is 
context and audience-dependent as veracity in interpersonal communication. In particular, 
these views are open to the criticism concerning the extension of their categorical ban. If the 
ban is intended in an absolute sense, then it becomes clearly too demanding, as it would turn 
socially accepted practices into morally blameworthy acts. If, instead, the ban is limited only to 
lies and not to deception, then these views introduce an untenable difference between the 
moral import of lying and deception which then lead to endorse a too rigid perspective on 
lying and a too relaxed approach on the risks of condoning deceptive practices.  
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(4.3) The limits of exceptionalist autonomy-based positions 
 
The second kind of positions that we shall analyze are those that are autonomy-based and 
exceptionalist. For these perspectives the key moral issue pertaining to the use of lying, 
deception and concealment in medicine regards the infringement of patient’s autonomy. 
However, these perspectives are also exceptionalist, as they specify the principle of respect for 
patient’s autonomy in terms of two prima facie duties: the negative obligation to respect 
patient’s liberty, and the positive obligation to respect patient’s autonomy (see 3.2).50 This 
position is by far the dominant one in the medical ethics.  
 
 According to Beauchamp and Childress (2009), whenever doctors lie and deceive for 
“the good of the patient”, they are acting paternalistically. Accordingly, to decide whether our 
actual duty is to deceive a patient in a given scenario, we should ask whether the 
corresponding act of medical paternalism is morally justifiable. Consequently, the problem of 
justifying a deceptive act becomes, for those supporting this view, the problem of justifying an 
act of medical paternalism, where “paternalism” is here defined as “the intentional overriding 
of one person’s preferences or actions by another person, where the person who overrides 
justifies this action by appeal to the goal of benefiting or preventing or mitigating harm to the 
person whose preferences or actions are overridden” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 208).  
 
 However, not every act of paternalism is equal, and we should distinguish between soft 
and hard paternalism. In cases of soft paternalism, the clinician intervenes for the patient’s 
good with the aim of preventing substantially nonvoluntary conduct. Examples of agents who 
act nonvoluntary are those in which people are severely depressed, mentally ill, or are under 
the effects of drugs that prevent them from acting competently. In all these cases the 
autonomy of the agent is compromised, and thus any paternalistic act would qualify as an act 
of soft paternalism. For example, if we prevent someone having drug-induced hallucinations 
                                                   
50 Consistently with the previous chapter, by “autonomy” I shall here mean the principle of respect for autonomy 
as Beauchamp and Childress have articulated it in their classical Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009). 
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from jumping off a bridge, we would act paternalistically, as we would infringe on this 
person’s liberty of action. But since this person is also temporarily not an autonomous agent 
due to the effects of the drugs, then our act would qualify as an act of soft paternalism. Usually, 
soft paternalism is considered to be morally justifiable, as the infringement of patient’s 
autonomy is either negligible or non-existent since the patient was not able to decide and act 
autonomously in the first place.  
 
 By contrast, in the case of hard paternalism, clinicians infringe on patient’s autonomy 
by restricting/distorting the information available to the patient or by overriding patient’s 
deliberate choices. A paradigmatic example of hard paternalism is when a clinician decides to 
withhold information about a bad diagnosis or prognosis on the supposition that breaking this 
news would have fatal or irreversible negative effects for the health of the patient (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2009, 211). This is the only class of cases that is relevant for the present analysis, 
and consequently the only one that we shall now analyze.  
 
 Thus, the question becomes: following this view, how can we distinguish those cases 
in which hard paternalism is morally permissible? According to Beauchamp and Childress, the 
answer to this question is that hard paternalism is more easily justified whenever the 
prospective infringement of patient’s autonomy are minimal and the benefits relevant or, 
more precisely, “As a person’s interests in autonomy increase and the benefits for that person 
decrease, the justification of paternalistic action becomes less plausible; conversely, as the 
benefits for a person increase and the person’s autonomy interests decrease, the justification 
of paternalistic action becomes less plausible” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 214). To 
specify this position, they propose (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 216) the following five 
conditions in which hard paternalism can be justified: 
 
1. A patient is at risk of a significant, preventable harm. 
2. The paternalistic action will probably prevent the harm. 
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3. The projected benefits to the patient of the paternalistic action outweigh its 
risks to the patient. 
4. There is no reasonable alternative to the limitation of autonomy. 
5. The least autonomy-restrictive alternative that will secure the benefits and 
reduce the risks is adopted  
 
 At the level of public interventions, a typical example of a hard paternalistic 
intervention meeting all these conditions is the mandatory law of wearing seatbelts while 
driving. This law is paternalistic because the state infringes on citizen’s liberty of not fastening 
their seatbelts. But why is such paternalistic policy morally justifiable? Following the above 
criteria, the answer is that not wearing seatbelts exposes patients to the risk of significant and 
preventable harm; enforcing a policy of wearing seatbelts will probably prevent this harm; the 
projected benefits vastly outweigh the risks; population-wise, these risks cannot be prevented 
by other means than making seatbelts mandatory; seatbelts represent the least autonomy-
restrictive alternative available (rather than, say, forbid driving). In the case of seatbelts, 
Beauchamp and Childress’s view seems to provide an adequate way of determining why such 
an intervention is justifiable. In this example the act of hard paternalistic concerns a public 
intervention at the population level. Nevertheless, the criteria proposed by Beauchamp and 
Childress seem to capture the fundamental features of this scenario inasmuch as the law of 
enforcing seatbelts infringes on individual liberty, and individual liberty is one of the 
conditions for exercising individual autonomy. But the same perspective applies to similar 
cases in medical contexts, as the following one: 
 
After receiving his preoperative medicine, C, a 23-year-old male athlete scheduled for a 
hernia repair, states that he does not want the side rails up. C is of clear mind and 
understands why the rule is required; however, C does not feel the rule should apply to 
him because he is not the least but drowsy from the preoperative medication and he has 
no intention of falling out of bed. After considerable discussion between the nurse and 
patient, the nurse responsible for C’s care puts the side rails up. Her justification is as 
follows: C is not drowsy because he has just received the preoperative medication, and its 
effects have not occurred. Furthermore, if he follows the typical pattern of patients 
receiving this medication in this dosage, he will become drowsy very quickly. A drowsy 
patient is at risk for a fall. Since there is no family at the hospital to remain with the 
patient, and since the nurses on the unit are exceptionally busy, no one can constantly 
stay with C to monitor his level of alertness. Under these circumstances the patient must 
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be protected from the potential harm of a fall, despite the fact that he does not want this 
protection […] The nurse restricted this autonomous patient’s liberty based on […] 
protection of the patient from potential harm […] and not as a hedge against liability or 
for protection from criticism (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 215). 
 
 Like in the case of seatbelts, Beauchamp and Childress argue that the decision of the 
nurse represented an instance of hard but justified paternalism. In fact, the patient was at risk 
of harming himself and that harm was easily preventable; the putting up of the side rails is 
efficacious in preventing this harm from happening; the prospective benefits clearly outweigh 
the “risks” of having side rails around one’s bed; no other alternative was available to prevent 
that kind of harm; side rails were the least autonomy-restrictive measure (e.g. in compares to, 
say, tying up the patient to the bed). Both in the seatbelts and in the side-rails case, 
Beauchamp and Childress’s account of justified hard paternalism accounts for why such 
paternalistic restrictions of liberty appear to be morally justifiable all things considered. 
 
 However, this perspective is not unproblematic. In particular, lies and deceptive 
communications are not side-rails, and the moral phenomenon of dishonesty has several 
distinctive features that here are not taken into adequate consideration. In particular, 
dishonesty has significant implications for the preservation and the fostering of the bond of 
trust between doctor and patient. While the perspective of justified paternalism endorsed by 
Beauchamp and Childress–and by reflection by most of mainstream medical ethics–may 
provide a reliable tool for deciding whether instances of hard paternalism are justified in cases 
analogous to the one of side-rails, it is at least questionable whenever it applies equally well to 
cases in which the paternalistic act involves dishonesty. More specifically, and given what we 
have seen, I argue that, contrary to what is usually assumed, whenever this perspective is 
applied to justify cases of benevolent deception it runs into serious objections. 
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(4.3.a) Overemphasizing autonomy, downplaying trust  
 
By definition, autonomy-based perspectives consider the infringement of patient’s autonomy 
to be the chief moral issue entailed in the use of dishonest practices. In fact, following these 
views, in order to decide whether or not an act of deceptive hard paternalism is justifiable, we 
must balance considerations of nonmaleficence and beneficence against considerations of 
respect for patient’s autonomy. Focusing only on considerations of autonomy may be 
appropriate for paternalistic acts such as the State’s policy of making seatbelts mandatory, but 
less so in the case of lies, deception and concealment of medically relevant information.  
 
 The paternalistic rationale justifying the mandatory enforcing of seatbelts does not 
entail any breach of trust between the State and drivers; nor the does so the example of the 
nurse: indeed the patient would perceive the putting up of side rails as a constrain of his 
liberty rather than as a betrayal of some obligations of fidelity. By contrast, the case of a 
deceptive placebo sneaked into a patient’s injection seems to call into question a different 
moral phenomenon, as it does not only infringe on patient’s autonomy but it also potentially 
compromises the trust between doctors and patients. 
 
 If what I have argued so far is correct, then, in the cases in which an act of hard 
paternalism involves an act of dishonesty it makes little sense to consider only the rationale for 
autonomy and not the one for trust. To be fair, in other parts of their account Beauchamp and 
Childress recognize that to be trustworthy is a fundamental virtue for clinicians, and that 
preserving patient’s trust is essential to pursue the ends of medicine. However, these 
considerations do not seem to do any relevant moral role when it comes to decide whether an 
act of hard paternalism involving the use of dishonest communication is morally permissible. 
 
 In sum, if considerations of respect for patient’s autonomy are always crucial, they are 
not the only ones deserving our attention, and often not even the most important ones in 
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evaluating whether of not an act of dishonesty is morally permissible. Moreover, taking such a 
narrow perspective exposes autonomy-based and exceptionalist positions to other two 
objections: the one of creating a biased “moral perspectivism”, and the one of increasing the 
suspiciousness toward medical professionals. 
 
 
(4.3.b) Moral perspectivism 
 
In evaluating the moral permissibility of a deceptive act, autonomy-centered exceptionalist 
positions run into the risk of adopting a univocal and one-sided moral perspectivism. In fact, 
what it required on the part of the physicians is just to balance between the prospective 
health-benefits and the prospective infringement of patient’s autonomy. This methodology, 
however, does not adequately take into account what, following Bok’s analysis, we have 
labeled as the “discrepancy of the perspectives”; that is, the tendency to evaluate differently 
the risks and consequences of an act of deception depending on which of the two 
perspectives is articulated: the deceiver or the deceived’s one.  
 
 Without further qualifications, clinicians adopting the view of “justified hard 
paternalism” as proposed by Beauchamp and Childress would invariably tend to articulate 
only their perspective. Of course clinicians taking this view should ask themselves what kind of 
implications would follow from deceptive act for that particular patient. To some extent, then, 
the circumstances and preferences of the patient are factored in while balancing the reasons 
behind each possible course of actions and thus before taking the final decision about whether 
a certain deceptive act is morally permissible. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to presume that in 
each case patient’s preferences are determined just from the point of view of the clinicians 
who is evaluating the possibility of being dishonest, and not from the point of view of the 
patient who will be subjected to deceptive act.  
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 As we have seen in (3.3), this may bias the moral appraisal of a deceptive act at 
difference level. Even if we consider only the rationale for respecting patient’s autonomy, 
considering only our own perspective could lead us to unwanted consequences, such as to a 
failure in recognizing that we are acting paternalistically; a biased identification of the reasons 
supporting our paternalistic act; overlook other truthful non-paternalistic alternatives, and so 
on. The risk, then, is that the process of moral justification envisioned by these perspectives is, 
at least in the case of deception, systematically skewed on the perspective of the physicians. 
 
 
(4.3.c) Arbitrariness and suspiciousness  
 
Another objection to which autonomy-based exceptionalist positions are exposed is that they 
foster a climate of suspiciousness. Not only these views articulate only the perspective of the 
clinician, but the doctor is also the only one who knows the final result of each decision-
making process. Clinicians who judge that a deceptive act is morally permissible are never 
compelled to disclose, at any given time, to the patient in question that they have done so for 
his or her benefits. In other words, not only autonomy-based exceptionalist positions grant to 
the clinicians the dubious ability of being able to fairly articulate the patient’s perspective, but 
they also grant to clinicians the possibility of keeping such choices perfectly secret. As long as 
the clinician judges that she has acted in an ethical and fair way, she must never reveal the use 
of deceptive means. Failing to disclose an act of hard paternalistic dishonesty is never a 
morally problematic. This view, I contend, is problematic for two reasons. 
 
 First, it grants to clinicians the best possible conditions for profiting by the “free-rider 
status” that dishonesty grants to those who take the deceiver’s perspective: clinicians are 
always the judges, the executors, and those who can excuse their own conduct. This condition may 
introduce several bias in our moral judgments because of the” discrepancy of the perspective”. 
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Secondly, this practice may indirectly foster a climate of lowered trust toward medical 
professionals. In fact, within this view, there is always the possibility for clinicians to unjustly 
distort or withhold information relevant for patients.  
  
 This suspiciousness may arises because physicians have a prima facie duty of veracity 
and yet are not compelled to disclose whether they plan to, or have already broken, such 
obligation. Accordingly, there is no way of telling whether a clinician is honest or whether she 
is systematically breaking her obligation of veracity. In normal contexts, this suspiciousness 
does not arise because of the minimal trust grounding each the therapeutic relationship. We 
normally trust that our clinicians will not act too paternalistically and will not harm and exploit 
us. However, the nature of trust-relationships is essentially diachronic and frail (see next 
section). Thus, we may normally trust our clinicians, but we would become very suspicious 
whenever we assume the perspective of the deceived, for example if we uncover that our 
clinician has prescribed us a inert placebo as if it was an active medication. In this case, 
interpersonal trust may fall below a minimal threshold, and it is likely to remain so precisely 
because we are now aware that doctors can decide to deceive us and yet are never compelled 
to reveal whenever they have made an exception to the duty of veracity. 
 
 In these circumstances, this unaccountability may lead to legitimately suspect of 
clinicians’ moral integrity. Since each infringement of the prima facie duty of veracity may and is 
likely to remain secret, then, from the point of view of patients or society, there is no way of 
telling to what extent physicians are upholding their duties of honesty and, by extension, they 
wider set of obligations entrenched in their fiduciary pact with patients and society. 
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(4.4) The limits of trust-based categorical perspectives  
 
The third possibility is to take a trust-based categorical approach. According to this view, the 
primary concern while we evaluate the morality of a deceptive act concerns the preservation 
of the bond of trust between doctor and patient (or medicine and society). These perspectives 
are categorical on precautionary and consequentialist grounds: since they consider trust to be 
the condition sine-qua-non therapeutic relationships exist, and there is always the possibility that 
even a small act of dishonesty might have catastrophic consequences for trust, then–it is 
claimed–no act of dishonesty should be permissible. In other words, given its potential 
consequences for something as fundamental as trust, according to these views we should 
enforce a categorical ban of all dishonest practices. Limiting the scope of this claim to lies, 
Jackson has defended precisely this view according to which: 
 
The commitment not to lie is only persuasive and reliable if it is an unqualified and non-
discretionary commitment. Anything short of this does not work. Exceptions that are 
implicit are maybe even more liable to expand and weaken our reliance on the rule. At 
least if the exception is spelled out there is a possibility that the precedent will be 
reflected on and that some attempt will be made to fit subsequent exceptions within it. 
Anyway, whether we do it implicitly or explicitly, when we make an exception we set a 
precedent (Jackson 2001, 135).  
 
 Since each lie sets a “precedent”, in Jackson’s view clinicians should have an absolute 
moral duty never to lie (though she does not consider problematic deception and 
concealment!). Notice how this argument explicitly builds upon the previous objection moved 
to autonomy-based exceptionalist positions: since clinicians must not disclose when, how and 
why an exception to the rule of veracity has been made, one can never know whether doctors 
have been honest in their communications; consequently, one can always suspect that 
clinicians do not respect their duties of veracity (and by extension their other duties), 
especially those who have been already deceived. Apart from our trust, who can guarantee that 
physicians are honest if we have no way of knowing when and how they have secretly decided 
to violate their prima facie duty or veracity? 
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 As in the next chapter I will defend a balanced perspective, I share three core 
assumptions with the view that motivates this interrogative. First, for the reasons that we have 
seen in (3.2), trust is the pivotal concept for constructing a moral theory of how we should 
deal with honesty (and dishonesty) in medical settings. Second, trust-based relationships have 
a frail character: not only those who trust are vulnerable to be betrayed by those who are 
trusted, but trust, once shuttered, may be hard to restore (see below). Hence, for their own 
nature, trust-based relationships mandate a cautionary stance.51 Thirdly, because trust is so 
fragile, clinician’s unilateral discretionality and secrecy in deciding whether an act of dishonesty 
is justifiable should be regarded as problematic.  
 
 Setting aside these points of agreement, however, I argue that trust-based positions 
supporting a categorical ban are still deeply problematic, partly because they fall into the same 
kind of criticisms that apply to other categorical positions as well, partly because they overlook 
the importance of respecting patient’s autonomy, and partly because they are premised on a 
too strong cautionary stance. Like any categorical position they cannot account for situations 
in which there is a conflict of duties, as in every case similar to the “murderer at the door” 
example; and they run into the difficulties of establishing the limits of their categorical ban. 
Aside from these general critiques, categorical trust-based views run also into some more 
specific criticisms that I address below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
51 Trusting others is never an entirely rational phenomenon (Baier 1986). For one thing, being in a trust 
relationship leads the trustor to resist evidence about the immoral conduct of the trustee: if I believe that you are 
very trustworthy, it might first think that you are late to our appointment for different reasons, and only after a 
while I might start considering the possibility that you have fled with our money. By contrast, if I openly distrust 
you–or at least I have a neutral attitude toward your behaviour–, I might begin to suspect of your being late even 
if I do not have any evidence to substantiate my suspiciousness.  
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(4.4.a) The nature of trust-based relationships  
 
Categorical trust-based positions are grounded on two claims: (i) that trust-based relationships 
are frail and thus each act of dishonesty will have severe consequences; (ii) and that there are 
no non-arbitrary ways for deciding which exceptions to the duty veracity are justified. Clarifying 
the meaning of these two claims reveals why categorical trust-based positions are problematic 
and allows ascertaining what features a better theory should have to avoid the same pitfalls.  
 
 
(4.4.a.i) The frailty of trust-based relationships 
 
Let us begin by unpacking the first claim, namely that every act of uncovered dishonesty may 
potentially shatter trust by setting up a precedent. There are two different ways in which this 
claim can be understood, one stronger and one weaker. The stronger interpretation is that 
every act of dishonesty will compromise the trust between doctors and patients. Usually, 
supporters of trust-based positions ground their precautionary positions by underscoring the 
“frailty” of trust-based relationship. 
  
 Unlike other kinds of interpersonal relationships (e.g. love, faith), trust relationships 
are by all accounts connoted by an intrinsic frailty. By definition, establishing a relationship of 
trust exposes the trustor to the risk of being betrayed by the trustee. But how severe should be 
a betrayal as to compromise the bond of trust between the trustor (i.e. the patient) and the 
trustee (i.e. the doctor)? Consider the following account involving a deceptive placebo:  
 
Now I was brought up, as I suppose every physician is to use placebos, bread pills, water 
subcutaneously, and other devices for acting upon a patient’s symptoms through his mind 
[…] It never occurred to me until I had given a great many placebos that if they are to be 
really effective they must deceive the patient […] But one day a patient caught me in the 
attempt to put her to sleep by means of a subcutaneous injection of water. “I saw you get 
that ready,” said she, “and there is no morphine in it; you were just trying to deceive me”. 
I was fairly caught and there was no use trying to bluff it out, so I merely protested that 
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my deception was well meant, that it profited me nothing, that I was simply intended to 
give her a night’s rest without the depressing effects of morphia, etc. “Of course I see 
that”, she said, “but how am I to know in future what other tricks you will think it best to 
play for my good?” How am I to believe anything you say from now on?”.  I did not 
know what to answer to make at the time, and I have never been able to think of any 
since (Cabot 1903, 248). 
 
 This quote underscores two crucial points. First, the bond of trust between patient 
and physician can be shattered even by a trivial episode–in this case the provision of an 
innocuous and “well-intentioned” placebo. As noted before, sometimes the mere 
suspiciousness of others’ dishonesty is sufficient to compromise trust, even if the trustor has 
no evidence or proof of the trustee’s betrayal. Other times, instead, a real betrayal will be 
discovered, as in the above case of the placebo injection. In both cases, the greater a betrayal 
is perceived, and the easier it is for it to shatter the bond of trust. In order to preserve an 
optimal climate of trust, thus, clinicians should not only refrain from being dishonest, but they 
should also promote trust in a positive sense, upholding a high moral standard to prevent 
unwarranted suspiciousness. In other words, to preserve and foster the bond of trust with 
patients, clinicians should be like Caesar’s wife, that is, they “must be above suspicious”.  
 
 Secondly, once shattered, trust is hard and sometimes impossible to reconstruct. Trust 
has a diachronic character, and one case of uncovered dishonesty may lead one to suspect of 
the moral integrity of other persons, even if those persons are significantly trustworthier than 
others. Once trust has been disrupted, people become suspicious, and start guessing what the 
deceiver’s “hidden agenda” might be is, thus wondering on how many occasions s/he might 
have already profited, or will again profit, by our misplaced trust.52 Importantly, trust cannot 
be willed: like disbelief we cannot decide who, when, and what we want to trust (Baier 1986).  
                                                   
52 Consider also the following story told by Harris (2013, 21-22) “Jessica recently overheard her friend Lucy 
telling a white lie: Lucy had a social obligation she wanted to get free of, and Jessica hear her leave a voicemail 
message for another friend, explaining why their meeting would have to be rescheduled. Lucy’s excuse was 
entirely fictitious–something involving her child’s being sick–but she lied so effortlessly and persuasively that 
Jessica was left wondering if she had ever been deceived by Lucy in the past. Now, whenever Lucy cancels a plan, 
Jessica suspects she might not be telling the truth… Lucy has not reason to think that Jessica has a grievance 
against her–because she doesn’t. She simply does not trust her as much as she used to, having heard lie without 
compunction to another friend.” 
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 What does the frailty of trust entail in clinical contexts? For one thing, it entails the 
adoption of a cautionary stance on the part of the clinician. If trust is a precondition to build a 
meaningful therapeutic relationship, then physicians must be aware of the frail nature of any 
trust-based relationship, knowing that one episode of uncovered dishonesty may sometimes 
be sufficient to compromise the trust in their personal and professional trustworthiness. In 
this respect, the precautionary worries motivating trust-based positions seem to be justified. 
 
 However, from the need to adopt a cautionary stance as to preserve trust whenever 
possible it does not follow that each deceptive act will irremediably compromise trust, not 
even in the case in which the deception is ultimately uncovered. There are at least two reasons 
supporting this view. The first one is that it is possible for someone to actually willing to be 
deceived, or to entrust others to decide over issue of information provision in her/his place. 
In these cases, an uncovered deception may not shatter trust as it can instead reinforcing it by 
showing how much the doctor “understand” and “care” for this patient (see 6.8).  
 
 Second, there are countless situations in our lives in which lying, deception and 
concealment of information are practices but they do not affect our trust toward others. For 
example, we do not loose our trust in the police if we are stopped by an “undercover” car; we 
do not loose trust in an actor who dies on the stage but then walks away at the end of the 
show; we do not loose trust in a magician who pretend to possess magical powers during a 
performance; and we do not loose trust as we play board games in which part of the game is 
precisely that of deceiving others about our identity. Thus, it is simply false that any uncovered 
act of deception would always and irremediably compromise interpersonal trust.  
 
 In the next chapter I will argue that what the magician, the police, the actor and the 
board game scenario have in common is that they are all situations in which the trustor know 
that the trustee may legitimately resort to deceptive means; accordingly, she can thus 
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“suspend” her usual judgment over the trustor overall trustworthiness. Furthermore, I will 
also maintain that such situations are already common in medical settings. 
 
 So, which act of dishonesty will endanger individual and public trust in medical 
professionals? The answer to this question is that it always depends on the context, that is, on 
who trusts whom for what. As noted by Hardin (2002) “trust is generally a three part relation: A 
trusts B to do x (or with respect to x)”. Thus I can trust my brother to be well intentioned on 
my part when we will discuss financial matters even if I know that he is inclined to cheat when 
we play cards. In this case, I trust someone (my brother) with respect to something specific 
(be well intentioned on my part while discussing financial matters), even if I know that I 
should probably not trust him in other contexts (i.e. as we play cards).  
 
 Hence, a weaker and more plausible version of the second claim is that only some acts 
of uncovered deception will irremediably compromise interpersonal trust. These acts, I 
proposed, are the ones in which the trustor interpret the act of uncovered deception as a 
betrayal of her trust. Clearly, this is not the case in any of the scenarios presented above. Only 
in these cases of perceived betrayal, due to the frailty and diachronic character of trust-based 
relationship, there is a high chance that trust will be compromised. Henceforth, I shall take 
this narrower version of the first claim as the one that ought to be addressed while evaluating 
the moral justification of an act of dishonesty in medical contexts.  
 
 In sum, the cautionary stance motivating categorical trust-based position partially 
misconstrue the nature of trust, as it is premised on the false claim that every deceptive act, 
uncovered or not, might irremediably compromise patient’s trust. Yet, this is not the case in a 
large class of situations. Therefore, although we should adopt a cautionary stance with respect 
to the use od deception in clinical contexts, adopting a categorical position on the grounds 
that every deceptive act will “set a dangerous precedent” seems to be unwarranted.  
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(4.4.a.ii) Arbitrariness and suspiciousness reloaded 
 
The second claim, which also is decisive in justifying categorical trust-based views, is that each 
exception may potentially “set a dangerous precedent” for trust because it is decided in an ad 
hoc, arbitrary, way. It is the arbitrariness in the process whereby exceptions are decided what 
justifies on the part of the patient a legitimate suspiciousness as to the real motivations behind 
each dishonest act: 
 
Is there a third way [between categorical ban and no ban at all]? A possibility here is to 
seek to soften the simple absolute rule against lying by incorporating some exceptions 
into the rule. The resultant rule would still be absolute, but less simple. However, we run 
into difficulties if we try to soften the strict rule against lying: how to do so without 
inviting further erosion; how to draw a firm but non-arbitrary line between defensible and 
indefensible lying? […] Once we start writing in exceptions there seem no firm barrier to 
our tacking on further ones as need arises. But a firm barrier is needed–or else trust in 
each other’s word becomes impossible (Jackson 2001, 133). 
 
 In this quote, Jackson notes that, at least theoretically, there is a third way that could 
avoid the problem of any extreme position regarding the moral justification of dishonesty in 
clinical settings: to elaborate a non-arbitrary rule for deciding which exceptions to the duty of 
veracity are or not legitimate. If such rule could be found, that it would be possible to have 
both permissible exceptions to the categorical ban of dishonesty–thus avoiding its many 
pitfalls– and to generally preserve the trust of the public and of individual patients in those 
who have resorted to situational dishonesty–since their decisions would have depended on the 
occurrence of the right circumstances rather than on a mere calculus that could have been 
biased for their own selfish interest. Clearly this non-arbitrary rule in currently not in place in 
contemporary clinical settings, where most (if not all) of the decisions regarding the use of 
dishonest practices are taken by single clinicians, that is, in a semi-arbitrary way.  
 
 In other words, the problem of individuating a principle that might theoretically allow 
for justified exceptions to the duty of veracity is necessarily interwoven with the problem of 
keeping the decision of clinicians about such exceptional cases secret and thus unaccountable. 
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But even if such rule could be found, then it would be still valid the other part of the 
objection that points at the legitimate suspiciousness that patients and the public may harbor 
concerning the ad hoc judgment of the single clinician. Siding with this latter argument, I agree 
that any trust-based view that allows for exceptions to the rule of veracity ought to meet these 
two intertwined challenges, thus indicating how exceptional cases can be distinguished from 
those in which we should stand firm by the duty of veracity; and how it is possible to preserve 
trust in the light of the secrecy that current practices entail. Differently from Jackson, 
however, I do not think that these two challenges are impossible to meet. Indeed, as I will 
explain in the next chapter, it is possible to avoid the pitfalls of categorical perspectives 
without compromising the bond of trust between doctors and patients. 
 
 
(4) Summary  
 
In this chapter I have analyzed some of the major accounts that have been proposed to deal 
with the moral implications of dishonesty in medicine. After distinguishing between trust-
based, autonomy-based and balanced views, and between categorical and exceptionalist 
positions, I have argued that categorical positions bases on trust and autonomy as well as 
autonomy-based exceptionalist positions lead to unwanted or counterintuitive consequences, 
and are therefore inadequate. All categorical positions face the decisive criticism that in 
medical contexts clinicians seem to face genuine moral dilemmas involving a conflict between 
veracity and other obligations, usually beneficence and nonmaleficence. Furthermore, these 
views have troubles in specifying a limit to their categorical ban: if the ban is extended to 
deception, then it leads into counterintuitive conclusions; if it is limited to lies, then it provides 
an unsatisfactory way of thinking about some of the features of dishonesty.  
 
 Then, I have criticized the autonomy-based exceptionalist view elaborated by 
Beauchamp and Childress, arguing that it does not take into adequate consideration some of 
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the core features characterizing the moral phenomenon of dishonesty. According to the view 
elaborated by Beauchamp and Childress, to decide whether an act of hard paternalism is 
justified we should balance considerations of autonomy against consideration of beneficence 
and nonmaleficence. As I have argued, this perspective is useful whenever we are considering 
cases of hard paternalism in which the only moral issue at stake regards the infringement of 
patient’s autonomy–as for example in the case of the mandatory law to wearing seatbelts or in 
the case of the patient refusing the side rails. However, the same perspective is problematic 
when it is applied to cases of hard paternalism that involves dishonesty in communication: lies 
are not seatbelts, and resorting to dishonesty entails something more than just infringing on 
other’s autonomy, that is, short and long term effects on trust. Yet, these possible implications 
for trust are not factored in Beauchamp and Childress’s account, thereby leading into two 
further problems: the one of “moral perspectivism”, and the one of “arbitrariness”.  
 
 Finally, I have criticized trust-based categorical positions, arguing that they partially 
misconstrue the phenomenon of trust. While these positions rightly identify in the 
preservation of the bond of trust between doctor and physician a key moral issue pertaining to 
the use of dishonesty in clinical settings, the premises on which they ground their categorical 
perspective are either clearly false or dubious. First, it is not true that every act of uncovered 
dishonesty will endanger interpersonal trust, as trust-relationships are usually quite specific. 
Not every uncovered act of dishonesty will threaten interpersonal trust, and consequently the 
cautionary stance taken by these positions is unwarranted. Second, it may not be true that a 
rule that allows exceptions to clinicians’ duty of veracity will necessary compromise patient’s 
trust; as I will show in the next chapter, it is possible to avoid both the pitfalls of categorical 
positions while at the same time devising a way of preserving patient’s trust and autonomy. 
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5. Deception and Public Justification 
 
 
Truth is beautiful, without doubt; but so are lies. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
Every truth has two sides; it is as well to look at both, before we commit ourselves to either. 
Aesop 
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(5) Introduction 
 
In this chapter I advance my proposal that deception in clinical settings is ethically justifiable 
in exceptional cases, provided that the following conditions are met: (i) that other plausible 
courses of truthful action have been ruled out; (ii) that the proponent would be ready to 
defend her conduct in public; (iii) that the deceptive act is publicly disclosed. Whenever these 
conditions are in place, I will argue, benevolent deception may be morally permissible. This 
chapter is divided in four parts. First, I shall briefly recapitulate the main argument. Then, I 
shall articulate my solution based on three procedural conditions named (i) the test of veracity, 
(ii) the test of hypothetical publicity, (iii) and the test of public disclosure. Thirdly, I will show 
how this perspective can be translated into a decisional flowchart for guiding clinical decision-
making. Finally, I shall consider the main advantages of my account. 
 
 
(5.1) Summary of the main argument 
 
Clinicians’ obligation to tell patients the truth is a recent addition to medical ethics. 
Traditionally, medicine has been grounded solely on the principles of beneficence and non-
maleficence. In the last fifty years, however, the rise of autonomy in biomedical ethics as well 
as other societal changes have brought to the fore the necessity of incorporating rules of 
veracity within professional codes and ethical guidelines. Accordingly, today it is widely 
accepted that clinicians have a duty of veracity toward their patients. In medical ethics, this 
duty is often conceptualized as a prima facie duty, that is, as a duty that is morally binding unless 
there are compelling reasons to do otherwise. Prima facie duties establish a default attitude, but 
allow for qualified exceptions whether the right circumstances obtain.  
 
 In order to identify those exceptions, however, one needs to specify the extension of 
the obligation of veracity. I have thus proposed to conceptualize clinicians’ prima facie duty of 
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veracity as the conjunction of two complementary prima facie obligations: the negative “duty of 
truthfulness” and the positive “duty to inform” patients. Building on this distinction, 
dishonesty in professional communication has been further defined in the terms of the ways 
in which clinicians can violate these two obligations. This has led to distinguish the concepts 
of lying, deception, and keeping someone in the dark. Importantly, within this theoretical 
framework, one can deceive others by action as well as by omission, and even by remaining 
silent or by telling the truth; it is also possible to be dishonest without deceiving others, but 
merely by failing to provide all the relevant information required by the duty to inform. 
 
 Next, I have looked into the reasons why dishonesty is prima facie unethical in clinical 
medicine, identifying two main rationales. The first rationale concerns the respect of patient’s 
autonomy. Lying and deceit prevent patients from forming their own views and thus to decide 
and act autonomously. Consequently, dishonesty is prima facie unethical because it disrespects 
patient’s autonomy. The second rationale, then, is that dishonesty threatens the bond of trust 
between clinicians and patient. Patients and clinicians are brought into a relationship because 
of a fiduciary pact. This pact establishes a reciprocal set of rights and duties whereby society 
entrusts medical professionals with power and authority provided they abide to certain 
standards of competence and morality. Dishonesty undermines the trustworthiness of 
clinicians, hence jeopardizing the bond of trust between patient and doctors and the bona fide 
in medical professionals. Consequently, dishonesty is prima facie unethical because it threatens 
an essential precondition for having meaningful clinical relationships. 
 
 I have then argued that each of these rationales may provide a compelling and 
independent reason to support the view that veracity should be clinicians’ default attitude in 
clinical settings. However, while respecting patient’s autonomy is always a necessary condition 
for having an ethical clinical relationship, the preservation of the bond of trust between doctor 
and patients is often a necessary and a sufficient condition for achieving such an end. In fact, 
not every clinical relationship occurs between two competent and autonomous agents, and 
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without trust clinicians cannot in any case adequately foster patient’s autonomy. Finally, 
elaborating on Bok’s analysis, I discussed how dishonest acts must be always evaluated by 
articulating both the perspective of the duper and the perspective of the duped, thus taking 
into account the moral phenomenon of the “discrepancy of the perspectives”.  
 
 Next, I have analyzed other accounts that have been elaborated in medical ethics to 
deal with the moral implications of benevolent deception, noting their limitations. I have thus 
distinguished first between “autonomy-based”, “trust-based”, and “balanced” positions, and 
then between “categorical” and “exceptionalist” views. Categorical positions are problematic 
because considerations of compassion and beneficence may sometimes override the duty of 
veracity; and because it is impossible to specify the limits of a categorical ban of dishonesty 
without falling into false or counterintuitive conclusions.  
 
 Exceptionalist autonomy-based positions–like Beauchamp and Childress’s “justified 
hard paternalism”–, instead, overemphasize autonomy over trust, and thus do not take into 
adequate consideration the implications that dishonesty may have for the doctor-patient 
relationship, an issue which is particularly severe because of the secrecy that these views allow 
to clinicians.  
  
 Lastly, categorical positions based on trust capture most of the features of trust-based 
relationships, including their frail nature. However–and aside for underestimating the 
importance of respecting patient’s autonomy–, these views are based on two problematic 
assumptions, namely: that every act of uncovered dishonesty will compromise trust; and that it 
is impossible to identify possible exceptions to the duty of veracity in non-arbitrary ways. The 
first of this assumptions, I argued, is based on a partial misconstruction of how trust-based 
relationship operate, while the second stands still in need of a reply, to the elaboration of 
which the rest of this chapter is hereafter devoted. 
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(5.2) The proposed solution: deception and public justification 
 
Based on the previous analysis, a satisfactory exceptionalist view of dishonesty in clinical 
contexts should posses at least two features. First, it must be able to take into adequate 
account the consequences that benevolent deception may have for both patient’s autonomy 
and trust. Any theory that does not take into adequate account both rationales is likely to 
overemphasize one aspect over the other, and thus to be biased under that respect.  
 
 The second feature, then, flows from the fact that those who deceive and those who 
are deceived tend to appraise the same scenario from different perspectives. Accordingly, the 
evaluation of the risks, costs and moral implications of each of deception may be biased 
whether we articulate it from only one of the two possible perspectives. In clinical contexts 
this discrepancy is further reinforced by the power-asymmetry entrenched in any therapeutic 
relationship and by the possibility for clinicians to act in complete secrecy, and by the frail 
nature of trust-based relationships which means that even a small breach of patient’s trust may 
result in irreparable consequences. Any theory that allows exceptions to the duty of veracity 
must also explain how it rules out or minimizes the risks for interpersonal and social trust that 
may arise from permitting the use of benevolent deception. 
 
 To meet these requirements, the account that I will propose is based on the concept 
of “publicity”. According to this view, each deceptive act requires a moral justification. 
However, in order to be admissible, this moral justification must meet two demanding criteria: 
first, those who are supporting it must be prepared to defend their reasons in public; second, 
every exception that will be (or has been) made must also be publicly disclosed. Clearly, the 
practical import of these two criteria depends on the meaning of the term “public”–or, as we 
shall see, of the term “publicity”. To unpack this crucial point, in this chapter I articulate my 
proposal in the terms of a three tier-process whereby clinicians can formulate adequate moral 
justifications to defend the exceptional use of benevolent deception in clinical contexts. This 
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process is arranged in three steps, namely, (i) the test of veracity; (ii) the test of publicity; (iii) 
and the test of disclosure. Whenever a moral justification for using benevolent deception 
successfully passes these three tests then, I argue, such an act may also be morally permissible. 
 
 
(5.3) The principle and the test of veracity 
 
According to Aristotle, “Falsehood is in itself bad and blameworthy, while the truth is noble 
and praiseworthy” (2000, 76). Lies, deception and misleading concealment are in themselves 
“blameworthy” because they always exploit others’ trust, disrespect their individual autonomy, 
and lead to unwanted consequences for both the deceivers and the deceived. By contrast, the 
truth is “noble and full of praise” because telling the truth enables social and interpersonal 
cooperation, reinforces trust, and allows others to become fully autonomous agents.  
 
 For these reasons, falsehood is prima facie morally wrong while truthfulness is prima facie 
morally right. Other things being equal, truthfulness should be our default attitude in 
communication, while lying and deception should instead be avoided and blamed. The same is 
true, of course, of the attitudes that other speakers should have while communicating with us. 
Social cooperation is based on mutual trust, and mutual trust is partially grounded on the 
belief that usually the behavior of others will conform will be predictable to some extent 
because it will conform to certain shared rules. The reverse is true with lies and deception. In 
most of the cases we are not prepared to take the perspective of the deceived, and this is why, 
once we learn that we have been duped, we are first surprised and then upset. Hence there is a 
structural imbalance in the way in which we appraise truthfulness and falsehood: the former is 
“noble and full or praise”, while the latter is always “mean and culpable”.  
 
  Acknowledging this fundamental difference in our moral attitudes toward 
truthfulness and falsehood, Bok (1978) has proposed to adopt what she defined as the 
 108 
“principle of veracity”. This principle stipulates that there is “an initial imbalance in the 
evaluation of truth-telling and lying. Lying requires a reason, while truth telling does not. It 
must be excused; reasons must be produced, in any one case, to show why a particular lie is 
not “mean and culpable” (Bok 1978, 22). According to this principle, there is a fundamental 
difference between honesty and dishonesty: while normally the former does not require the 
provision of a moral justification, the latter, instead, always does.  
 
 Bok’s “principle of veracity” shares profound similarities with the Rossian view that 
clinicians have a prima facie duty of veracity. Both the principle and the prima facie duty of 
veracity are grounded on the recognition that there is a structural imbalance between 
truthfulness and falsehood. Furthermore, they both specify this imbalance as a difference at 
the level of moral reasons-giving: truthfulness does not require an excuse, while falsehood 
always stands in need of a justification.  
 
 A first important corollary of this view is that, unless there are compelling reasons to 
act otherwise, we should always prefer truthful courses of action to deceptive ones. Other 
things being equal, if we can achieve our objectives without resorting to deception we must do 
so. Falsehood is always prima facie “mean and culpable”, but it is even the more so when it is 
redundant, superfluous and gratuitous. Thus, before considering whether an act of deception 
is morally justifiable, we should first determine whether such an act is necessary to achieve our 
objectives. This implies that deception can be morally justifiable if and only if other truthful 
courses of action have been already identified and ruled out.  
 
 But who should, in any one case, conduct this process of evaluation whereby all other 
plausible and truthful courses of action are identified and eventually discarded in favor of 
deception? Given that deception is often a matter of secrecy and concealment, the answer to 
this question cannot be but “the deceiver”. In each case, the burden of demonstrating that a 
departure from the duty of telling the truth is required should fall on those who propose, 
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enact and will possibly profit by such a departure. They are the ones who must demonstrate 
that, among all other plausible alternatives, in these specific circumstances deception is the 
best plausible means to achieve the desired objective.  
 
 Meeting this precondition requires, on the part of those who are proposing the 
deception, at least the active effort of searching for other plausible courses of action, as well as 
the capacities for appraising how well each of them would achieve the desired objective. Thus, 
the moral justification of an act of deception stands or falls with the ability of the deceivers to 
argue that such act was necessary rather than a matter of selfish convenience. 
 
 Therefore, any clinician who is pondering if an act of deception is morally justifiable 
must first answer the following question: “Would you be able to argue that deception is the 
only plausible means to achieve your objective?”. If the answer to this question is affirmative, 
then the process of moral evaluation may continue to the stage at which the reasons in 
support and against the proposed deceptive act are weighted one against the other. If, instead, 
the answer to this question is negative, then the considered act of deception is unjustifiable 
because there is no compelling reason to override the prima facie duty of veracity.  
 
 Henceforth I shall refer to this preliminary check-question as the “test of veracity” (or 
TOV, for short). In my account The TOV serves a twofold function. First, it encapsulates the 
principle that, other things being equal, we should always prefer truthful courses of action to 
deceptive ones; second, it makes explicit that, in any one case in which a deceptive act is 
morally judged, the burden of proof for demonstrating the lack of other plausible and truthful 
alternatives should falls on those who are proposing or have already enacted it. 
 
 Importantly, the TOV does not entail that every deceptive act is unethical. Rather, it 
only underscores that truthful courses of action are generally preferable to deceptive ones, and 
therefore that whoever resorts to deception must also provide some reasons for not abiding to 
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the default attitude of veracity. Likewise, prima facie duties indicate what our default attitude 
should be, but admit that one can act otherwise whenever there are overriding reasons for 
doing so. In the next section we shall explore more in depth what kind of reasons one must 
provide in order to defend benevolent deception in a satisfactory way. 
 
 
(5.4) Justifying deception: the test of publicity 
 
The test of veracity rules out dishonest acts that are unjustifiable because superfluous: other 
things being equal we should prefer truthful courses of actions. There are cases, however, in 
which deception is the only plausible option. Consider the example of an empirical study 
through which a team of psychologists aim at studying people’s cheating attitudes in 
cooperative scenarios. If the study participants were aware that the researchers are observing 
their cooperative attitudes they will alter their behaviour accordingly, hence biasing the study. 
Thus, in order to investigate such attitudes, the researchers must deceive the participants 
about the true scope of the study–for example by temporarily concealing the purpose of the 
tasks that the subjects are required to take. In this case, resorting to deception is the only 
plausible means through which the researchers can achieve their objective.  
 
 Passing the TOV, however, is not sufficient for a dishonest act to be morally justified. 
The fact that human extinction may be the most effective means to solve the problem of 
human hunger does not make it something morally permissible or praiseworthy per se. 
Something can be a perfect means to achieve an end and be morally blameworthy at the same 
time. Therefore, once a proposed act of deception has passed the TOV, those advocating it 
must still defend their proposal by providing their reasons in its favour. This second step 
inevitably implies a trade-off between the reasons supporting the case for deception and those 
against it. Since falsehood is always “mean and culpable” those proposing a deceptive act must 
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show, in any one case, that the moral goods that it will conceivably allow to achieve will 
eventually outweigh its drawbacks. 
 
 Usually, the identification and the weighting of these reasons in support and against an 
act of deception are left to the private judgment of those who are proposing the deceptive act. 
This is the case, for example, of the account proposed by Beauchamp and Childress (2009) for 
which it is usually the clinician who propose the deception the one who articulates the reasons 
pros and cons it, and the one who eventually decides what ought to be done in each case. A 
major problem with this view is that any decision of this sort is likely to be biased. In fact, the 
ones who conduct this evaluation are also the ones proposing the deception to meet their 
objectives. This introduces a structural bias in the evaluation of the arguments in favour or 
against deception due to our tendency of articulating skewed perspectives (see 3.3).  
 
 In the example above, the balancing of the reasons pros and cons the use of a 
deceptive trial-design will be carried out by the researchers proposing it. Inevitably, the 
researchers will tend to articulate their perspective, that is, the one of those needing deceptive 
means for achieving their objective (i.e., obtaining valid data). In this case, as we will see, the 
risk of arbitrariness is partially controlled (but not eliminated) by the needs to submit a formal 
application to the ethical committee or IRB, and to obtain a valid informed consent (or a 
delayed consent) from the study participants. Yet, in contexts in which the duper can evaluate 
the various practical and moral implications of dishonesty in full secrecy, the risks of carrying 
out a skewed evaluation become exponentially greater. Unfortunately, this latter scenario is the 
most likely to occur in clinical settings, where a clinician can and will often decide in semi-
arbitrary ways whether a proposed act of dishonesty is or not morally permissible.  
 
 Therefore, the discrepancy of the perspectives raises a genuine conundrum for anyone 
evaluating the use of deceptive means: in order to justify an act of deception one must 
evaluate whether its pros outweigh its cons; yet, due to the “discrepancy of the perspectives”, 
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such moral evaluation is likely to be systematically biased. To resolve this difficulty I propose 
to adopt the view that any valid moral justification for an act of deception requires the 
provisions of adequate reasons in its support; and that these reasons are adequate if and only 
if other reasonable persons and those who will be deceived could agree with them. On this 
view, moral justification is thus essentially a process of public reason-giving. As Hume noted, 
someone seeking moral justifications must “depart from his private and particular situation 
and must choose a point of view common to him with other; he must move some universal 
principle of the human frame and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and 
symphony” (1948, 252).53  
 
 Sissela Bok (1978) has further developed this position, arguing that a moral 
justification for a lie is adequate only if it could conceivably withstand an ideal process of 
public justification. Thus, an act of dishonesty is justifiable only if everyone could in principle 
consider it to be so–including the ones that will be eventually deceived. The idea behind this 
view is that, if the reasons supporting or opposing a given act of deception were articulated 
and evaluated from a “public” point of view, then it would be possible to both include and even 
out the biases introduced by the partial perspectives of the duper and of the duped, thus 
providing a fairer basis for taking moral decisions.54 In Bok’s words, we should thus 
 
combine [the] concept of publicity with the view of justification in ethics as being directed to 
reasonable persons, in order to formulate a workable test for looking at concrete moral 
choice. It will be a test to weigh the various excuses advanced for disputed choices, and 
therefore for lies. Such a test counters the self-deception and bias inherent in the liar’s 
perspective. It challenges privately held assumptions and hasty calculations. It requires 
clear and understandable formulation of the arguments used to defend the lie–arguments 
which might otherwise have remained inchoate or seemed intuitively right without ever 
being questioned. Its advantages, moreover, are cumulative: the objectivity and ability to 
shift perspectives gained in each appeal to publicity carry over to subsequent ones. 
Basically, it is through the exercise of such appeals and the debate they engender that a 
more finely tuned moral sense will develop (1978, 91-93). 
                                                   
53 Similarly, Rawls argued that the process of moral justification “presumes a clash of views between persons or 
within one person, and seeks to convince others, or ourselves, of the principles upon which our claims and 
judgments are founded. Being designed to reconcile by reason, justification proceeds from what all parties to the 
discussion hold in common” (1999, 54). 
54 “The test of publicity asks which lies, if any, would survive the appeal for justification to reasonable persons” 
(Bok 1978, 93). 
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 How is it possible, in practice, for clinicians to move from their private perspective to 
the articulation of public reasons that could withstand the judgment of other reasonable 
persons? What steps needs to be taken in order to craft a moral justification that avoids the 
structural biases introduced by the “discrepancy of the perspectives”? Extending Bok’s 
proposal, I will contend that there are four different levels of “publicity” that must be taken 
into consideration while evaluating the moral permissibility of deception in clinical settings. 
These levels are the ones of (a) clinician’s private consciousness; (b) the community of peers; 
(c) the public of reasonable persons; (d) and the perspective of the deceived. We shall now 
proceed to see how a method structured around these levels operates, and how effective it can 
be in controlling the biases entrenched in any particular perspective.  
 
 
(5.4.a) The first level of publicity: self-reflection and the balancing of the reasons 
 
The first level of publicity is the one of the private consciousness of the deceivers. Usually, 
this is the only level considered by other accounts. At this stage, those proposing the act of 
deception ought to identify the sets of reasons in favour and against it, ascertaining which one 
eventually outweighs the other. While each case is unique, there are at least three sets of 
reasons that must always be considered whenever we evaluate the morality of a deceptive act. 
 
 First, there are those reasons that might be cited in favour of the proposed deceptive 
act. Since the test of publicity (henceforth, TOP) should follow the test of veracity, the case 
for deception can always count on at least one favourable reason: namely, that deception is the 
best means for achieving the desired end. There are, however, several other reasons for which 
one might resort to situational dishonesty. In clinical contexts, there might be, first and 
foremost, reasons of beneficence and nonmaleficence: deception can sometimes be required 
to avoid causing suffering; to prevent an emotional, psychological or physical trauma; or for 
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preserving hope. Deception can also be necessary to preserve patient’s long-term autonomy, 
as when clinicians conceal grim news to avoid a potentially fatal heart attack. There might be 
also considerations of justice, as sometimes a lie can be the most cost-effective way of 
achieving an end, for example for making diagnosis that would otherwise requires too 
expensive equipment. In research contexts, instead, deception may be necessary to obtain 
valid data.55  
 
 Second, there are the reasons against the use of deception. As I have argued (see 3.2), 
there are at least two considerations that must be always taken into account while pondering 
the use of dishonesty: the respect of other’s autonomy and the preservation of trust. These 
two rationales may independently provide a compelling reason to reject a proposed deceptive 
act and therefore ought to be considered in every case. It is important to note, however, that 
while these two aspects are always crucial, they are not the only ones that must be considered. 
Resorting to dishonesty in clinical settings may raise additional concerns that might include, 
but are not limited to, the evaluation of the practical consequences, the breach of oaths and 
promises, the infringement of criminal law, and the possible moral corruption that may derive 
from lying and deception. 
 
 Third, one must also consider the features of the deceptive act. Deception, like any 
other means, may either succeed or fail. Given the bad consequences that follow when 
deception is uncovered, deceivers should proceed only if they are reasonably sure that they 
will succeed in their deception. To this end, one must consider both the short and the long-
term perspective: as St. Augustine noted, lies tend to produce a slippery slope in which in 
order to “shore up” previous lies one needs to lie even more. This creates a self-reinforcing 
vicious circle for which, on the one hand, one gets progressively accustomed to lying while, on 
the other hand, the chances of being discovered as well as the severity of the consequences 
                                                   
55 In some cases dishonesty may be motivated by purely selfish reasons, as when clinicians mollify anxious 
patients with the only intent of getting rid of them; on this issue see (6.9.c). 
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increase. Finally, among all the plausible deceptive acts, some may be less desirable than 
others (Sokol 2007). As I argued in (2.3), there is no intrinsic moral difference between lying, 
deceit and malicious concealment, as their moral weigh is context and audience-sensitive. 
However, in most of the cases people tend to consider an open lie as being more 
blameworthy than an elusive answer. Thus, between two plausible and equally effective 
deceptive acts, one should select the one that is likely to be perceived as being less 
blameworthy. Other things being equal, deception and concealment are thus preferable to 
openly stated lies. 
 
 Once these aspects have been considered, the sets of reasons in favour and against the 
deceptive act must be weighed one against the other. If the reasons in favour outweigh those 
against it, then the proposed act of deception is morally justifiable. While this methodology is 
sound, if conducted only at the level of the private consciousness of those proposing the 
deception it is likely to be biased under two respects.  
 
 For one thing, one may simply fail to identify all the relevant reasons that are pertinent 
to each case. Most physicians are still not properly trained in dealing with moral dilemmas, let 
alone with other technical distinctions as the one between lying, deception and concealment. 
Also, the calculus of the potential consequences and the determination of the least 
problematic verbal formulation to be used may require both cognitive resources and a 
creativity that not everyone may possess. In other words, a fair identification and judgment of 
all the relevant reasons pros and cons a given act of deception may be a practically demanding 
task for which individual resources may be insufficient. Moral judgments, like any judgment 
taken by less than perfectly rational agents, are intrinsically fallible (Ross 1930).  
 
 More importantly, the final judgment may be structurally biased due to the 
“discrepancy of the perspectives”. Deceivers tend to systematically discount the long-term 
risks of deception in favour of their short-term gains. They tend to articulate only their own 
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perspective, including all the reasons in their favour while excluding those concerning the 
consequences for the deceived. Also, deceivers tend to cover selfish motives of action by 
disguising them under altruistic justifications–often through semi-unconscious self-deception.  
 
 In sum, an act of deception may be morally permissible if and only if it meets at least 
two preliminary conditions. First, it must pass the test of veracity, and thus it should arguably 
be the best plausible means to achieve a goal. Second, the reasons in favour of the deceptive 
act must outweigh those contrary to it. While these two conditions are always necessary, 
however, they can never be sufficient: in order to reach a fair moral judgment about whether a 
deceptive act is or not morally permissible other steps have to implemented as to control for 
the structural biases introduced by the presence of the discrepancy of the perspectives and to 
reduce the margin of error which is due to the intrinsic fallibility of our moral judgments. 
 
 
(5.4.b) The second level of publicity: the community of peers 
 
The second level of publicity is the one of the active confrontation with the community of 
peers. While each clinical encounter is unique, doctors tend to face a number of situations that 
are fairly typical across all clinical contexts. For example, working in an oncological facility 
would likely expose a clinician to a set of more or less similar situations, from the disclosure of 
grim diagnostic news to the need of preserving hope in terminal patients. But even if one has 
never encountered a scenario similar to the one at hand, other colleagues, peers and 
professionals, might have. The pooled experience of the whole community of medical 
professionals clearly exceeds the one of any of its individual members. This collective 
experience may serve as an ideal basis to refine, complement, or revise the evaluation of the 
reasons that has been conducted only on a self-reflective plane of analysis.  
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 Thus, the second level of publicity demands that we further articulate our reasons in 
favour or against the deceptive act in the light of what others peers would say (or have said) 
about it. Depending on the circumstances, reaching this second level may entail different 
practices, which can be more or less demanding in terms of time and resources. For example, 
a clinician may actually consult other more experienced or trusted colleagues, asking for their 
feedbacks on the case at hand. Another possibility is to look into the available literature in 
medical journals, including the ones in medical ethics, looking for ethical analyses of similar 
cases. A third option might be to contact a clinical ethicist or to reach out for some member 
of the ethical committee. In any one case, the form of the selected practices may vary, but the 
goal is the same: challenging our private assessment of the case by looking at how it would 
withstand the criticism of others sharing our professional experience and perspective. 
 
 How can we be sure that our reasons are sufficiently refined to withstand peer’s 
criticisms? In the view that Bok (1978), Sokol (2007), and I endorse, clinicians can take a 
simple mental test: the “test of publicity”. This test demands that those proposing the 
deceptive act must ask themselves whether they would be ready to defend their choice in front 
of their peers. Ethics committees and internal audit commissions provide viable examples of 
this kind of like-minded, epistocratic juries. Would the clinician be ready to defend her choice 
of resorting to deception in front of such commissions? Would the clinician be ready to argue 
that she resorted to deception only for the benefit of the patient? Would the clinician be ready 
to take full responsibility for pursuing such an act, hence accepting all the consequences that 
might follow whether the commission judges this act to be unjustified?  
 
 Here there are three important things to note. First, like the TOV, also the TOP 
makes explicit that the burden and the responsibility for justifying any act of deception falls on 
those proposing it. Sure, it is still a matter of the personal judgment whether one has 
sufficiently articulated the reasons pros and cons a deceptive act. However, by taking the TOP 
one is at least forced to re-appraise the strength of her position; if one concludes that she will 
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not be ready to publicity defend her choice in front of her peers, this may indicate that the 
proposed act is either not morally permissible per se, or that the reasons in its favour ought to 
be better articulated.  
 
 Second, by leading clinicians to articulate their reasons from the point of how they 
could withstand the criticism of peers, this simple test may aid in screening out those acts of 
proposed deception that might have passed the first level of publicity but that, upon further 
reflection, appear to be unjustifiable. In particularly, the TOP is likely to reveal which acts can 
be convincingly defended as to be for the patient’s benefit, and those that are instead 
motivated only by selfish reasons (consciously endorsed or not). Who would be ready to 
claim, in front of a disciplinary commission, that it was morally defensible to lie about one’s 
having a degree in medicine simply to “reassure the patient”?  
 
 Third, taking the TOP may aid clinicians in refining their argumentations. Confronting 
how other cases have been previously justified may lead to reassess one’s own justifications by 
ruling out fallacious arguments, clarifying the terms that were previously ambiguous, and 
identifying those reasons pro and cons that have been overlooked. Therefore, taking the TOP 
may lower the demandingness of taking fair moral assessments alone, hence mitigating the 
problem of the intrinsic fallibility of our individual (moral) judgments. 
 
 At this level, however, the TOP still does not solve the problem of the discrepant 
perspectives. Confronting our motives of action against those of other colleagues may aid in 
distinguishing whether we are resorting to deception only for selfish interests.56 Nonetheless, 
even the viewpoint of all the relevant experts may be collectively biased on sectarian grounds. 
Communities composed of peers tend to excuse rather than condemn the behaviour of their 
members. Being “peers” means sharing the same perspective, and this may lead to biased 
                                                   
56 However, in other cases the boundary between selfishness and benevolence may be blurred, or both can be 
simultaneously in place. For example, the researchers in the above example can aim both at promoting their 
career and, at the same time, at extending collective scientific knowledge about cooperative attitudes. 
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judgments in which the morality of an act is judged on the plane of “us” versus “others”, 
rather than on the plan of “good” versus “bad”.57 For instance, medical professionals have 
long argued in favour of their exclusive privilege of resorting to practices of benevolent 
deception, hence defending their “free-rider” status: patients had to be absolutely truthful with 
their clinicians, but clinicians were instead free to invoke their “therapeutic privilege”.  
 
 Therefore, while at this second level of publicity the TOP may aid in mitigating some 
of the issues of a standard, self-reflective processes of moral decision-making, it still cannot 
fully control for the structural biases introduced by the discrepancy of the perspective. The 
fact that a given community has always adhered to certain ethical standards and norms of 
conduct does not imply that such standards and norms are either right in themselves or 
appropriate for all cultural contexts. 
 
 
(5.4.c) The third level of publicity: consistency and the public of reasonable persons  
 
The third level of publicity is the one at which the evaluation of the reasons for the proposed 
deceptive act are tested against the possible criticisms of a public from which no reasonable 
person is in principle excluded. At the most general level, this public includes not just the 
clinician’s peers and other experts but potentially every reasonable person, that is to say, anyone 
who has can partake in the game of “giving and asking” for rational reasons. Thus, the third 
                                                   
57 Janis has noted how decisions about foreign policies may be biased due to the way in which they are internally 
elaborated by a community of like-minded peers: “The members’ firm belief in the inherent morality of their 
group and their use of undifferentiated negative stereotypes of opponents enable them to minimize decision 
conflicts between ethical values and expediency, especially when they are inclined to resort to violence. The 
shared belief that “we are a wise and good group” inclines them to use group concurrence as a major criterion to 
judge the morality as well as the efficiency of any policy under discussion.  “Since our group’s objectives are 
good”, the member feel, “any means we decide to use must be good”. This shared assumption helps the 
members avoid feelings of shame or guilt about decisions that may violate their personal code of ethical 
behaviour. Negative stereotypes of the enemy enhance their sense of moral righteousness as well as their pride in 
the lofty mission of the ingroup” (Victims and Groupthink, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972, 204; quoted in Bok 
1978, 97). 
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level of publicity demands that we articulate our case by taking into account how other 
rational persons who do not share our sectarian perspective could object to it.  
 
 How can we articulate our reasons to control for the potential bias introduced by our 
belonging to a certain community of like-minded people? How can we appraise the limits of 
our moral judgments as they are articulated only from a self-interested point of view? 
Throughout the history of mankind, and more recently throughout that of Western 
philosophy, this problem has always received a strikingly similar solution: “One should treat 
others as one would like others to treat oneself”. This maxim, which is known as the “Golden 
Rule” of reciprocity, requires us to appraise the consequences of our actions by assuming the 
perspective of those who will be subjected to them. The Golden Rule is often used to judge 
what we ought to do to benefit others and to do good. However, there exists also a negative 
and cautionary form–sometimes known as the “Silver Rule” and dated back to the Confucian 
tradition–, which states, “One should not treat others in ways that one would not like to be 
treated”. As Al-Ghazali noted with respect to the specific problem of lying to others:  
 
If you want to know the foulness of lying for yourself, consider the lying of 
someone else and how you shun it and despise the man who lies and regard his 
communication as foul. Do the same with regard to all your own vices, for you do 
not realize the foulness of your vices from your own case, but from someone 
else’s (quoted in Bok 1978, 29). 
 
 Practicing the Silver Rule allows to control for the bias entrenched in our sectarian 
perspective by forcing us to appraise whether we are prepared to be consistent in our moral 
judgments. Consistency refers here to the combination of two conditions (Carson 2010, 130-
131). The first condition is that whenever moral judgments we make must be consistent with 
the judgments we make about relevantly similar case: our moral judgments should in principle 
be universalizable. So, if we think that action A is good, and action B is identical under any 
morally relevant respect to A, then we should conclude that also action B is good. The second 
condition is that our attitudes and actions must be consistent with the moral judgment we 
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make. To further explain the relationship between moral consistency and the application of 
the Golden Rule, Carson (2010, 135) uses the following example: 
 
I am a plumber and often lie to my customers–I claim that they need expensive repairs 
when they do not. I claim that it is morally right for me to do this. Yet, I object very 
strongly when I discover that my auto mechanic lies to me and claims that I need a $2000 
engine overhaul when, in fact, I only need a $200 tune-up. On the face of it, there is no 
morally relevant difference between what I do and what my mechanic does. To be 
consistent, I must either (1) change my moral judgment about my own lying and say that 
it is wrong for me to lie to my customers, or (2) change my judgment and attitudes about 
what the mechanic does to me, and hold that his lying to me about my engine is morally 
permissible and not longer resent it or object to it. 
 
 Siding with Carson’s analysis, I understand the third level of publicity as the level at 
which through the Silver Rule we check the consistency of our moral judgments about a 
deceptive act. In this view, the appeal to the reasonableness of the public serves a double 
function: to withstand the criticism of other reasonable persons we should not only provide 
logically valid argumentations (e.g., by avoiding logical fallacies), but we should also be ready 
to admit that we will consider these reasons to be ‘reasonable’ even if we were the target of 
the proposed action. The appeal to the ‘reasonableness’ of the public thus provides both the 
formal condition (logical validity) for any reason that will enter into our argumentation as well 
as a criterion to judge those argumentations (moral consistency). 
 
 Differently from both Carson and Bok, however, I stress that in clinical contexts the 
condition of moral consistency is not entirely adequate and sometimes self-defeating without 
further qualifications. By practicing the Silver Rule, in fact, we might introduce another 
potential bias in our moral evaluation because we substitute the perspective of the patient with 
our evaluation of what we, as patient, would think about that specific deceptive act. However, 
reasonable people might ostensibly disagree about issue of values–especially whether they 
touch bioethical issues such as abortion, end-of-life questions, GMOs, animal 
experimentation, etc. (Boniolo 2012; Boniolo and DiFiore 2010; Boniolo and Maugeri 2014). 
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Even if we are consistent in our moral judgments, there is always the possibility that other 
reasonable people would disagree with us.  
 
 Recall, for example, the historical shift in the public attitudes toward truth telling 
discussed in (1.1). In the last thirty years, people’ attitudes have dramatically changed, with the 
vast majority of patients now preferring to be told the truth–even in those cases in which the 
truth to be disclosed is bad. For a certain time, clinicians who have been trained before that 
shift had to face the new sensibility of the public for individual autonomy. Reasonable doctors 
had to face reasonable patients who could have had entirely different attitudes toward truth 
telling in medicine, hence creating the space for legitimate moral disagreement. The same 
situation may still happen today as patients from different cultural and religious backgrounds 
may entertain very different attitudes with respect to truth telling (Surbone 2006). In these 
situations, fulfilling the formal conditions of logical validity and moral consistency would not 
aid physicians in assuming the deceived’s perspective, as the clinician would only appraise how 
she would judge such an act if she were the patient. 
 
 In sum, the third level of publicity ensures that we are moral judgment is not biased by 
selfish or corporative interests, but it does not assure that such an evaluation would be still 
valid outside our system of beliefs and values. In order to control for this residual potential 
bias, we should carry on the process of public justification at another, more general, level. 
 
 
(5.4.d) The fourth level of publicity: the perspective of the deceived 
 
Even if the whole public of reasonable persons is taken into account, there is still one point of 
view that is missing from the picture: the one of those sharing the perspective of the deceived. 
Without taking into account the perspective of the deceived the final judgment might be 
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skewed on the perspective of the deceiver, as it would be a trial in which a court of law emits a 
verdict after having heard only the perpetrator’s reasons but not those of the victims. 
Including the perspective of the deceived requires another step in the process of their 
articulating clinicians’ reasons. At this last level, therefore, the TOP ought to include also the 
following question: Were this patient aware of her circumstances, would she agree that 
deception is the best course of action to pursue? 
 
 Depending on the circumstances there are several ways in which clinicians might take 
into account the perspective of deceived. In general, however, there are three broad categories 
of cases. First, there are the cases in which clinicians can ask directly to the patients whether 
they would consent to the use of deception. (We shall examine these cases below). For 
example, in the context of medical research, participants in deceptive clinical trials may be 
asked to sign in advance an informed consent module in which it is made explicit that the 
information received during the trial may be incomplete or misguiding in order to protect the 
scientific validity of the study. Importantly, in this way it is possible to include not just the 
perspective “of patients” in general, but to respect the perspective of “this” patient, with her 
individual needs, values, beliefs, and relationships–at least in principle.  
 
 In many cases, however, it would be self-defeating to inquire into patient’s preferences 
about the use of deception (Korsgaard 1996).58 Often deception has to be performed in 
secrecy to be successful, without arising any suspiciousness on the part of those who will be 
deceived. In all these cases, in order to answer to the latter version of the TOP, clinicians 
must rely on indirect sources of information about the patient’s likely attitudes and 
preferences. For example, doctors can rely on what patients have previously made explicit (“I 
                                                   
58 Korsgaard (1996, 155-156) has argued that if someone consents to be deceived, then this person would stop 
believe anything. In Korsgaard’s words, “Sometimes it is objected that someone could assent to being lied to in 
advance of the actual occasion of the lie, and that in such a case the deception might still succeed. I can certainly 
agree to remain uninformed about something, but this is not the same as agreeing to be deceived. For example, I 
could say to my doctor: “Don’t tell me if I am fatally ill, even if I ask.” But if I then do ask the doctor whether I 
am fatally ill, I cannot be certain whether she will answer me truthfully. Perhaps what’s being envisioned is that I 
simply agree to be lied to, but not about anything in particular. Will I then trust the person with whom I have 
made this odd agreement?”. I think this view is too narrow; see (5.7). 
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do not want to know if the result is bad”), their personal acquaintance with them, and on what 
relatives and caregivers may know about their preferences. In any case, looking for individual 
preferences may help clinicians to anticipate how patients would react if the deception gets 
uncovered and thus to better evaluate the consequences of the deceptive acts. 
 
 The last scenario is the most extreme one, and occurs when it is impossible to 
ascertain patient’s perspective both directly and indirectly. For example, this is the case in 
which an unknown patient shows up alone in an emergency clinical setting. None of the 
medical professionals knows this patient, and there are no hints that may lead to reconstruct 
her social or cultural background. In these cases, the clinician may have insufficient 
information to characterize patient’s individual point of view. Whenever this happens, 
clinicians ought to substitute the perspective of this patient with the one of another reasonable 
person who might be imagined in the same situation.  
 
 
(5.5) Merits and limits of the test of publicity: from hypothetical to actual publicity 
 
The test of publicity allows clinicians to improve their decision-making processes as they 
evaluate the moral permissibility of deceptive acts. Specifically, by taking the TOP physicians 
may: (a) improve the identification of all the morally relevant reasons in favour or against an 
act of deception; (b) improve their argumentation through the identification of fallacious 
arguments and the clarification of key-terms (e.g., “individual autonomy” or “deception”); (c) 
control for those structural biases that are introduced by the discrepancy of the perspective as 
the sets of the reasons supporting or opposing a proposed deceptive act are weighted one 
against the other. If what I have argued so far is correct, then implementing the TOP in 
clinical settings represents a significant improvement over the way in which moral dilemmas 
about truth telling and deception are currently approached in medical ethics.  
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 However, even if we agree that a systematic implementation of the TOP would result 
in better moral decisions, this does not mean that the TOP provides a perfect solution for 
every case–or that it is not in itself problematic. The TOP has merits as well as limits. As Bok 
noted, “The test of publicity is not always needed; where needed it cannot always be 
implemented; if implemented it does not always bring forth solutions to moral quandaries. 
Given these limitations it can nevertheless reduce the discrepancy of perspectives, shad light 
on moral reasoning, and facilitate moral choice” (1978, 103). The TOP is “not always needed” 
because some deceptive acts would not pass the prior test of veracity: there are cases in which 
a deceptive act is ruled out well before reaching the TOP; it “cannot be always implemented” 
because sometimes there is not enough time; and, sometimes it cannot “bring forth solutions 
to moral quandaries” because the dilemma at had has simply no “right” solution: though one 
set of reasons must eventually prevail, there are cases in which the force of the respective 
sides might be almost equal and in which, even after the balancing, it is not clear what our 
actual duty should be. 
 
 More importantly, Bok’s perspective does not fully address another objection: namely, 
that the whole process from the TOV to the performance of the deceptive act can remain 
secret. Indeed, sometimes to meet the requirements of the TOP clinicians may actually discuss 
the moral dilemma at hand with their colleagues, peers, the patient’s caregivers, and 
sometimes even with the patient herself. However, clinicians can do so in indirect ways–e.g., 
by describing the case in hypothetical terms (“What would you do if…”). Thus, it is possible 
to apply the TOP and to keep the deception completely secret. The possibility of complete 
secrecy leaves the present account vulnerable to the critiques motivating categorical trust-
based positions, namely: that the process whereby clinicians identify possible exceptions to the 
duty of veracity is arbitrary; and that the virtual unaccountability of clinicians may lead us to 
suspect of their overall moral integrity (see 4.4). Let us briefly discuss how these two critiques 
can be addressed to the present account, even when the TOP is implemented.  
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 Implementing both the TOV and the TOP provides clinicians with a method for 
deciding when and how an exception to the duty of veracity is morally permissible. By leading 
clinicians to consider other perspectives other than theirs, decision-making processes 
implementing the TOP are arguably less biased than those without it. In this sense, this 
account convincingly answers to the critique of arbitrariness: contra Jackson (2011) and others, 
it is not true that there cannot be non-arbitrary ways of deciding which exceptions to the duty 
of veracity are ethical or not.  
 
 However, one might still object that even within the present account the risk of 
arbitrariness persists, although in a different form. It persists because it is always the clinician 
who is proposing the deception the one who judges whether she has successfully passed the 
TOV and the TOP. Thus, while applying the TOP may be of help in refining one’s own 
argumentations, it does not completely solve the problem of arbitrariness, which is instead 
moved from the level of the judgment over the competing reasons pros and cons the 
deceptive act, to the level of the judgment over the success of the TOP itself. The TOP may 
ideally provide a non-arbitrary method for identifying permissible exceptions, but the 
judgment over whether the method has been correctly and impartially applied remains an issue 
that pertain to the “arbitrary judgment” of the single clinician.  
 
 The second critique, then, concerns the preservation of trust. Usually we trust that 
clinicians will abide to certain minimal standards of morality and competency. Without such 
fundamental trust therapeutic relationships would become impossible. However, this trust 
may be jeopardized by the legitimate suspiciousness that clinicians make unjustifiable 
exceptions to the rule of veracity either because they are too paternalistic or because they are 
motivated by purely selfish reasons. This suspiciousness is further motivated by the fact that 
clinicians can operate in complete secrecy and are thus unaccountable. Since they must not 
reveal how, when and why they have decided to “opt-out” from the duty of veracity, then one 
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might suspect of the truthfulness of all their communications–especially if one has already 
assumed the perspective of the deceived and being subjected to an act of deception.  
 
 Implementing the TOP would not make the present account immune from this 
critique. In fact, applying the TOP may raise clinicians’ self-awareness about their 
responsibilities and lead them to better appraise the consequences of their actions, but it does 
not make them anymore accountable to the public eye than other methodologies: those who 
eventually decide to resort to dishonesty could still do so in complete secrecy. Thus, even by 
implementing the TOP, an exceptionalist account would still be liable to the critique that by 
allowing exceptions to the duty of veracity one might irremediably jeopardize the trust of 
patients, in particular of those that have already shared the duped’s perspective. 
 
 These two critiques remain unmet because the TOP implements only a form of 
“hypothetical” and not of actual “publicity”.59 Clinicians implementing the TOP have just to 
image how they would defend their acts in public, but they are actually never compelled to do 
so in practice. The TOP is only a mental experiment useful for better articulating one’s own 
reasons in a less biased way; but it does not require clinicians to publicly disclose whenever they 
have resorted to deception. By contrast, if clinician would be required to implement some 
form of actual publicity the two above critiques would be easily avoided. As for arbitrariness, 
if clinicians were required to publicly disclose when and why they resort to deception, then 
they would also have a strong incentive to conduct the TOP impartially. Passing the TOP 
would still remain an issue of private judgment, but, at least, those taking it would be 
motivated to do their best to apply the test fairly. As for the preservation of trust, instead, 
implementing some form of actual disclosure would solve the problem of suspiciousness by 
                                                   
59 This distinction is frequently drawn in political philosophy to distinguish two requirements for the acceptability 
of State laws–and especially of coercive ones. According to supporters of the idea of hypothetical publicity, a law 
is good only if those who will be subject to it can potentially agree upon it. This principle is usually attributed to 
Kant as he famously said that, “All actions relating to the right of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is 
incompatible with publicity” (Kant 1795). According to the defenders of actual publicity, instead, a law is 
legitimate only if those who will be subjected to it have actually agreed upon it. For a comprehensive overview of 
this debate see Grosseries (2005). 
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making it possible to know how, when and why an exception to the duty of veracity has been 
made, thus rendering those physicians who have resorted to deception publicly accountable. 
 
 The problem with actual publicity is that it seems to be too demanding. Clearly, it is 
impossible to organize every time an ad hoc audit commission, a citizen jury or a court of law 
as to literally translate the TOP in actuality. How should clinicians publicly disclose whenever 
they make exceptions to the duty of veracity? To answer this question, in the next section I 
will introduce the concept of “technique of actual publicity”. As I will explain, in general there 
is no need of resorting to complicated institutional and decisional devices because medical 
professionals are already using several techniques that satisfy the requirements of actual 
publicity. Therefore, I will argue, in order to meet the above objections, we have simply to 
extend the use of these techniques of actual publicity to all those cases in which a deceptive 
act is eventually performed in clinical settings. 
 
 
(5.6) Solving the problem of secrecy: introducing the techniques of publicity 
 
In medical contexts there are cases in which lying, deceit and concealment are already used in 
systematic and institutionalised ways. Consider the case, mentioned above, of a group of 
researchers in social psychology who decide to use a deceptive trial design to study people’s 
cooperative attitudes. In this case, resorting to a deceptive disclosure at the beginning of the 
trial is the only plausible way in which the scientists can preserve the scientific validity of the 
study. Today deceptive studies of this kind are common in psychology, sociology and even in 
medicine–for example in the field of placebo studies (Wendler and Miller 2008). The most 
striking case in this respect, however, regards the use of strategic concealment in double-blind 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs). In this trial design neither the researchers nor the 
participants are informed of which treatment each participant is receiving: this information is 
temporarily concealed in order to preserve the trial internal validity.  
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 How is this possible? How do researchers succeed in securing these exceptions to the 
duty of veracity in ways that are prima facie considered ethical by individuals, society, and 
institutions? In this section I suggest that an important part of the answer to this question lies 
in what I shall define as the “techniques of publicity”. The “techniques of publicity” are all 
those public means used by medical professionals to prevent, control for, and mitigate the 
moral implications of a deceptive act. Despite their heterogeneity, what the techniques of 
publicity have all in common is that they are ways of publicly disclosing that an exception to the 
duty of veracity will or have been made. In some cases these techniques allow bridging the 
gulf separating the perspective of the deceivers and the one of the deceived; other times, 
instead, they can only mitigate the consequences that an act of deception could have for the 
capacities of individuals to act autonomously, their interpersonal trust, and the bona fide of 
society toward medical professionals. We shall now proceed in the following way: in in this 
section I shall further characterize the concept of the “techniques of publicity”; in the next 
one I shall then explain how the systematic adoption of these techniques would complement 
my account. 
 
 Let us begin by considering two cases from research contexts: “debriefing” and 
“informed consent”. Among the conditions for approving deceptive studies, IRBs and ethical 
committees require the implementation of techniques of “debriefing”: once the study is 
completed the researchers must inform the participants of its true scope, disclosing them the 
use of deception. If participants think can that the use of deception was not appropriate they 
forbid the researchers from using their data. Techniques of “debriefing” are used to protect 
the trust of future study participants and to partially restore participants’ autonomous agency–
although in a post hoc way.  
 
 Something similar happens with informed consent, which is perhaps the most 
important technique of publicity that clinicians, bioethicist, and policy-makers have elaborated 
and implemented in the last seventy years (Faden and Beauchamp 1986; O’ Neill 2002; 
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Beauchamp and Childress 2009). Obtaining a valid consent is today a necessary pre-condition 
for conducting any clinical and scientific study with humans. This is true of both deceptive 
studies as well as of those trials that use strategic concealment but not deception. In the first 
case, the informed consent may explicitly require the participants’ consent to the use of 
deceptive techniques; in the latter case, instead, it may require them to temporarily waive their 
right to be informed about the kind of treatment that they will receive during the study. In 
both cases, the informed consent module absolves a similar function to the practice of 
debriefing: it publicly discloses to the prospective study participants that the researchers may 
or have used deception or concealment for preserving the internal validity of the study.  
 
 Despite their formal differences, debriefing and informed consent share a common 
goal: to balance the preservation of trust and the respect for autonomy with the need of using 
deception or concealment. In both cases this objective is achieved by disclosing that the 
researchers will be or have been untruthful in their communications with the study 
participants. The crux of both techniques, thus, is that of voluntarily waiving the secrecy that 
usually accompanies deceptive acts, publicly declaring that an exception to the duty of veracity 
has been or will be made. By disclosing when, how and why a deceptive act might or have been 
performed, the researchers waive their virtual unaccountability, hence preventing the 
phenomenon of the discrepancy of the perspectives from arising (e.g. informed consent 
before the trial), or explicitly facing its consequences (e.g. data withdraw after debriefing). 
 
 While these ways of publicly disclosing the use of deception and strategic concealment 
are commonplace in today research settings, analogous techniques exist also in clinical 
contexts. This is the case, for example, of techniques of “delayed” information disclosure. In 
delayed information disclosure clinicians first deceive or conceal information to a patient–for 
example in the “unhopeful surgeon case”–and then disclose the truth at a later stage, once the 
patient has physically and mentally recovered. A similar case occurs when clinicians resort to 
deceptive means for diagnostic purposes. Sometimes deception and concealment are the best 
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means to find out whether the symptoms reported by a patient have or not a psychosomatic 
component, hence allowing the clinician to select the most appropriate therapeutic path. After 
the diagnostic test has been taken, the clinician may disclose to the patient that the 
intervention that has been previously administered was just an inert one, hence explaining that 
the temporary deception was needed for selecting the best treatments.  
 
 Similarly to the case of informed consent before deceptive trials, patients in clinical 
settings can waive their right to receive certain kind of information in clinical contexts 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 131-132; see also 6.10). In this case, patients may explicitly 
state their preferences while discussing with their clinician possible strategies of information 
disclosure. This may happen in the context of taking diagnostic procedures for genetic 
diseases or life-threatening conditions. By agreeing in advance what attitude the physician will 
take in disclosing the results of the tests, patient and physician may publicly accommodate the 
use of selective or deceptive disclosures. Like in research contexts, in all these cases the goal 
of these techniques is again that of publicly disclosing when, how and why an exception to the 
duty of veracity has or will be made. Under this respect, the main difference between the two 
settings is only that within research contexts the implementation of these techniques of 
publicity is a structured practice, whereas in clinical contexts their use is situational and left to 
the sensibility and judgment of individual clinicians.  
 
 In difference to the current practice, I argue that the implementation of techniques of 
actual publicity ought to be made systematic in clinical settings: those who have or will resort 
to a deceptive act must also publicly disclose what they will do or have done. This means that, 
in addition to the TOV and the TOP, clinicians who resort to deception in clinical settings 
must always adopt at least one techniques of actual publicity. Before considering how this 
proposal could be translated in practice, let us further characterize it with respect to the theory 
that has been put forward in this chapter.  
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 In the view that I have proposed implementing a form of hypothetical publicity 
through the TOP is a necessary but not a sufficient requirement for a deceptive act to be 
morally justified. In addition to judging that a deceptive act is morally permissible through the 
TOP, those who are proposing to resort to deception must also take responsibility for 
preventing or mitigating the consequences of their acts. The implementation of hypothetical 
publicity must therefore be complemented with the implementation of at least one technique of 
actual publicity. In defending this view I must leave company with both Bok and Sokol, who 
consider instead the TOP to be the last step that clinicians ought to take in evaluating 
deceptive acts. Henceforth I shall refer to the test through which clinicians ought to select the 
best technique of publicity as the “test of public disclosure” (or TPD).  
 
 Importantly, there are some important differences between the test of publicity and 
the test of public disclosure. The most important difference is that the TOP is a mental 
experiment that implements a form of hypothetical publicity, whereas the TPD is a way of 
implementing a technique of actual publicity. While the first can be taken in complete secrecy 
of one’s own private conscience, the latter requires instead something to be publicly done. 
Another capital difference between the two tests is that the former demands clinicians to 
image how they would defend their choices from the criticisms of others, while the latter 
requires only that clinicians disclose whenever they plan or have made an exception to the duty 
of veracity. Adopting a technique of publicity does not automatically requires clinicians to 
defend their choices in front of an actual public–although it may create the preconditions for 
demanding such a public defence in exceptionally controversial circumstances.  
 
 
(5.7) The techniques of publicity and the test of public disclosure 
 
The “techniques of publicity” are all those means of publicly restoring, amending and 
justifying an exception to the duty of veracity. Informed consent and debriefing in RCTs, 
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authorized deception scripts, are all “techniques of publicity”, that is, ways of healing or 
preventing the damages of secret deceptive acts by making them publicly accountable. 
Depending on the context, one technique of publicity may be required instead of another; 
however, what is crucial is that for any deceptive act at least one technique of publicity is used. 
In this section we shall consider more closely how clinicians can translate this proposal in 
practice. 
 
 Let us begin with a characterization of the possible kinds of techniques of publicity, 
starting with what I shall consider as the ideal case: the obtainment of a valid consent for an 
openly deceptive study. As noted above, by obtaining such informed consent the researchers 
warn in advance the participants that they might be deceived during the study. By expressing 
their consent, the participants waive their right to be truthfully informed during the trial. This 
is an ideal case because those who will be deceived are informed of the deception before it 
occurs. Accordingly, they can autonomously decide whether or not they want to be subjected 
to it for the sake of promoting scientific knowledge and their trust will not be compromised. 
By contrast, those who participate in deceptive trials with debriefing are in a less favourable 
position: they can still decide to withdraw the data, but they cannot decide whether they 
consent to be deceived or not, as the deception has already took place. Acknowledging this 
difference, we shall henceforth distinguish between prospective and retrospective techniques of 
publicity. 
 
 The two techniques of informed consent and debriefing, however, share one 
important characteristic: they are both addressed to the ones that will be or have been 
deceived. By doing so, they are either preventing or making explicit the difference between the 
perspective of the deceiver and the one of the deceived. In the case of informed consent this 
discrepancy does not even arise: since the ones that will assume the duped’s perspective have 
autonomously chosen so, they cannot blame the deceivers for the consequences of the 
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deceptive act.60 In the case of debriefing, instead, the clash of the perspectives is made explicit 
by allowing the participants to veto what has been obtained by exploiting their trust. 
Henceforth, I will distinguish between direct and indirect techniques of publicity: direct 
techniques of publicity are those that are directly addressed to the deceived; indirect 
techniques of publicity are instead those that publicly disclose the deceptive act at others level 
of publicity. 
 
 There are many situations in which the deception cannot be directly disclosed. One of 
these cases is the one of the old man who is demanding to his clinician if he has cancer (see 
1.4.d). As I have argued, in this case it is ethical to lie to the inquiring patient out of 
compassion: the cancer can be easily removed surgically in day-hospital, and there seem to be 
no other plausible course of action for the clinician to be truthful while at the same time 
preventing a likely long-term, unnecessary, emotional shock with potentially severe 
consequences. Delaying the disclosure do not appear either as a viable alternative: revealing 
the use of deception may still lead the patient to entertain the false belief that his cancer “will 
always be there spreading”, and it might also negatively impact the quality of the doctor-
patient relationship. Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that in this case the proposal 
of using deception has already passed both the TOV and the TOP: how could the physician 
publicly disclose the deception if he cannot directly inform the patients neither prospectively 
nor retrospectively? 
 
 In this case, I propose that clinicians should nonetheless adopt an indirect technique of 
publicity. As we have seen while introducing the TOP, there are different levels of publicity 
that are arranged on the base of their relative distance with respect to the perspective of the 
deceiver. Hence, there is the first level of publicity that corresponds to the clinician’s private 
                                                   
60 In discussing the various levels of publicity, Bok hints at the need of implementing forms of prospective and 
actual publicity: “If possible, such an open discussion should take place before the initiation of the deceptive 
scheme, giving those to be deceived an opportunity to be heard. To do so, is the only sure way of having the 
perspective of the deceived represented” (Bok 1978, 98). 
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consciousness. This is, of course, a sui generis kind of publicity, for it is a level to which nobody 
else has usually direct access. Then, the second level of publicity if the one of peers, that is, of 
all other persons sharing our perspective. Next, there is the level of those sharing the 
perspective of the deceived. On a different plane, then, there is the level of the public of all 
reasonable persons to which both the deceiver and the deceived belong as they engage in the 
play of exchanging reasons. 
 
 When there are no plausible direct techniques of publicity, which indirect ones ought 
the clinician to prioritize? I suggest that, in these cases, clinicians should follow an inverse 
order of priority with respect to the one adopted while taking the test of publicity, as depicted 
in the following diagram: 
 
 
 
 Therefore, if the patient in question cannot be directly informed, clinicians should 
disclose the deception to others who share the perspective of this individual patient such as 
caregivers and close relatives. If there are no caregivers or close relatives, then the clinician 
should find other indirect ways of publicly disclosing the act of deception, at least at the level 
of those who share her/his perspective. Here there might be different options, depending on 
the context. Clinicians may decide to write and submit a short case-report to the local ethical 
The$Public$of$Reasonable$Persons$
The$Deceiver$ Peers$and$Colleagues$$ The$Deceived$
Caregivers$$
and$Rela7ves$
T h e $ T e s t $ o f $ P u b l i c i t y $ $
T h e $ T e s t $ o f $ P u b l i c $ D i s c l o s u r e $
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committee, to disclose the deception to other clinicians, or even to submit a short article to 
ethical journals. In any case, the principle guiding the choice should be that the less private the 
disclosure is, the better it would serve its purpose. Since institutional bodies and person with a 
leadership position have a public stance, they should be generally prioritized over individual 
peers. Hence, it is better to disclose the decision of resorting to deception to the head of the 
clinical unit rather than to a fellow colleague. In all these cases, it applies also the previous 
distinction between prospective and retrospective techniques of publicity: if possible it is 
better to inform the head of the clinical unit before resorting to deception rather than 
afterwards. 
 
 With the prospective/retrospective and direct/indirect general distinctions in place, we are 
now in a good position to elaborate a general ranking of which technique of publicity ought to 
be prioritized in each case. The most favourable scenario occurs when a clinician can use a 
prospective and direct disclosure. By contrast, the worse scenario is when there are no other 
options than indirect and retrospective techniques of publicity: this case coincides with the 
clinician keeping the deception fully secret. In between these two extremes, there are many 
intermediate levels in which, other things being equal, clinicians should always prioritize those 
techniques that are prospective over those that are retrospective as well as those that are 
closer to the perspective of the deceived over those that are closer to their own private 
consciousness. The following schema captures these ideas: 
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 The test of disclosure introduces an intermediary step between the TOP and the actual 
deception. Once the proposed deception has passed the TOP, clinicians should ask 
themselves whether they could still implement some prospective techniques of publicity. If 
such an option is not available, then they should evaluate which technique of publicity could 
be implemented after the deceptive act has been performed, prioritizing those that are direct 
and closer to the deceived’s perspective. Having identified which technique of publicity is the 
most appropriate one in that particular case, clinician can then proceed with the deception. 
 
 There are a few advantages associated with the proposal of implementing forms of 
actual publicity in clinical contexts. The first advantage is that of confuting the critique of 
secrecy and unaccountability that motivates categorical-trust based positions. This critique is 
that the virtual unaccountability of clinicians making an exception to the duty of veracity may 
raise a series of legitimate suspects about the way in which physicians decides in these cases. 
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Since clinicians are not required to take the TOP in any public and actual form (i.e. to defend 
their choice in any actual terms), then their evaluation on whether they have correctly applied 
the TOP could remain secret and thus be biased in the same way in which the standard 
evaluation of the reasons in other accounts is.  
 
 This critique loses much of its force once the TOP is complemented with the actual 
disclosure of the deceptive act, because the very fact of disclosing the exception provides a 
strong incentive to take the test seriously. The techniques of publicity have thus an 
“expressivist” function, which is to increase the awareness of clinicians taking the TOP about 
the potential consequences of their acts, hence incentivizing them to avoid arbitrariness and 
sloppiness. As for the critique about clinicians’ virtual unaccountability, it clearly falls with the 
introduction of techniques of publicity: the objective of publicly disclosing that an exception 
to the duty of veracity has been made, in fact, is precisely that of making clinicians 
accountable for it. Moreover, by endorsing transparency and accountability, clinicians and 
medical professionals would also reinforce the trustworthiness of their professional status. 
 
 There is, however, also a possible drawback. One of the problems in implementing my 
proposal is that prospective techniques of publicity are not always available. Sometimes 
clinicians have to decide quickly whether or not they ought to reply truthfully to patients’ 
direct questions. In these circumstances the clinician has little time to decide, and she cannot 
certainly be expected to ponder every aspects or to ask other more experiences colleagues for 
advices. Other times, instead, it would be unclear for the physician taking the test of public 
disclosure which practical options she has for disclosing the act of deception if the patient 
cannot be directly informed and there are no caregivers or close relatives. Since the 
community of peers is organized at many different levels, sometimes it is difficult to identify 
which disclosure would meet the requirement of actual publicity.  
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 These practical limitations represent an important challenge for the implementation of 
the present account. However, these concerns are likely to be resolved as this proposal is 
progressively implemented in clinical settings. If clinicians start adopting adequate techniques 
of publicity in a systematic way, they are also likely to create over time some “best practices” 
that might subsequently help clinicians in similar positions to meet similar concerns. For 
example, after observing a few analogous cases in which physicians have reported the use of 
deceptive means with the same category of patients, the head of a clinical unit may decide to 
discuss with other peers whether it is the case to implement some better techniques of 
publicity to cope with these cases. Opening a discussion about the need to address the 
consequences of deception may lead to the creation of new options, from the introduction of 
prospective information disclosures to the teaching of focalised material in medical schools. In 
other terms, by opening a conversation about deception and publicity, the adoption of the 
present view may aid in enlarging the set of options at the clinicians and patients’ disposal. 
 
 
(5.8) A decisional flowchart for guiding clinical decision-making 
 
A possible objection to my account that is that it is too demanding: implementing the tests of 
veracity, publicity and disclosure require time and cognitive resources; yet clinicians must 
often take rapid decisions. To address the same issue, Sokol (2007) has proposed a decisional 
flowchart to aid physicians in deciding whether a deceptive act is morally permissible. Sokol’s 
proposal explicitly builds upon Bok’s analysis and is therefore compatible with the view that I 
have so fare elaborated in this chapter. As such it shares all of its merits as well as some of its 
limitations: like Bok, also Sokol fails to acknowledge that without a requirement for actual 
publicity the whole procedure risks to be biased and eventually self-defeating. To resolve this 
and other minor issues, I have modified Sokol’s original flowchart to include also the level of 
the techniques of actual publicity into account. The resulting diagram provides a practical 
summary of the view that I have defended in this chapter: 
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What#are#your#jus-ﬁca-ons#for#the#proposed#decep-on?#
Applying#ethical#reasoning#for#non>decep-ve#
ac-on#
•  To#prevent#great#physical#or#psychological#harm#(including#death)##
•  To#preserve#or#enhance#hope#
•  Pa-ent#is#reliably#believed#or#known#to#not#want#informa-on#
•  Pa-ent#is#not#emo-onally#or#cogni-vely#equipped#to#cope#with#the#truth#####
•  Decep-on#will#enhance#autonomy#in#the#long#run#(e.g.,#by#preven-ng#life#threatening#hear#aHack)#
Do#the#jus-ﬁca-ons#outweigh#the#objec-ons?#
If#aware#of#the#facts,#would#the#pa-ent#consent#to#the#lie/#decep-on#
in#advance?#(if#pa-ent’s#view#are#not#known,#subs-tute#the#pa-ent#
for#“a#reasonable#person”)?#
Proposed#decep-on#is#morally#permissible# Reject#the#proposal#
Take#the#Test%of%Veracity,#the%Test%of%Publicity#and#
the#the#Test%of%Disclosure%%%%
Can#the#objec-ve#be#met#without#recourse#to#decep-on?#
Use#non>decep-ve#means#to#achieve#objec-ve#
Given#the#circumstances#and#your#assessment#of#the#pa-ent’s#mental#state,#is#the#decep-on#aHempt#
likely#to#succeed?#
Reject#proposed#decep-ve#ac-on#Will>non#lying#decep-on#meet#the#objec-ves?#
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(5.9) Four advantages of the proposed account 
 
In this concluding section I shall further characterize the account that I have defended by 
underscoring its main advantages with respect to other competing alternatives in 
contemporary medical ethics. 
 
 First, this account avoids the many pitfalls of categorical positions while at the same 
time enforcing a strict prohibition on using deception in clinical settings. The view that I have 
defended is quite demanding in terms of requirements: passing the test of veracity, the test of 
publicity and the test of disclosure might require an active effort on the part of the physician 
proposing the deception. Arguably, only a few deceptive acts would be judged morally 
permissible if the tests are correctly applied. This is to be expected: the use of deception is 
very risky, especially in clinical settings, and therefore the rule of veracity must be strictly 
enforced, even if it remains a prima facie rule. In difference to all categorical positions, 
however, the view that I have defended provides also a flexible tool that allows coping with 
extreme scenarios, like for example the one of the “murderer at the door” or the other various 
scenarios that have been presented in the introduction. Thus, the present account is able to 
capture our moral intuitions about the bad consequences of resorting to deceptive means 
without falling into the paradoxical or unwanted consequences of other absolutist positions. 
 
 Second, the view that I have elaborated differs from other accounts in medical ethics 
as it is grounded on a wider analysis of the moral implications of deception for both trust and 
individual autonomy. This broader focus has brought to recognize the mutual 
interdependence of the two main rationales that can be invoked to prima facie object to the use 
of deception in clinical settings. While most other accounts are motivated either by the will to 
preserve trust or by the will of respecting and promoting patient’s autonomy, my account 
assign to both rationales the role of necessary and possibly independent conditions for 
rejecting deception in clinical settings. Appraising the moral implications of untruthfulness 
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from this wider perspective is important because it allows identifying all the relevant reasons 
that ought to be considered when clinicians evaluate an act of deception.  
 
 Third, in difference to other accounts such as the one of Beauchamp and Childress, 
my proposal acknowledges the inherent biases that are entrenched in our moral judgments 
because of the discrepancy of the perspectives. Since we tend to appraise the same act of 
deception differently depending on whether we endorse the perspective of the deceived or the 
one of the deceivers, considering such an act only from one of these two perspectives is likely 
to lead to a skewed evaluation. With respect to a third, impartial, point of view deceivers will 
tend to excuse themselves more often than not, while the deceived will tend to condemn them 
more often than not. In each case, the evaluation of the reasons pro or cons a given act of 
deception is likely to be biased in one sense or the other. This phenomenon is even more 
important in clinical settings where doctors and patients are within an asymmetrical 
relationship of power and knowledge and doctors can often operate in complete secrecy. To 
solve this problem I have argued for the systematic implementation of a refined version of 
Bok’s “test of publicity” as a mandatory requirement for clinicians considering the use of 
deception. Adopting the TOP leads clinicians to refine their argumentations by weeding out 
possible fallacious arguments and facilitates the identification of all the relevant reasons at 
stake, thus leading to recognise those acts of deception that are motivated only by selfish 
rather than by altruistic reasons.  
 
 Fourth, in difference to Bok’s proposal, my account avoids the objection of complete 
secrecy. Moral decisions that are taken in complete secrecy can be biased (either because of 
the discrepancy of the perspective or because we fail to identify and correctly weight all the 
relevant reasons). Furthermore, by conferring a status of virtual unaccountability, 
institutionalized secrecy may cast a legitimate doubt on the moral commitment of physicians 
to adhere to the fiduciary pact binding them with patients: since we do not know how, when 
and why a clinician makes an exception to the duty of veracity we can never be sure that 
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she/he is not making unjustifiable exceptions. To cope with this problem I have proposed to 
complement the previous account with a further step in which clinicians who resort or have 
resorted to deception select at least one way of publicly disclosing it. By introducing and 
characterizing the concept of “techniques of publicity” I have thus argued that Bok’s 
requirement of hypothetical publicity is not sufficient to adequately fulfil its role unless it is 
complemented with the adoption of some form of actual publicity. Adopting the techniques 
of publicity has several advantages as they can: correct the biases entrenched in taking secret 
moral decisions; reinforce the trust between physicians and society; and foster the 
conversation about how clinician can best cope with deception in clinical settings. 
 
 
(5.10) Four possible objections and four replies 
 
In this last section I will consider four possible objections to the account that I have 
elaborated. In particular, answering these four questions allows for clarifying both the 
meaning of the theoretical approach that I have so far proposed and how clinicians and other 
health professionals may use the diagram presented in (5.8). 
 
Objection (a). According to the diagram you presented, there exists a strict order in which 
the reasons for justifying a deceptive act ought to be articulated. As the diagram depicts, we 
should begin with the TOV, proceeds to the TOP and then conclude with the TOD. 
However, sometimes it is impossible or impractical to follow this order: for example one 
clinician may first determine what kind of disclosure would be ideal in one case, and then 
proceeds to ponder the reasons supporting or opposing the deceptive act only retrospectively; 
hence, how should one understand the diagram in light of this possibility? 
 
Reply (a). The diagram is not meant to depict a rigidly unidirectional process. Rather, it 
provides only a rough blueprint for articulating our reasons as we evaluate the moral 
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justifiability of an act of clinical deception. In other words, the diagram provides what I argued 
is the best sequence of passages to be followed in ideal circumstances, that is to say, in 
absence of other relevant practical considerations. Other things being equal, following the 
sequence proposed in the diagram is the optimal thing to do. However, in actual 
circumstances, it is to be expected that the process of moral justification that occurs in 
practice may not be entirely identical to the one proposed in the diagram, as it is more likely to 
follow instead a back-and-forth approach. Nevertheless, my view is that, independently from 
the order that is actually followed, the process of moral justification for an act of clinical 
deception cannot be considered complete until all three steps have been implemented. 
 
Objection (b). The perspective that you are proposing is very demanding: to go through all 
the diagram one may need a lot time and cognitive resources, as each step implies a decision 
to be taken, and such decisions can sometimes be very complex. This demandingness makes 
this approach useless in contexts in which clinicians have to take rapid decisions. In other 
words, this approach may be useful to take a more pondered decision while evaluating the 
patient’s future therapeutic plan, but not for taking rapid decisions in ER contexts.  
 
Reply (a). Indeed, demandingness is one of the chief characteristics of the account that I 
have proposed. As I have previously specified (see infra 5.7-9), this demandingness reflects 
the fact that clinicians’ duty of veracity ought to be considered as being rather stringent. At the 
same time, however, this makes also the present account unsuited to take decisions in settings 
in which rapid decisions are needed. While I acknowledge that this may represent a limit to 
the practical usefulness of the view that I have defended, I do not think that it provides any 
ground for considering its application less desirable for two interrelated reasons. First, this 
objection does not apply only to my account, but rather to any other non-categorical view. By 
definition non-categorical views set a default attitude, but require us to take a decision 
whenever we detect a potential moral dilemma. Resolving these moral dilemmas inevitably 
implies that we need to evaluate the alternative at stake, and then decide what ought to be 
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done all things considered. But again, this process requires time and cannot often be carried 
out if what we need is not a reasoned conclusion, but a rapid decision. This is a practical limit 
of any non-categorical view of applied ethics, rather than a specific drawback of my account.  
 
 However, this does not mean that my or other non-categorical accounts cannot be 
relevant in emergency-like situations. As explained in (5.7), by implementing the TOD, my 
view may have an explicit “expressivist function”: since clinicians have anyway the duty to 
disclose that an exception to the duty of veracity has been made, they can always use the 
diagram as a way of articulating their reasons in a retrospective way. This may in any case 
result in a better defence or justification of what has been done, also in emergency-like 
situations. Moreover, it is to be expected that in the long run implementing the TOD may 
bring about guidelines and shared “best practices” that can be also directly useful to deal with 
emergency-like situations. A clinician may thus be unable to use my view in one single case, 
but if enough similar cases occur, then through the TOD it is likely that such clinician will in 
the long run refine and adopt better ways of dealing with similar circumstances.  
 
Objection (c). As you explained in the first chapter, attitudes toward clinical truth telling have 
been shifting in the last decades and they are still widely different across cultural contexts. 
However, it seems that the diagram provides a one-size fit-all approach that do not take into 
adequate considerations these possible differences. 
 
Reply (c). On the contrary: the view that I have proposed is flexible enough as to take into 
consideration not only cultural but also personal differences regarding clinical truth-telling. In 
fact, the diagram is fairly open-ended, and it leaves some room to take into consideration 
possible cultural, moral, and individual preferences. This is explicitly the aim of the TOP, after 
all, through which clinicians ask themselves whether they would be ready to defend their 
deceptive act in public, that is to say, in front of their colleagues, the patient and other 
reasonable persons. Clearly, this very approach would lead to different answers in different 
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times and cultural context. For example, in front of the same situation, a doctor from the 
beginning of the 20th century may reach a different conclusion about what ought to be done as 
compared to one clinician who has been trained at the beginning of the 21th century. In other 
words, the diagram indicates how we should articulate in any one case our reasons, not what 
ought to be done irrespectively of the specific socio-cultural context in which the decision 
takes place. 
 
Objection (d). Throughout the previous chapters you have defended a view for which the 
justifiable use of clinical deception ought to be considered as an “exception” to clinicians’ duty 
of veracity. However, is this view is extended to every doctor-patient communication, for 
example in oncological contexts, it seems that these “exceptions” are instead fairly common. 
 
Reply (d). I concede that in some specific contexts clinicians may somehow depart from a 
strict adherence to their duty of veracity in ways that are not very problematic, currently 
accepted, and not so uncommon. With reference to oncological clinical settings, for example, 
it might be the case that clinicians frequently dealing with terminally ill patients may resort 
with a certain frequency to techniques of delayed or partial information disclosure in way that 
are incompatible with a rigorous adherence to the positive prima facie duty of truthfulness but 
that would nonetheless pass all the tests described in the diagram. In these cases it appears 
that while one can still argue that clinicians have a prima facie duty of veracity, the cases in 
which such duty can be legitimately overridden in favour of other prima facie duties are too 
common to be defined “exceptions”. Nevertheless, there are two reasons for which, even in 
the light of this consideration, we may want to consider clinicians’ duty of veracity not just as 
a prima facie duty, but as a rather strict one, that is to say, as a prima facie duty that can be 
overridden only in exceptional circumstances. First there are reasons concerning the 
importance of truth telling (see chapter 3). Second, not every clinician operates in contexts in 
which the circumstances forces moral dilemma about truth telling on a daily basis. Since the 
theory that I am proposing aims at being applicable to all clinical settings, it is then arguably 
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still reasonable that in the vast majority of the cases clinical deception or selective disclosure is 
unethical and should therefore be avoided, hence accounting for an “exception” to clinicians’ 
duty of veracity. 
 
 
(5) Summary  
 
In this chapter I have defended the view that benevolent deception may be morally 
permissible in whether three conditions obtains: that other plausible courses of non-deceptive 
action have been ruled out; that those committing the deceptive act would be ready to defend 
their conduct in front of a public jury composed not only by their peers, but also by those 
who will be deceived and in principle by every reasonable person; and, finally, that the deceptive 
act is eventually disclosed. In elaborating this view I have first shown the similarities between 
Bok’s principle of veracity and Ross’s conception of prima facie duties, emphasizing how they 
similarly interpret the structural imbalance between truthfulness and falsehood in the terms of 
a difference at the level of moral reason-giving.  
 
 Then, I have presented a refined version of Bok’s test of publicity as a practical 
methodology for clinicians for better articulating their reasons in favour and against a 
proposed act of deception. By implementing the TOP, clinicians’ decision-making is less likely 
to be biased by self-interests and self-deception. However, I have also argued that Bok’s 
proposal is not entirely satisfactory because in many cases it would not be able to control for 
the bias which are entrenched in any privately conducted moral evaluation in which we have 
some interest involved. This limitation stems from the under theorization of the distinction 
between hypothetical and actual publicity, which exposes this account to the critique targeting 
the secrecy usually conceded to clinicians in clinical settings.  
 
 148 
 To solve this problem I have proposed to adopt the concept of the “techniques of 
publicity” and consequently the test of public disclosure as a way of complementing the 
previous account. By adding the requirement that clinicians must in any case identify and 
adopt the best technique of publicity it is possible to reply to the objections motivating 
categorical trust-based positions as well as to achieve other objectives, such as the ones of 
increasing interpersonal and social trust and of incentivizing clinicians to avoid sloppiness and 
selfishness while applying the test of veracity and the test of publicity. The resulting view is 
that benevolent deception is morally permissible only if the justification of such an act would 
pass the test of veracity, the test of publicity, and the test of public disclosure. To underscore 
the pragmatic import of this view, I have then proposed a modified version of Sokol’s 
decisional flowchart to aid physicians in taking better decisions in real-case scenarios. 
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Part II 
Veracity, Deception and Placebo Effects61 
 
 
 
Over the last forty years a converging series of empirical studies has revolutionized the way in 
which placebo effects have traditionally been conceptualized in medicine. These studies 
suggest not only that placebo effects may be ubiquitous across research and clinical settings, 
but also that they may modulate patient’s health-relevant outcomes in a plethora of conditions 
such as pain, depression, irritable bowel syndrome, Parkinson’s disease, and recurring 
migraine. These empirical findings have revamped the debate over the moral permissibility of 
administering placebos in clinical contexts. 
 
 The main ethical issue pertaining to the clinical use placebos concerns the use of 
“paternalistic”, “therapeutic”, or “benevolent” deception: Is it ever permissible to lie, deceive, 
or conceal information to patients for the sake of promoting or inhibiting placebo responses? 
In order to answer this general question, in the second part of this dissertation I will apply and 
further extend the theoretical framework elaborated in part (I) with the aim of determining 
how clinicians’ prima facie obligation of veracity ought to be specified in the light of new 
empirical discoveries about the underlying mechanisms of placebo (and nocebo) responses.  
 
 This second part is divided into two chapters. In chapter six I analyze the traditional 
debate over the moral permissibility of administering deceptive placebos. In difference to 
current practices, categorically restrictive policies, and the accounts advanced by other 
scholars, I will argue that the use of deceptive placebos is morally permissible in exceptional 
cases.  
                                                   
61  This second part is partially based on Annoni (2013); Annoni and Miller (2015a; 2015b).  
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 In chapter seven, then, I discuss the moral implications of using verbal techniques of 
“therapeutic communication” to promote or inhibit placebo responses, and of administering 
physical placebos without deception (open-label placebos). In particular, I will defend the view 
that clinicians and oncologists may already implement within their routine clinical activities 
several adjuvant techniques of therapeutic communication as to provide patients with a 
superior quality of care in non-deceptive, low-risk and highly cost-effective ways. 
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6. The Ethics of Deceptive Placebos 
 
 
 
 The giving of a placebo –when, how, what–seem to be a function of the physician, 
which, like certain function of the body, is not to be mentioned in polite society.  
Pepper 
 
 
He who cannot dissimulate cannot cure.  
Hoffman 
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(6) Introduction 
 
In this chapter I discuss the ethics of administering deceptive placebos in clinical contexts. 
What follows is divided in two parts. First, I will introduce the main coordinates of the current 
debate over the moral permissibility of using deceptive placebos in clinical contexts. Section 
(6.1) provides a synthetic reconstruction of the historical debate about the clinical role of 
placebos; section (6.2) introduces some preliminary definitions and conceptual distinctions; 
section (6.3) inquires into whether deceptive placebos have clinically relevant effects; section 
(6.4) explores whether placebos are clinically effective without deception; finally, (6.5) reviews 
available evidence about the use and attitudes towards the clinical use of placebos. In the 
second part of the chapter (6.6), I analyze a series of arguments that have been used to argue 
for or against the clinical use of deceptive placebos, finding them all wanting. Section (6.7) 
confutes the view that it is possible to administer placebos in ways that are non-transparent 
and yet not deceptive, hence avoiding the traditional moral quandaries of resorting to 
deception; then section (6.8) explores the claim that deceptive placebos are aligned with 
patients’ preferences and thus do not compromise their autonomy and trust; section (6.9) 
criticizes Foddy’s (2009) position that placebo are “always safe” and “often the best available 
treatment”; finally, section (6.10) analyzes the ethical underpinnings motivating the “placebo 
policy” endorsed by the American Medical Association (AMA), arguing that it provides a 
suboptimal starting point to think about the clinical use of deceptive placebos.  
 
 
(6.1) The origins of the placebo debate 
 
The genealogy of the term “placebo” leads back to the Hebrew Bible, when in the 4th century 
St. Jerome translated the word ethalekh with the Latin verb “placebo”, i.e., “I shall please” 
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(Shapiro and Shapiro 1997, 28; Jacobs 2000).62 The first known use of the word “placebo” in 
medicine dates 1772, when the Scottish professor of medicine William Cullen stated in a 
lecture: 
 
Mr. Gilchrist will bear me testimony that at first view I considered him as 
absolutely incurable, and as hasting very fast to his fate, and I took him in 
hopes of making some observant upon his case, and even of learning 
something by his death, I prescribed therefore in pure placebo, but I make it 
a rule even in employing placebos to give what would have a tendency to be 
of use to the patient (1772, 218f). 
 
 This quote exemplifies the double role that placebos have played in medicine up to 
mid of the 20th century: on the one hand, they served as tools of intentional ignorance in 
clinical experiments to gain scientific knowledge (Kaptchuk 1998a); on the other hand, they 
served as instruments of the healing arts to please the patient and ease the doctor’s work.63 In 
the rest of this chapter we shall focus only on this latter aspect, that is, on the role that 
placebos played in clinical contexts as distinct from the one they played in research. 
 
 In medicine, the practice of administrating sham interventions has been fairly 
common until 1950.64 In 1803 Thomas Jefferson noted that “one of the most successful 
physicians I have even known has assured me that he used more bread pills, drops of colored 
                                                   
62 The word “placebo” acquired a more secular meaning only in 14th century France, when it was customary for 
mourning families to dispense a meal after the Office of the Dead. To profit from the banquet, distant relatives 
and unrelated persons used to sneak in by simulating grief and desperation, joining the rest of the congregation 
by the time of singing the Psalm 116:9: “Placebo Domino in regione vivorum” (“I shall please the Lord in the 
land of the living”). Accordingly, these people were called “placebo singers”, or “placebo” (Shapiro 1968).62 
63 Shortly after this lecture, Motherby’s New Medical Dictionary defined a “placebo” as “A common place method 
or medicine” (1785) and, a few years later, Fox’s New Medical Dictionary as “an epithet given to any medicine 
adopted more to please than to benefit the patient” (1803). A placebo was then something deprived of real 
healing powers but with the capacity of relieving patients. According to Shapiro and Shapiro (1997, 31), the first 
definition of placebo as “an inactive substance” in a dictionary dates 1894, while its first definition as something 
“inert” dates from 1942. 
64 Before the late 17th century the use of “bogus” treatments had been probably non-existent in Europe. The 
reasons lie in the ideas of “disease” and “cure” that were characteristic of that time. Instead of being an 
ontologically isolated entity a “disease” was more a unique personal condition. Consequently, “a treatment 
targeted the ‘person’ who manifested as a singular ‘gestalt’. An appropriate treatment–including regimes, 
behaviour, herbs, and/or words–always existed for a humoral disorder; there was never a need for a simulated 
treatment […] For magico-religious healers, bogus treatment was even more unthinkable. The supernatural realm 
provided an endless source of potential healing possibilities [such as performative speech acts]. Religious healing 
was always a source of relief in this world or the next. Self-defined dummy treatments were simply unnecessary” 
(Miller et al. 2013, 1-2). Risse (1986), in his book Hospital Life in Enlightenment Scotland, writes that at the end of the 
18th century physicians often used placebos whenever they were unsure about the diagnosis, wanted to buy some 
time and observe the natural course of the disease, or the case at hand was so desperate that relief was the only 
option left. Placebos were thought to lack any capacity to influence the causes of the patient’ actual diseases, and 
the ethics of their provision was grounded solely on considerations of paternalistic beneficence. 
 154 
water, and powder of hickory ashes, than of all other medication put together” (Jefferson 
1898). He famously defined this practice as “the pious fraud”. A century later Richard Cabot, 
a prominent Harvard physician, observed how he “was brought up, as I suppose every 
physician is, to use placebo, bread pills, water subcutaneously, and other devices” (1903). 
Another article entitled Placebo from 1885 confirms that, at the end of the 19th century, it was 
common routine to give an entire “polychromatic assortment of sugar pills” to unaware 
patients (Anon, 1885).  
 
 Still in 1945, one of the first scholarly papers on to this topic, concluded that a placebo 
was able to “smooth [the patient] path”; that “it cannot harm and may comfort”; and that it 
was especially useful for the “ignorant […] disappointed and displeased […] hopeless, [and] 
incurable case[s]” (Pepper 1945). Shortly after, a Lancet article entitled “The Humble 
Humbug” vividly characterized the role of the placebo in medicine as 
 
[a] means of reinforcing a patient’s confidence in his recovery, when the diagnosis is 
undoubted and no more effective treatment is possible; that for some unintelligent or 
inadequate patients life is made easier by a bottle of medicine to comfort their ego; that 
to refuse a placebo to a dying incurable patient may be simply cruel; and that to decline to 
humour an elderly ‘chronic’ brought up on the bottle is hardly within the bounds of 
possibility (Anon 1954, 321).  
 
 From the time of the “pious fraud” to the one of the “humble humbug” placebos in 
general practice were thus conceived as inert remedies unable to influence the 
pathophysiology of diseases. Accordingly, their primary role was that of providing “mental 
relief” to uneducated, unintelligent or desperate patients. In the absence of ethical guidelines, 
placebos and therapies were therefore both delivered by following the classical Hippocratic 
rule “help, or at least do not harm”. Since placebos could “help” without harming, the 
benevolent deception required for their administration was frequently practiced, normally 
excused, and often considered one of the hallmarks of the doctor-patient relationship. 
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 After World War II, two factors conspired in changing the ethical debate over the 
clinical use of placebos. The first one was the rise of respect for autonomy as a basic principle 
in medical ethics. After the 1947 Nuremberg trial it was established that people have a right to 
refuse medical procedures (Faden and Beauchamp 1986). In order to authorize or veto an 
intervention, however, patients need to be informed about it. Thus, as discussed in part (I), 
physicians came to have a duty to disclose to patients truthful information about their 
diagnosis, prognosis and the nature of prescribed treatments. With the emergence of honesty 
and transparency in communication as a key value for all health professionals, the “pious 
fraud” associated with the traditional use of placebos became increasingly considered as a relic 
of the bygone age of medical paternalism. The second decisive factor, then, was the series of 
scientific investigations that in the last forty years have progressively uncovered the 
neurocognitive mechanisms of placebo responses, demonstrating that the provision of a 
deceptive placebo may sometimes provide patients with something more than “mental relief”. 
 
 Before exploring the ethics of using deceptive placebos in clinical practice, however, it 
is necessary to consider four preliminary questions, namely: (a) What is a “placebo”? (b) Do 
placebos have clinical relevant effects? (c) Do placebos require deception to be clinically 
effective? (d) How often and why are placebos used in clinical settings? In the next four 
sections we shall synthetically explore each of these crucial aspects of the placebo debate. 
 
 
(6.2) “Placebo” and “placebo effects”: preliminary definitions 
 
The first difficulty in analyzing the ethics of placebos and placebo effects is that it is unclear 
what “placebo” and “placebo effects” are. In fact, there is unanimous consensus that the 
placebo construct is one of the most misleading concepts in contemporary medicine (Miller 
and Kaptchuk 2008; Miller and Brody 2011). It has been argued that “the placebo concept as 
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presently used cannot be defined in a logically consistent way and leads to contradictions” 
(Gøtzche 1994), and thus that “[w]e need to stop thinking in terms of placebo” (Nunn 2009).  
 
 For the purpose of the present analysis, however, I will define a “placebo” as any 
medical intervention believed to be inactive for the patient’s condition but administered by 
health professionals as if it was an active treatment (Miller and Colloca 2009; Annoni and 
Miller 2015;).65 Depending on the circumstances and on the biomedical theory assumed, a 
placebo can thus be a pill, an injection, an exercise regime, a diagnostic or even a surgical 
procedure (Grümbaum 1986; Benedetti 2011; Miller et al. 2013).  
 
 A distinction that is usually drawn is the one between “pure” and “impure” placebos. 
A placebo is said to be “pure” if it is believed to lack therapeutic properties in general for the 
condition being treated (e.g. lactose tablets, saline injection, cornstarch pills etc.). By contrast, 
a placebo is said to be “impure” if it is a treatment which is used as a placebo but which is also 
known to be effective for other conditions or under diverse modalities of administration. 
Common examples of “impure placebos” are antibiotics used to treat viral infections, over-
the-counter analgesics, or vitamins for cold (Brody 1982; 1985; Miller and Brody 2011). Pure 
placebos are often described as “inert” or “inactive” but this is misleading: even lactose pills 
or saline injections contain “active” ingredients that have biochemical properties and may 
induce quantifiable changes (for example, a saline injection will raise the water level in the 
blood stream). The distinction between pure and impure placebos is therefore not always 
sharp. 
 
                                                   
65 There is a fundamental ambiguity in defining a placebo as “a treatment that is believed to be ineffective for the 
condition being treated” insofar as the subject holding the belief is left unspecified. It is in fact possible that a 
physician believes a treatment to be effective even though there are no empirical studies demonstrating its efficacy 
according to the standards of evidence-based medicine (Howick 2011). Since it is possible for different 
physicians to hold different beliefs about the efficacy of diverse treatments, the definition of what is “a placebo” 
is inherently blurred. For a detailed analysis of how this problem may impact the way in which clinicians might 
protect patients’ trust, respect patients’ autonomy, and administer placebos in beneficial ways, see Barnhill (2012). 
Furthermore, the distinction between “active” and “inactive” treatments is murky; see Miller and Brody (2011). 
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 The concept of “placebo effect” is possibly more confusing than the one of 
“placebo”. Currently, there is no agreement on how “placebo effects”, should be 
conceptualized. What is clear, however, is that traditional, dictionary-like definitions of 
“placebo effects” as “a positive effect following from the administration of an inert placebo” 
are inadequate. First, this kind of definitions perpetuates the conceptual paradox according to 
which something “inert” (i.e., the “placebo”) is said to cause an effect (i.e., the “placebo 
effect”). Second, as we shall see in the next section, while the administration of a treatment 
(placebo or not) may cause a “placebo effect”, other variables of the healing context may 
likewise induce a placebo effect without the administration of physical interventions (see 6.3).  
 
 In an effort to capture within a unique concept the multifaceted nature of “placebo 
effects”, over the years several scholars have proposed to re-conceptualize the concept of 
“placebo effect” in the terms of “context effects” (di Blasi et al. 2001; Miller and Kaptchuk 
2008), “meaning response” (Moerman 2002), “symbolic aspects of the therapy” (Brody 1995), 
“interpersonal healing” (Miller et al. 2009), “positive care-effect” (Blease 2012), or as the “alief 
effect” (Haug 2011). 66 While none of these definitions has so far gained prominence, for the 
purposes of the following inquiry I shall stipulate that by “placebo effect” or “placebo 
responses” I mean any modification in a patient’s health-related outcomes that derive from 
contextual aspects of the clinical encounter rather than from the specific effect of therapies. 
 
 A third reason for why these dictionary definitions are inadequate is that empirical 
studies have now revealed the existence of an interesting flipside of the placebo-phenomenon: 
the “nocebo effect”. Nocebo effects are “adverse events produced by negative expectations 
and represent the negative side of placebo effects” (Colloca and Finniss 2012, 567). In parallel 
with the previous definition, by “nocebo effect” or “nocebo responses” I shall henceforth 
                                                   
66 Haug (2011) elaborated an interesting proposal based on the idea of “alief” developed by Gendler (2008). 
According to this view, an “alief is associative, automatic, and arational. As a class, aliefs are states that we share 
with nonhuman animals; they are developmentally and conceptually antecedent to other cognitive attitudes that 
the creature may go on to develop. And they are typically also affect-laden and action-generating’’ (Gendler, 
2008a, p. 641). According to Haug, this concept would be able to provide a unitary perspective on placebo 
effects that avoids the limitations of the classical perspectives. 
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mean any adverse modification in a patient’s health-related outcomes that derive from 
contextual aspects of the clinical encounter rather than from the specific effect of therapies. 
 
 
(6.3) Do placebos have clinically relevant effects? 
 
In 1955 Henry Beecher conducted a proto-systematic review of 15 placebo-controlled trials, 
concluding that the average number of people that had experienced relief in the placebo group 
was 35.2 %; i.e., over one third of the total. Beecher’s study aimed at demonstrating that 
people assigned to control groups in clinical trial might experience real improvements in their 
conditions despite having received no “active” or “real” medication, and therefore that it was 
impossible to assess the efficacy of a new medical interventions unless one compared it with an 
inert control (i.e., “the placebo”). Beecher’s article, famously entitled “The Powerful Placebo”, 
had an enormous impact, and represented a watershed for the way in which placebo and 
placebo effects came to be conceptualized within and outside biomedicine. 
 
 Although Beecher’s study had many methodological limitations and was based on 
unproven theoretical assumptions (Kienle and Kiene 1997), in the last four decades a 
converging series of laboratory experiments, clinical trials, and neurocognitive studies has 
partially vindicated his conclusions about the existence of a powerful placebo effect. Empirical 
evidence on placebo effects comes from three main sources: (a) RCTs specifically aimed at 
studying placebo effects; (b) over forty years of controlled experiments; (c) recent studies with 
brain imaging techniques. Collectively these complementary strands of empirical research have 
shed considerable light on the psychological and neurophysiological mechanisms underlying 
placebo responses (Benedetti 2011).  
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 However, while the reality of placebo responses is beyond dispute, the extent to which 
placebo effects can be harnessed to induce clinically relevant effects is still controversial. In a 
series of Cochrane systematic meta-reviews entitled “Placebo interventions for all clinical 
conditions”, Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche (2001; 2004; 2010) analyzed over 330 trials and 
concluded that placebo interventions had no “significant clinical effect”. Placebos were found 
to have a marginal effect only on outcomes that were subjective (either patient or observer-
reported) and continuous–most notably pain. These results led to question whether the 
placebo effect was “powerless” rather than “powerful”, and to what extent the results 
attributed to “placebo effects” were instead the product of subjective report biases.  
 
 Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche meta-reviews prompted several responses within the field 
of placebo studies (Miller 2001; Kaptchuk 2001; Wampold et al. 2005; Meissner 2005; Howick 
et al. 2013). These replies underscored that these meta-reviews “examined placebo effects in 
medical experiments, where subjects are aware that they may or may not be receiving 
placebos. In the clinical contexts, placebo effects are likely to be stronger because patient are 
led to believe that they are receiving an active medication” (Kolber 2007, 89). 
 
 Aside from these methodological controversies, and in contrast with the results of 
these meta-reviews, most of the claims supporting the case for the clinical effectiveness of 
placebos are based on the results of high-quality laboratory studies and of experiments 
conducted in controlled conditions. In particular, in the last two decades, researchers have 
increasingly resorted to “open-hidden” experiments to separate placebo effects from other 
variables of the healing context and to assess their relative magnitude (Colloca et al 2008). 
 
 In this elegant trial design, the same medication is delivered to patients either in the 
full view of a clinician who openly describes the procedure and its anticipated effects 
(expected open administration) or covertly, for example through an intravenous infusion 
machine (unexpected hidden administration) (Levine et al. 1981; Gracely et al. 1983; Levine 
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and Gordon 1984; Benedetti 1995). The scope of open-hidden experiments is to assess 
whether it makes a difference to administer a drug while removing some variables from the 
healing context (e.g. patient-doctor communication; bedside presence of caregivers, etc.). 
 
 In one experiment of this kind, Amanzio et al. (2001) administered four commonly 
prescribed analgesics to patients in postoperative settings. In the open administration groups a 
doctor performed the procedure by telling the patient that the injection was a powerful 
painkiller and that the pain would soon subside. In the hidden administration groups, patients 
received instead the exact same dose of analgesics, this time delivered through an automatic 
infusion machine without anybody in the room and without emitting detectable signals. 
Patients were therefore unaware of when they were receiving the painkiller. The detected 
difference between the reliefs of pain in the two groups provided a measure of the placebo 
effect. The study found that the dose of analgesic needed to reduce the pain by half was 
significantly greater in the hidden administration groups for all four painkillers. Thus, the same 
dose of a proven analgesic had different effects depending on it being administered in an open 
or in a hidden manner. Similar results have been replicated with morphine (Bendetti et al. 
2003a), and in conditions other than pain, including state anxiety (Benedetti et al. 2003a), and 
Parkinson’s disease (Pollo et al 2002; Benedetti et al. 2003b).  
 
 In general, open-hidden experiments demonstrate that the effectiveness of therapies 
depends not only on what they contain but also on how they are delivered. The same dose of 
analgesics may have different effects depending also on other variables of the “healing 
context” such as the bedside presence of a nurse, or the way in which it is described. By 
“healing context” it is here meant the ensemble of rituals, tools, environmental features, and 
symbols associated with the delivery of therapies (Jonas 2011; di Blasi et al. 2001).  
 
 Among the components of the healing context some are of special importance and 
have been subjected to empirical studies. These studies suggest that variables such as the 
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doctor’s attitude (Thomas 1987), her perceived confidence (Uhlenhuth 1966), the 
environment in which the therapy takes place (de Craen et al. 2000), and the ritual performed 
(Kaptchuk 2002), may all shape the final health outcome. For example, the formal 
characteristics of a therapy (i.e. its color, shape, timing) seem to have a measurable impact on 
its effectiveness. Branded placebos are more effective than generic ones (Branthwaite and 
Cooper 1981; Waber et al. 2008); sham surgery is more effective than sham injections, while 
sham injections are more effective than oral placebos (de Craen et al. 2000). Color and timing 
also matters, as blue and green placebos have been shown to be better in inducing sleep, while 
red ones are superior as stimulants (Hussain and Ahad 1970; Sallis and Buckalew 1984; de 
Craen et al. 1996). Also, placebos administered more frequently seem to have greater effects 
than placebo administered sparsely (De Craen et al. 1999; de Craen et al. 2000).  
 
 Placebo treatments may have effects that match or surpass those of standard 
medications. A study by Kaptchuk (2008) and colleagues investigated the hypothesis that it 
was possible to isolate two additive placebo components: (i) the one determined by the 
delivery of the therapy and (ii) the one determined by the interpersonal physician–patient 
relationship. The study was performed on 262 patients with irritable bowel syndrome (IBS). 
Participants were randomised into three groups. The first arm was the “no treatment” or 
waiting list and was meant to operate as the control for factors such as regression to the mean 
and spontaneous remission. In the second arm, patients received placebo acupuncture, but 
their relationship with the physicians was curtailed to a minimum—‘limited interaction’. 
Finally, in the third arm, patients received the same placebo acupuncture administered by 
warm, confident, and emphatic practitioners—‘augmented relationship’.  
 
 Results confirmed that for all four outcomes (global improvement scale, adequate 
relief of symptoms, symptom severity score, and quality of life) IBS patients in the limited 
interaction group reported more relief than those on the waiting list, but less than the ones in 
the ‘augmented group’. Improvements were significant: after three weeks, patients reported 
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improvement 27% in the control group, 43% for the limited group, and 62% in the 
augmented group. The magnitude of the response matched that of alosetron and tegaserod, the 
two most commonly prescribed drugs for this condition but which are known to have 
significant, even life-threatening, side effects. This study confirmed that non-specific effects 
can produce clinically significant outcomes and provided a first proof of principle that it is 
possible to isolate and combine diverse components of the healing context that induce 
placebo effects. 
 
 Another series of experiments in which placebo treatments seemed to have greater 
effectiveness than standard therapies is the so-called German acupuncture trials (GERAC) 
(Hacke et al. 2007). This double blind, placebo-controlled, multi-centred, parallel-group trial 
with 1,162 patients aimed at comparing traditional therapy (drugs and exercises) for chronic 
low-back pain against verum acupuncture and sham acupuncture (performed with retractable 
needles). Interestingly, this large evidence-based study found that between verum and sham 
acupunctures there was virtually no difference. More importantly, researchers found that 
acupuncture was almost twice as effective as the standard conventional therapy. Hence, in this 
case, a sham procedure proved to be more effective than the standard therapy. 67 
 
 Therefore, compelling evidence from controlled laboratory studies and clinical trials 
seems to support the claim that placebo effects may sometimes be significant–especially for 
conditions like pain, depression, and irritable bowel syndrome. However, these results ought 
to be interpreted with caution for at least two reasons. First, there is a relevant difference 
between controlled research environments and clinical contexts, and studies suggest that 
placebo effects are higher in the former setting than in the latter one (Benedetti 2011). 
Second, placebo effects are highly variable among individuals and healing contexts and thus 
highly unpredictable (Kaptchuk et al 2008; Hall et al. 2012). As Miller and Colloca (2009, 317) 
concluded in a comprehensive review of the literature, “[t]he upshot to date is that we lack 
                                                   
67 For a methodological analysis and critique of these trials see Howick (2011). 
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systematic and definitive evidence of clinically significant benefit from placebo treatments. 
Accordingly, more clinically relevant research is needed before placebo treatments can be 
recommended as evidence-based therapy”.  
 
 In siding with this latter remark, I shall endorse a cautionary position regarding the 
possible clinical effectiveness of placebos. This position is based on two assumptions. First, 
the clinical effectiveness of placebos is likely to be limited to conditions that have strong 
symptomatic components like pain, IBS, and depression. Second, the clinical effect that 
placebo treatments might have for these conditions is typically highly variable, moderate and 
short-term. Thus, while on the one hand we might have good reasons to object to placebo 
treatments be recommended as evidence-based treatments in clinical settings, on the other 
hand, we might also have good reasons to support their use in specific individual cases.  
 
 
(6.4) Do placebos require deception to be effective? 
 
A crucial question concerning the effectiveness of placebo treatments is whether or not they 
require deception to induce significant placebo effects. Historically, the belief that placebos 
have to be administered deceptively or covertly to be effective has been widely shared. Clearly, 
since the main ethical issue concerning the clinical use of placebos regards the moral 
implications of resorting to “benevolent deception”, if placebos could instead be administered 
without deception the main issue hindering their use would disappear. But can non-deceptive 
placebos match the clinical utility of their deceptive counterpart? 
 
 Recent empirical studies on placebos “without deception” have questioned the widely 
shared assumption that placebos require deception to be effective (Krueger et al. 2006; 
Sandler and Bodfish 2008; Kaptchuk et al. 2010). In a pilot trial, patients with irritable bowel 
syndrome were randomized to receive either no treatment or a placebo pill that was honestly 
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described as containing no active medication (an “open-label placebo”, or OLP). Patient were 
read a script about placebo responses and informed about the rationale of the study. Perhaps 
surprisingly, patients who received OLPs reported statistically significant improvements with 
respect to the control group (Kaptchuk et al. 2010). Similar results have been replicated in 
other pilot studies for recurring migraine (Kam-Hansen et al. 2014) and depression (Kelley et 
al. 2012), suggesting that “taking a pill” may have beneficial effects even if that pill is not 
deceptively presented as an effective medication. 
 
 However, while these studies provide a first proof of principle that placebo effects can 
be induced not only by deceptive placebos, they do not demonstrate that covert and revealed 
placebos are equally effective. At present, more research is needed to solve this empirical 
question. Nevertheless, several authors have argued that, given our contemporary 
understanding of the placebo phenomenon, the burden of proof should be on those 
advocating the equal effectiveness of open-label placebos (Kolber 2007; Foddy 2009; Barnhill 
2011). In fact, compelling evidence suggests that the magnitude of placebo effects may be 
influenced by the strength of patient’s expectations about future clinical benefits (Kirsch 1997; 
Colloca 2013). Since deceptive placebos affirmatively presented as effective medications are 
likely to elicit stronger expectations than placebos presented as “inert treatments”, it is 
reasonable to expect that deceptive placebos “might offer a medical benefit to some patients 
over and above the medical benefit offered by disclosed placebos” (Barnhill 2011).  
 
 Furthermore, independently of whether deceptive and revealed placebos are or not 
equally effective, covertly administered placebos can be used also with a diagnostic function, 
for example to discriminate real and pseudo-seizures in epileptic patients (see below, section 
6.7). Clearly, utilizing a revealed placebo in these cases would be self-defeating, as the success 
of the diagnostic procedure may precisely depends on the patient being convinced that she is 
assuming a real medication. Thus, even if revealed and cover placebos would be equally 
 165 
effective from a therapeutic point of view, this would not remove the question of whether 
deceptive placebos utilized with a diagnostic purpose would be ethical or not. 
 
 In sum, even if placebos without deception have clinically relevant effects, in absence 
of further evidence it is reasonable to hold that placebos administered with deception provides 
patients with an increased therapeutic benefit with respect to revealed placebos and that, in 
any case, only the use of deceptive placebos provides a plausible diagnostic tool in certain 
clinical scenarios. Thus, since there are cases in which the proposal to use a deceptive placebo 
would conceivably pass the “test of veracity”–for it would represent a plausible option in 
absence of alternative and truthful courses of action–one cannot entirely avoid the question of 
whether the clinical use of deceptive placebos is or not morally permissible. 
 
(6.5) Prevalence and attitudes toward the use of placebos: a synthetic overview 
 
In the last thirty years there has been an increasing number of empirical studies inquiring into 
the attitudes of clinicians toward the clinical use of placebos. These studies provide a useful 
starting point to answer three questions: (a) How often are placebos used in clinical settings? 
(b) Why do health professionals use placebos? (c) What are clinicians’ ethical attitudes toward 
the use of placebos? In this section we shall take a closer look at some of the major empirical 
studies that have been conducted over these issues. 
 
 In 2003 a national questionnaire survey of Danish physicians (772 practitioners) found 
that that 41% of private specialists, 54% of hospital doctors, and 86% of general practitioners 
admitted using placebos at least once–with 46% of the latter group reporting ten of more 
usages in the previous year (Hróbjartsson and Norup 2003).68 Placebos were mostly used as 
                                                   
68 In this study researchers “characterized a placebo treatment as an intervention not considered to have any 
“specific” effect on the condition treated, but with a possible “unspecific” effect (Hróbjartsson and Norup 
2003). Interestingly, clinicians reported also different beliefs as to the efficacy of placebos: 51% believed that they 
could modify only subjective symptoms, 32% that they impact both subjective and objective symptoms; 9% did 
not believed in any effect; while the remaining 8% did not know. This means that, still in 2003, 68% of the 
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analgesics, with antibiotics for viral infection being the most used kind. The most cited reason 
to prescribe placebos was to “avoid conflicts with patients by complying with their treatment 
preferences”. Roughly half of the clinicians found deceptive placebos ethically acceptable, 
while 40% found their use unethical; still, among those who found placebo unethical 50% 
admitted of having prescribed them in the last year. 
 
 Similarly, a 2004 study in Israel found that the use of placebos for clinical purposes 
was widespread. Initially the researchers hypothesized that the use of placebos in clinical 
settings was more than zero but less than 10%. Results among the participants (31 hospital 
physicians, 31 head nurses, and 27 family practitioners) indicated otherwise: 60% admitted of 
using placebos (71% among the nurses), with 37% of using them as often as once in a month. 
Most respondents found that placebos were clinically valuable (94%). Only 4% honestly 
informed patients that they were receiving a placebo, while 11% told the half-truth that it was 
a “non-specific medicine”, 17% omitted saying something, and 68% recurred to benevolent 
deception. Interestingly, this study found also that besides using placebos after an 
“unjustified” request for medication, to calm the patient, and as analgesics, physicians used 
placebos also as diagnostic tools to distinguish “organic from psychogenic or simulated 
arthralgia, seizure disorder, and abdominal or other pain” (Nitzan and Lichtemberg 2004, 
945).69 
 
 A much larger study found that between 46% and 58% of U.S. internists and 
rheumatologists recommended placebo treatments. Also, this study found that nearly half of 
the participants (46%) admitted of recommending treatments solely for the purpose of 
enhancing patient’s expectations, while 62% considered the use of placebos to be either 
                                                                                                                                                          
interviewed physicians had mistaken or confused ideas about placebo effects. A systematic review similarly 
concluded that up to 50% of physicians and nurses […] believed that placebo treatments are either always, often, 
or generally effective”, meaning that up to 50% thought that they were ineffective (Fässler et al. 2010, 12). 
69 This study did not investigate physicians’ ethical attitudes toward the use of placebos. However, it found that 
only 5% of physicians support a policy of total prohibition, while the majority see the use of placebos as 
conditionals on certain circumstances, such as prior experience (33%), notifying patients of receipt of a placebo 
(29%), or evidence from research that the placebo was effective (24%); (Nitzan and Lichtenberg 2004, 945). 
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obligatory or permissible in some circumstances. Interestingly, the study underscored that 
physicians prescribing placebos rarely used “pure” placebos (5%), as the vast majority used 
instead impure placebos such as over-the-counter analgesics, vitamins, antibiotics, and 
sedatives. The authors explained this result by underscoring the difficulty of writing a 
prescription for a sugar pill; the lack of marketed pills for such a use, and the reservations that 
one may have in knowing that a prescription is ineffective (Tilburg et al. 2004, 295). 
 
 The first systematic review (Fässler et al. 2010) analyzed 22 studies in 23 articles 
published between 1973 and 2009 and found that the proportion of health professionals 
reported of using placebos at least once a year varied between: 17% and 80% for pure 
placebos; between 54% and 57% for impure placebos and between 41% and 99% if both pure 
and impure placebos were addressed.70 The primary motivation to give a placebo was the 
desire of the patient to receive a medication, followed by the intention to take advantage of 
placebo effects, and the by the will to avoid conflicts with patients or the need of telling them 
that all therapeutic options were exhausted. As for ethical attitudes, this systematic review 
found that the majority of health professionals found the use of placebo morally problematic, 
but that up to 50% considered it acceptable whether it was meant to benefit the patient. 
 
 A recent study with 1715 UK doctors found that 97% of the interviewed participants 
reported having used impure placebos at least once in their career, and 77% of using them 
frequently (at least once in a week), while only 1% do the same with pure placebos. Common 
reasons to prescribe them were: psychological treatment, because patient requested a therapy; 
to treat non-specific complains, and to calm patients (Howick et al. 2013b). This study also 
investigated more in depth the ethical attitudes of physicians, finding that–with respect to the 
prescription of pure placebos–66% thought that in certain circumstances they were ethically 
permissible; that 82% found them unethical whether they entailed deception; and that 90% 
                                                   
70 Interestingly, in the studies in which it was possible for the physician to indicate what constituted a placebo, 
some indicated as “a placebo” the use of non-essential diagnostic procedures and physiotherapy (Fässler et al. 
2010, 11); on the importance of this notion see (6.10.d). 
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considered them unethical whether they jeopardized the doctor-patient trust.  Results for the 
case of impure placebos were similar (84%, 82% and 94% respectively). 
 
 In sum, deceptive placebos are still widely used in clinical settings for a variety of 
reasons that include doctors’ attempt to mollify patients and satisfy their request for a 
prescription, as well as motives regarding the clinical utility of placebo treatments. In general, 
the vast majority of clinicians use “impure” rather than “pure” placebos. Ethical attitudes are 
polarized, but the majority of medical professionals seem to agree that placebos are in general 
ethically worrisome but they can be justifiable in specific circumstances to benefit patients. 
 
 
(6.6) The ethics of deceptive placebos 
 
Deceptive placebos can have limited effectiveness for treating a number of conditions such as 
pain, depression and irritable bowel-syndrome. Since in principle placebos are also cheaper 
than other effective medications, one could argue that deceptive placebos may in some cases 
provide an appealing therapeutic option. Moreover, empirical surveys show that deceptive 
placebos are still widely administered in clinical settings for different reasons. However, the 
use of placebos is fraught with all the moral quandaries typically associated with the use of 
deception in clinical settings. Are deceptive placebos justifiable in clinical settings? And if so, 
how can we identify those cases in which their use is morally permissible? 
 
 In the rest of this chapter I explore the ethics of deceptive placebos by applying the 
theoretical framework that I have elaborated in the first part of this dissertation. In general, 
the view that I will defend about the ethics of deceptive placebos is the same that I have 
defended with regard to the moral permissibility of other forms of deception in clinical 
settings: while deception and dishonesty are prima facie wrong, resorting to such practices is 
permissible only in exceptional cases; namely, in all those cases in which the proposal of using 
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a deceptive placebo could conceivably pass the tests of veracity, publicity, and public 
disclosure. This general perspective, I will argue, is to be understood in a stricter sense when 
applied to deceptive placebos. Other things being equal, clinicians should not use deceptive 
placebos unless they have exceptionally good reasons to do otherwise.  
 
 In order to defend this position in the next sections I will discuss arguments that have 
been elaborated to claim that (6.7) physical placebos are not ethically controversial because 
they can be administered in ways that are neither “open” nor “deceptive”; (6.8) and because 
many patients do prefer to receive deceptive placebos; (6.9) that deceptive placebos should be 
frequently used because they are always safe and often the best available treatment; (6.10) and 
that deceptive placebos ought to be categorically prohibited on precautionary grounds. As I 
will argue, each of these positions is wanting for some reason, but their shortcomings can all 
be avoided by applying the view that I have elaborated in part (I). 
 
 
(6.7) Can placebos be administered in ways that are non-deceptive and yet not-open? 
 
Usually, it is assumed that covertly administered placebos involve some form of deception. 
Accordingly, the ensuing ethical debate revolves around whether such deception may or not 
be justifiable under certain circumstances (Bok 1978; Brody 1982; Bostick 2008; Kolber 2007; 
Miller and Colloca 2009; Asai and Kadooka 2013; Foddy 2009). There is, however, another 
possible line of argumentation that consists in maintaining that it is possible to administer 
placebos in “non-transparent ways”, that is, in ways that are neither “open” (e.g., “this is a 
placebo”) nor deceptive (e.g., “this is morphine” whereas the pill is instead a placebo). 
 
 Scholars pursuing this line of argumentation usually start by questioning the definition 
of “deception” assumed at the outset of the discussion. Deception is then normally defined as 
“intentionally causing someone to have a false belief that the deceiver believes to be false” 
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(Carson 2010; see 2.1). Consider, however, the following way of introducing a placebo: “I am 
prescribing you a pill which research suggests can be of benefit to you. In your circumstances 
I have reason to believe that it will work, with a minimum of side effects” (Gold and 
Lichtenberg 2014). It is claimed that this disclosure is “not transparent”–because it does not 
openly inform the patient that the pill is a placebo– and yet it is also “not deceptive”–because 
the statement is not factually false: placebos can be clinically helpful and the physician may 
genuinely believe so (Cohen and Shapiro 2013; Gold and Lichtenberg 2014).71 
 
 It is important to appreciate that if these authors were right, then they could argue that 
a clinician willing to prescribe a (non-transparent) placebo could legitimately do so without the 
need of publicly justifying his/her choice. Since there is no deception involved, then there are 
no risks for patients’ autonomy or trust, and therefore the proposal of using placebos in this 
way would not need to pass through the tests of veracity, publicity and of public disclosure to 
be morally justified. But is this line of argumentation successful in avoiding the traditional 
hurdles of the moral debate over the permissibility of prescribing placebos to patients?  
 
 I argue that is not, and for the following three reasons. First, advocates of the “non-
transparent” use of placebos have a too restricted conception of clinicians’ obligations of 
veracity. As I have argued in chapter 2, this obligation does not entail only a negative 
obligation to refrain from lying and deception, but also a positive duty of providing all those 
information that are sufficiently relevant for patients. Arguably, the fact that one is assuming 
or not an active medication is one of those information that are potentially relevant from a 
medical point of view. As noted by Kolber (2009, 25), “If a person ends up in the emergency 
                                                   
71 As Cohen and Shapiro (2013, 698) have recently argued, “When the doctor administering the placebo tells the 
patient, ‘I am giving you a substance that I believe will help your condition,’ the crux of the deception according 
to the traditional understanding is that the doctor expects the patient to assume the substance works on the 
tissue level, while intending by this utterance to mean it just works psychologically”. Similarly, Gold and 
Lichtenberg (2014, 221) have defended the same view in a recent article where they claim that a physician may 
introduce a placebo to a patient by saying “‘I am prescribing a pill which research suggests can be of benefit to 
you. In your circumstances I have reasons to believe that it will work, with a minimum of side effects’ […] if we 
define deception as ‘intentionally causing someone to have a false belief that the deceiver believes to be false’, 
then for the physician who genuinely believes in the therapeutic qualities of the placebo treatment, it would not 
be considered deception as well”. 
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room in an unfamiliar locale, he wants to give his treating physician the most accurate 
information possible about his current medication. With [incomplete] information, the doctor 
may decline to use highly effective treatments out of fear that it could interact with the 
medication the patient mistakenly thinks he is taking”. It is thus reasonable to argue that the 
nature of one’s medication is one of those essential pieces of information that fall under the 
duty to inform patients in order to respect their autonomy. Accordingly, clinicians using “non-
transparent” placebos would still be dishonest, even though they would be so not because 
they lie or deceive, but because they strategically “keep the patient in the dark” with respect to 
some relevant medical information. 
 
 Secondly, it can be argued that not informing the patient that the prescribed 
medication is a placebo qualifies as an act of deception by omission because the clinician would 
fail to correct a false belief entertained by the patient, i.e., the belief “that doctors give only 
active medications” (see 2.1). One could reply that clinicians cannot be sure about what beliefs 
are harbored by their patients, and thus, other things being equal, that they cannot have an 
intention to deceive them by omission. This reply, however, is unconvincing. As Bok has 
noted, the context in which any therapeutic encounter takes place is not neutral as to the 
beliefs that both parties can be reasonably expected to entertain: 
 
The statement that a placebo may help a patient is not a lie or even, in itself, deceitful. 
Yet the circumstances in which a placebo is prescribed introduce an element of 
deception. The setting in a doctor’s office or hospital room, the impressive terminology, 
the mystique of the all-powerful physician prescribing the remedy; they convey the 
impression that the treatment prescribed will have the ingredients necessary to improve 
the patient’s condition. The actions of the physician are therefore deceptive even if the 
words are so general as not to be lies. Verbal deception may be more direct, but all kinds 
of deception can be equally misleading (Bok 1974, 20). 
 
 Also Cabot (1903) objected to the proposal of administering non-transparent placebos 
on the ground that “a true impression, not certain words literally true, is what we must try to 
convey” and that what counts as “deceptive” may be dependent on the norms and 
expectancies of a particular social setting (Brody 1982). Today patients may reasonably expect 
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that all the medicines that doctors prescribe to them have been tested and approved for their 
specific efficacy. To contravene this widely shared expectation counts as deception, even if the 
words uttered by the clinician are sufficiently vague as not be literally false.72 
 
 There is also a practical reason for why it is not recommendable to consider the use of 
non-transparent placebos as distinct from the one of deceptive ones, namely, that 
concealment tends often to “spill over” into deception and lying (see 2.2). Assuming that the 
physician will not be able to write a prescription for a placebo pill to be dispensed by a 
pharmacy, how will she present the treatment to the patient? How will the bottle of pills be 
labeled? What if the patient starts asking questions about the medication contained in those 
pills? What if she wants to double-check online what sort of medication she has been 
suggested to take? Therefore, even if the initial statement may not be literally deceptive–
although it can be contextually so–there is always a risk that it could open the way for explicitly 
deceptive practices, requiring open lies where before there was only strategic concealment.  
 
 In sum, the view for which it is possible to avoid the traditional ethical hurdles of 
justifying a deceptive placebo cannot be escaped by claiming that placebos can be 
administered in ways that are neither open nor deceptive. It is not possible to have the 
placebo cake and eat it too: either the administration of a placebo is fully open-label, or else it 
is dishonest and it requires to justified according to the view that I have elaborated in part (I). 
 
 
                                                   
72 For this reason I disagree with both O’Neill (1984) and Barnhill (2011) that it might be a promising line of 
defence for deceptive placebos to argue that concealing the nature of an intervention is sometimes compatible 
with the respect of patients’ autonomy. In particular, O’Neill has argued that patients cannot be informed about 
every aspect of the treatments they receive, and therefore that they “can no more be asked to consent to every 
aspect of treatment than citizen can be asked to consent to every act of government. Respect for autonomy 
requires that consent be possible to fundamental aspects of actions and proposals, but allows that consent to 
trivial and ancillary aspects of action and proposals may be absent or impossible […] However, some non-
fundamental aspects of treatment to which consent has been given may have to include elements of deception 
and coercion. Use of placebos or of reassuring by inaccurate accounts of expected pain might sometimes be non-
fundamental but indispensable and so permissible deceptions” (1984, 176). 
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(6.8) Deceptive placebos and patients’ preferences 
 
In his formidable defense of the use of deceptive placebos, Adam Kolber (2007; 116) has 
argued that the provision of deceptive placebos might actually be consistent with some 
patients’ preferences. Other authors have similarly maintained that some patients–if not the 
majority of them–may actually “want to be locally manipulated [through a placebo] for the 
sake of achieving [a] larger goal”, that is, symptomatic relief (Cohen and Shapiro 2013, 703).  
 
 At present, empirical evidence on patients’ attitude toward the clinical use of placebos 
is scarce. A 1993 Swedish study found that 25% of interviewed patients agreed completely or 
for the most part that physicians ought to prescribe more often placebos on their own 
initiative, while 63% agreed that it is acceptable to administer a placebo to a dying cancer 
patient if there is little chance that she will discover the truth (Lynöe et al. 1993). More 
recently, a survey in US patients found that “most respondents (50-84%) judged it acceptable 
for doctors to recommend placebo treatments […] Only 21.9% of respondents judged that it 
was never acceptable for doctors to recommend placebo treatments” (Hull et al. 2014). 
 
 These findings may reinforce arguments in favor of deceptive placebos in two ways. 
First, they can reinforce the case for paternalism by suggesting that “placebo deception” 
constitutes only a minor infringement of patient’s autonomy (Kolber 2007). Second, they can 
mitigate the concerns about the effects of deception on trust. If a patient considers morally 
appropriate the use of deceptive placebos, then, when she discovers that her clinician had 
given her a placebo, she might not consider such deception a too severe breach of her trust. 
Perhaps some patients might even consider it as a sign of the doctor’s commitment to their 
wellbeing. Similarly, if the vast majority of patients support the use of deceptive placebos, 
using deceptive placebos would likely not compromise the social status of medicine. 
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 Taking into account patients’ preferences is crucial in any context, but it is especially 
important in relation to the ethics of deception. In fact, knowing patients’ preferences may 
shape the process whereby clinicians articulate their reasons about the moral permissibility of 
using deceptive placebos in one way of the other, as such preferences could determine both 
the way in which one could take the test of publicity and the way in which the use of 
deceptive placebos could eventually be disclosed. If patients are overwhelmingly in favor of 
deceptive placebos, then one might conclude that clinicians would be often ready to defend 
their use in public; if patients have the opposite opinion, instead, clinicians could reasonably 
be more cautious. Also, knowing patient’s preferences may lead to different conclusions about 
the moral permissibility of a deceptive act in those cases in which it is not possible to directly 
ascertain the preferences of a specific patient (for example, because it would reduce the 
therapeutic effectiveness of the placebo), and in which the clinician relies on her knowledge of 
what other reasonable people belonging to the same cultural group would do.  
 
 Thus, it is important to conduct more empirical studies in order to better ascertaining 
patients’ preferences regarding the clinical use of deceptive placebos. However, it is also 
important to underscore two important points that are often overlooked by commentators 
who use studies about patient’s unexpressed preferences to support the case for deceptive 
placebos. First, meeting patients’ unexpressed preferences is not the same as to respect 
patients’ autonomy. As noted by Barnhill (2011, 228), the fact “that a patient’s unexpressed 
preferences are met doesn’t mean her autonomy is respected because respecting her autonomy 
requires letting her make an actual informed decision about her treatment”. Thus, even if by 
using a deceptive placebo a clinician would eventually be making what that patient would 
consider to be right for her, this clinician would nonetheless violate this patient’s autonomy 
and right to informed consent. As the different levels of the test of publicity make explicit, 
respecting patient’s autonomy and meeting her preferences are two important and yet distinct 
desiderata for anyone supporting the case for a deceptive act.  
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 Second, patients’ unexpressed preferences may not be predictive of their actual 
reactions. As stressed in part (I) often we tend to appraise the moral consequences of a 
deceptive act differently depending on which of the two perspectives we assume: the one of 
the deceiver, or the one of the deceived. If this is true, then patients may agree that physicians 
should use placebos in certain circumstances, but may nonetheless consider a deception as a 
breach of their trust if they found out that they are the ones that have been deceived. 
Interestingly, the above-mentioned US study found also that most of the “respondents valued 
honesty by physicians regarding the use of placebos and believed that non-transparent use 
could undermine the relationship between patients and physicians” (Hull et al. 2014). This 
suggests that while not every patient considers the use of deceptive placebos as a breach of 
trust, some will, and most patients would still consider this practice to be problematic 
whenever the deception is uncovered.  
 
 In sum, while empirical knowledge about patients’ preferences regarding the use of 
deceptive placebos may influence how we articulate the reasons as we evaluate the moral 
permissibility of a specific case, this knowledge must always be used with caution; in 
particular, it can never be considered a good excuse for not respecting individual autonomy, 
and it may not be entirely predictive of patient’s actual reactions. 
 
 
 (6.9) A critique of Foddy’s view that clinicians have a “duty to deceive”  
 
In a 2009 target article for the American Journal of Bioethics, Bennett Foddy has argued that there 
are many cases in which it would be ethical–if not a duty–for clinicians to use deceptive 
placebos in clinical contexts. In particular, Foddy’s bold defense of the clinical use of 
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deceptive placebos is grounded on the assumption that they are “always safe, often effective, 
and sometimes necessary”73  
 
 In this section I argue that Foddy’s proposal is seriously flawed, might lead to severe 
consequences for both individual and public health, and should therefore be briskly refuted. 
While his argument is fallacious in a number of ways, I shall focus my critiques only on two of 
the claims motivating his position: (i) the view that placebos are “necessary” whenever they 
are the “best available treatment”; (ii) and the assumption that placebos are “always safe”. 
 
 
(6.9.a) When is a deceptive placebo the “best available treatment”? 
 
At the outset of this discussion, it is important to appreciate the extent to which Foddy is 
willing to defend the clinical use of deceptive placebos. As he explains, his defense regards all 
those cases in which deceptive placebos are “necessary” because they can be considered to be 
the “best available treatment” (2009, 5-7). These cases include not only the use of placebo to 
treat conditions for which empirical studies suggests that their efficacy may sometimes match 
that of the standard of care (e.g., depression or IBS), but also those cases in which 
 
Patients […] have treatable disorders but […] are nevertheless untreatable […] roughly 
half the time a patient presents himself to a doctor, a firm diagnosis cannot be made […] 
The untreatable patient can be prescribed a placebo, or sent away empty-handed. The 
latter course of action neglects an opportunity to alleviate the felt discomfort of the 
patient’s symptoms, and it may leave patients feeling shortchanged […] Since deceptive 
placebos are sometimes the best treatment, it is possible that they may be prescribed in a 
manner that is ethically defensible (2009, 6). 
 
 If Foddy’s defense succeeds, according to this quote, it would be ethical for clinicians 
to prescribe deceptive placebos to every patient who is otherwise untreatable. These cases 
                                                   
73 In this article, Foddy advances also other surprising claims, such that deceptive placebos “not subject to the 
same moral objections that face other forms of deception in clinical practice and medical research” (2009, 4). I 
will not discuss these other problematic aspects of his view; for a critique see Kolber (2009). 
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would be extremely common not only in clinical practice–where many patients present vague, 
symptomatic and medically unexplained symptoms–, but also in all other cases in which 
treatments are unavailable. In the light of empirical data about the current clinical use of 
placebos (see 6.5), Foddy’s proposal would always justify the practice of prescribing placebos 
to patients who pretend a prescription but for which a firm diagnosis cannot be made. 
Therefore, if Foddy were right, we should expect clinicians to use deceptive placebos on a 
fairly regular basis, as they would often be the only option available and thus the “best 
available treatment”. 
 
 This latter conclusion, however, mistakenly conflates the concept of “best available 
treatment” with the concept of “best clinical option”. In medicine, and especially in 
contemporary medicine, to prescribe a treatment might sometimes be the best available 
clinical option; other times, instead, the best “treatment” for a patient is simply to receive “no 
treatment” at all. Clearly, no clinician “has a duty” to prescribe a treatment to a patient simply 
because otherwise she would walk-away empty-handed. The role of clinicians is not just that 
of dispensing pharmaceutical treatments–“active” or “placebic” ones depending on the case–
but also that of providing care and support in order to select the best course of action that 
would allow to preserve and foster the patient’s health and wellbeing.  
 
 Indeed, sometimes to prescribe a “treatment”, even an active one, is the suboptimal 
choice for doctors. As Schenker et al. (2009) argued, whenever doctors are facing an uncertain 
diagnosis of medically unexplained symptoms, they always have another available option: to 
acknowledge their uncertainty. Medicine is not an exact science, and sometimes clinicians can 
be reasonably unsure about making a diagnosis or prognosis. Physicians may thus 
acknowledge that sometimes patient’s symptoms are both real and puzzling, expressing their 
concerns while at the same time showing empathy with the patient’s condition (Epstein et al. 
2007). For example, instead of providing antibiotics for a viral infection or a cold simply to 
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satisfy the patient’s desire of a medication, a clinician can always state, “I know that this kind 
of cold is bothersome, and I wish we had a medicine for it. Sadly, we still don’t have it”.  
 
 Aside from the fact that clinicians’ prima facie duty of veracity would in any case 
compel clinicians to tell the truth to patients even in the case of an uncertain diagnosis or in 
the absence of an effective treatment, by acknowledging their uncertainty clinicians can 
achieve other ends that would otherwise be precluded by the automatic prescription of a 
deceptive placebo; these include: the exploration of patients’ concerns, beliefs and 
preferences; the discussion non-pharmacological treatments (e.g., to maintain a high hydration 
in the case of a bad cold); and the enacting of shared decision-making (Schenker et al. 2009). 
Therefore Foddy’s claim that deceptive placebos are often the best clinical option because no 
other treatment is available is at best mistaken: while facing uncertainty in medicine doctors 
have always the option of being honest with their patient, hence sharing rather than dumping 
the responsibility of deciding how to best cope with untreatable conditions. 
 
 
(6.9.b) Are deceptive placebos “always safe”? 
 
Another mistaken assumption in Foddy’s argument is that “since placebos are inert, it is 
natural to expect that they are completely harmless, unlike active medications that frequently 
elicit unwanted side effects […] there is no reliable evidence to suggest that the beneficent use 
of placebos is unsafe” (2009, 5). Much of Foddy’s argument depends on the questionable 
premise that since placebos are always safe and sometimes effective, then there is always a favorable 
presumption to support their administration: other things being equal, they will be at best 
clinically useful and at worse completely innocuous. This claim, however, fails insofar as 
placebos may harm individual patients and society in a number of important ways. 
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 First, contra Foddy, placebos are always relatively “inert”, but never absolutely so. This 
is true of both “pure” and “impure” placebos, because a placebo is always “a placebo” 
relatively to a certain condition and according to a certain biomedical theory. Saline injections 
are not “inert” for rehydrating someone in needs of fluids; sugar pills are not “inert” for 
people who have diabetes; and lactose tablets are not “inert” for people who are intolerant to 
lactose. The risks that a deceptive placebo would lead to unwanted side effects are even 
greater in the case of the prescription of “impure” placebos. In fact, even the prescription of a 
“homeopathic” dosage of an effective medicine may unpredictably interact with the effects of 
other substances, and it can always be risky or defective on its own (e.g., the “homeopathic” 
doctor may mistakenly use a minimal and yet dangerous highly toxic substance). Furthermore, 
deceptively administered placebos can sometimes induce psychological addiction, as in the 
case of CG discussed in the introduction (Baumrucker et al.  2011).  
 
 Furthermore, there are other risks related to the prescription of a deceptive placebo, 
the most important of which is the possibility to overlook present symptoms (Bok 1978; 
Brody 1982). Patients who “walk away” thinking that they have already found an effective 
medication for their ailments may not look for a second opinion, hence precluding the 
possibility of undergoing more diagnostic exams.  Another harm of deceptive placebos comes 
in the form of all the indirect costs associated with the practice of buying and consuming 
them: as noted by Brody (1982), if patients can get placebos for free, then they will uncover 
the deception and the deceptive placebo would become ineffective; if, instead, they are 
required to pay for them, then they would have to pay no less than it would cost them to pay 
for standard medications. In any case, the prescription of deceptive placebos would have its 
own “cost”, either in terms of interpersonal trust and effectiveness, or in monetary terms. 
 
 Aside from the costs for each individual patient, however, deceptive placebos have 
also important costs for society. Prescribing “impure” placebos, in fact, may have both direct 
and indirect consequences for public health. As for the direct consequences, prescribing 
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antibiotics in the form of impure placebos make bacteria more resistant to them, hence 
leading to potentially severe consequences for public health in the long run.74 As for the 
indirect consequences on health, the cost of prescribing unnecessary treatments in the form of 
impure placebos is likely to be anything but trivial. As Bok noted (1972, 21) “A great many 
diagnostic procedures that are known to be unnecessary are undertaken to give patients a 
sense that efforts are being made on their behalf. Some of these carry risk; many involve 
discomfort and the expenditure of time and money”. If the concept of “placebo” is extended 
to all kinds of procedures that are unnecessary prescribed to satisfy patient’s request that 
“something be done”, then costs and harms entailed in Foddy’s proposal becomes obvious.  
 
 Finally, there is a subtler kind of harm that deceptive placebo can have as they 
contribute to the medicalization of society. Prescribing a deceptive placebo whenever there is 
no other treatment available to cope with unexplained symptoms promotes the wrong belief 
that there is “a pill for every ill” (Miller and Colloca 2009), and thus that everything can be 
cured or treated simply by quaffing some colored pill. In this respect, Cabot noted: 
 
The majority of placebos are given because we believe that the patient will not be 
satisfied without them. He has learned to expect medicine for every symptoms and 
without it he is simply won’t get well. True, but who taught him to expect a medicine for 
every symptom? He was not born with that expectation. He learned it from an ignorant 
doctor who really believed it […] it is we physicians who are responsible for perpetuating 
false ideas about disease and its cure […] and with every placebo that we give we do our 
part in perpetuating error, and harmful error at that (Cabot 1903, 348). 
 
 In this classical paper on truth telling and lying in medicine, Cabot strongly objected to 
the practice of prescribing “innocuous” treatments for providing “mental relief” to patients 
pretending a prescription. In Cabot’s view, clinicians had to appreciate that in these cases truth 
                                                   
74 The provision of antibiotics for viral infection may have negative consequences at the level of public health. It 
also represents a paradigmatic case of impure placebo use in clinical contexts. It is important to note, however, 
that this questionable practice can be also understood as a simple instance of medical malpractice, rather than as 
an instance of an unjustifiable use of a placebo. Simply put, doctors must not prescribe medicines for ailments 
for which they are known to be ineffective. This latter phrasing has the advantage of being more direct and more 
readily put into the context of already existing and well-received guidelines. Accordingly, if the objective of 
policy-makers or guidelines is that of regulating the use of antibiotics, it is probably better to phrase this issue in 
terms of medical malpractice rather then in the terms of ethics of using clinical placebos.  
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telling is likely to have more beneficial effects than lying and that the act of promoting false 
beliefs about health and disease is just another way of harming patients in the long run.75  
 
 Foddy’s arguments that deceptive placebos are “always safe” and “often the best 
clinical option” are thus flawed. Placebos can harm both patients and society in direct and 
indirect ways, and clinicians dealing with an uncertain diagnosis have always the possibility of 
choosing to be honest instead that prescribing a deceptive placebo not to let patients walk-
away empty handed. Thus, in addition to other concerns for patient’s autonomy and trust that 
accompany any proposed act of clinical deception, clinicians ought to be even more careful in 
considering the use of placebos because of the additional risks associated with their use. 
 
 
(6.9.c) Reinforcing the negative presumption against the use of deceptive placebos 
 
According to the view that I have defended in part (I) clinicians have a prima facie duty of 
veracity in their professional communications. Other things being equal, there is a negative 
presumption against the use of dishonest communication. This presumption derives from the 
moral implications that dishonesty have for the respect of patient’s autonomy and the 
preservation of trust between doctor and patient. Providing a compelling moral justification to 
defend a deceptive act is always demanding, as those who are defending it should, in any one 
case, to argue that such proposal would conceivably pass the tests of veracity, publicity and of 
public disclosure. How is this perspective applicable to the case of deceptive placebos?  
 
                                                   
75 Interestingly, however, Cabot himself did recognize that in very exceptional circumstances it might be morally 
permissible to prescribe a deceptive placebo only to meet patients’ request of a medication: “No patient whose 
language you can speak, whose mind you can approach, needs a placebo. I give placebos now and then […] to 
Armenians and other with whom I cannot communicate, because to refuse to give them would create more 
misunderstandings, a false impression, than to give them. The patient will think that I am refusing to treat him at 
all; but if I can get hold of an interpreter and explain the matter, I tell him no lies in the shape of placebos” 
(Cabot 1903, 348). 
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 First, the proposal of using a deceptive placebo would have to pass the test of veracity. 
In order to do so, one must be able to argue that, in those circumstances, the use of a 
deceptive placebo is the only plausible option available to achieve a certain objective. 
However, in most of the cases for which deceptive placebos are currently used, it is reasonable 
to conclude that such proposal would fail to pass the TOV. As the analysis of Foddy’s first 
argument shows, clinicians who prescribe deceptive placebos to patients for which no firm 
diagnosis could be made are systematically ignoring that they always have another plausible 
and truthful option at hand: acknowledging their uncertainty by telling the truth to patients. If 
the goal is that of fostering patients’ wellbeing, then usually there are many other options 
available to clinicians other than the prescription of a deceptive placebo.  
 
 Second, most of other proposals would fail to pass the test of publicity, either because 
of their unfavorable risks-benefits ratio, or because they would be publicly indefensible. Let us 
begin with this latter category of cases. Clearly, the proposal to use a deceptive placebo to 
“mollify a patient” would conceivably fail the test of publicity at some level. This is the case, 
for example, of a clinician who prescribes a deceptive placebo either because she is unsure 
about the diagnosis in that specific case, or because she wants to quickly get rid of a 
complicated patient, for example of someone who repeatedly shows up with a plethora of 
vague psychosomatic symptoms. Here the clinician does not resort to “benevolent” deception, 
but to deception simpliciter, as the act is finalized to benefit only the clinician, i.e. the deceiver.  
 
 Arguably, in these cases, the use of deceptive placebos is unethical as it contravenes 
the very scope of the medical profession, that is to say, to help others in need of medical 
assistance and care. Who would excuse a physician who systematically lies to patients simply 
on the grounds that she did not want to lose too much time attending to their questions and 
needs? Which professional body of peers would be ready to defend the conduct of this 
clinician in front of all other citizens? In these cases the test of publicity, if properly 
implemented, would rule out those proposals that are based on purely selfish motivations. 
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 Other times, instead, the proposal to use a deceptive placebo would not pass the test 
of publicity because of its unfavourable risk-benefits ratio. This may be so in most of the cases 
in which a placebo is given only to satisfy patients’ need of a prescription with the sole intent 
of providing “mental relief” (e.g., to calm down an anxious patient). Here the considerations 
of the individual and societal risks entailed in the use of deceptive placebos is likely to stop the 
articulation of the reasons in favour of the proposed deception either at the level of their 
balancing, or at the level of the public justifiability of this practice. Who would be ready to 
defend a trade-off between the “mental relief” of a few and the prospective increase of health-
care costs for everyone or, in the case of antibiotics, with the risk of creating more resistant 
bacteria? (As I discuss in the next section, the other case in which the use of deceptive 
placebos is justified for therapeutic purposes is instead more controversial.) 
 
 To sum up, in the vast majority of the cases the two main rationales for which 
deceptive placebos are currently widely prescribed to patients in clinical settings appear to be 
morally indefensible according to the view that I have proposed. Other things being equal, it is 
unethical for clinicians to use deceptive placebos, especially if their intent is to mollify patients 
and/or to satisfy their request for unnecessary or unavailable prescriptions. If what I have 
argued so far I correct, then professional organisations such as the AMA, professional 
organisations, and national institutions should take adequate measures to limit and prevent the 
further use of deceptive placebos in these cases. 
 
 
(6.10) A critique of the view that deceptive placebos are always unethical 
 
In sharp contrast with the data about the use of placebos in clinical settings, current ethical 
guidelines tend to endorse a policy of “categorical prohibition” with respect to the clinical use 
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of deceptive placebos. For example, in 2006 the American Medical Association (AMA) 
released its placebo policy in the form of an official “Opinion” in which it stated,   
 
[…] In the clinical setting, the use of a placebo without the patient’s knowledge may 
undermine trust, compromise the patient- physician relationship, and result in medical 
harm to the patient. Physicians may use placebos for diagnosis or treatment only if the 
patient is informed of and agrees to its use […] 
 
 According to this position, using deceptive placebos in clinical settings without 
patients’ consent is never permissible. Over the years several commentators have defended 
similar positions and therefore the AMA Code of Medical Ethics is not alone in advocating a 
categorical ban of deceptive placebos in clinical settings (Asai and Kadooka 2013; Brody 
1982). In any case, defenders of the categorical view do not deny that deceptive placebos may 
have clinical benefits; rather, they argue that deceptive placebos have a series of short and 
long-term implications–e.g., for trust, respect of patient’s autonomy and patients’ or public 
health–that once factored in justify a categorical ban of their use on precautionary grounds. 
 
 In recent years the AMA placebo policy has been subjected to several critiques 
targeting its problematic definition “of placebo” and the extent to which it succeeds in 
protecting patient’s trust, respecting patient’s autonomy, and ensuring medical benefit to the 
patient (Kolber 2007; Foddy 2009; Barnhill 2012). In this section I will focus only on the 
question of whether a categorical position provides a satisfying starting point to think about 
the ethics of deceptive placebos in clinical contexts. Siding with other critics, I will argue that 
the AMA placebo policy is too strict and overinclusive: there are cases in which using 
deceptive placebos has high prospective benefits, minimal consequences for patients’ 
autonomy, and, provided other conditions are met, a low risks to disrupt patients’ trust. 
However, while in these cases the use of deceptive placebos seems to be desirable and morally 
justifiable, it would be unethical and prohibited under the AMA placebo policy. 
 
 
 185 
(6.10.a) Defending the use of deceptive placebos for therapeutic purposes 
 
The first case questioning the rationale behind a categorical ban of deceptive placebos regards 
the possible scenario in which a deceptive placebo has high therapeutic utility. In absence of 
contrary empirical evidence, I assume deceptive placebos to have at best a limited, highly 
variable, and typically short-term clinical effectiveness. However, in the case of chronic or 
severe conditions with life impairing, symptomatic manifestations (e.g., chronic low-back 
pain), if no other clinical options are available, then even the perspective of a limited 
symptomatic improvement may translate into a significant difference for patients’ quality of 
life. Consider the following scenario: 
  
During a bad bout of depression, a patient begins psychotherapy and antidepressants. 
The regimen works quite well for several weeks, and the depression gradually gets under 
control. Soon after, however, doctors discover that the patient has an unrelated liver 
condition that requires him to discontinue his use of antidepressants. After ceasing 
medication, the patient’s mental health quickly decline. The patient’s psychiatrist is aware 
of considerable medical literature finding powerful placebo effects in the treatment of 
depression and knows of several researchers who claim that pharmaceutical 
antidepressant may not be much more effective than placebos. The psychiatrist, 
therefore, provides the patient with two weeks worth of placebo pills and misleadingly 
states that that they are antidepressant that are likely to help the patient without causing 
any worrisome side effects. After two weeks, the patient reports feeling much better 
(Kolber 2007, 120). 
 
 In this hypothetical scenario it is clear that the use of a deceptive placebo had a 
significant therapeutic benefit. Was it also morally justifiable? To answer this question let us 
apply the view elaborated in part (I), and ascertain whether the psychiatrist’s proposal would 
conceivably pass the tests of veracity, publicity and of public disclosure. 
 
 First, for this act of deception to be justifiable, we must see whether it could be 
defended as the best plausible course of action to achieve the given objective, which, in this 
case, is the control of patient’s depressive states. In the case above, given that other 
medications were no longer an option, it could be argued that psychiatrist had not other 
plausible means at his disposal to control for the patient’s depressive states. 
 186 
 
 Second, the proposal of using a deceptive placebo would have to pass the test of 
publicity. Would the psychiatrist be ready to defend her behavior in front of a commission or 
a court of law? Assuming in this case that: the depressive states were bad enough; that the 
administered placebo was a “pure” rather than a “impure” one and had no severe health-risks; 
that the way in which the misleading disclosure had been devised minimized the use of lying; 
that the paternalistic infringement of patient’s autonomy was judged to be justifiable in the 
light of the prospective benefits; that other colleagues as well as the patient’s wife eventually 
judged the use of placebos to be justifiable in this case; and that, according to the long-
standing relationship between that patient and the psychiatric the latter could confidently 
assume that the patient would in principle not oppose the use of the deceptive placebo; then it 
is also reasonable to conclude that, in this specific case, the psychiatrist would be ready to 
defend in public his choice. Accordingly, it could have been morally permissible for the 
psychiatrist to keep the placebo secret in this case.  
 
 Determining only the moral permissibility of the deceptive act, however, is never 
enough as the deceivers has also the moral responsibility of adopting the appropriate 
technique of publicity to minimize the potential harm for the patient’s trust and autonomy. In 
this case, after the two weeks the psychiatrist might consider revealing the deception to the 
patient, for example explaining that this experience revealed his “own ability to work through 
his emotional problems and shows that it will now better manage depression with 
psychotherapy alone”. By resorting to a retrospective and direct technique of publicity, the 
psychiatrist in this example can at least partially restore the patient’s autonomous agency as 
well as preserving the bond of trust in the light of the exceptionality of the circumstances and 
of the willingness to rebuild a therapeutic relationship based on honesty.76 
                                                   
76 Interestingly, while discussing this case, Kolber (2007, 121) refers to Bok’s analysis and hint at the need of 
implementing in this case what I have defined as the “techniques of publicity” as he observes, “[t]o make the case 
more appealing, we could add a variety of precautions on the deceptive use of placebos. For example, we could 
require physicians: (1) to consult with one or more other physicians or with an ethics committee before using a 
 187 
 
 Therefore, by deploying the appropriate technique of publicity, is reasonable to hold 
that clinicians may resort to deceptive placebos in a way that is highly beneficial for patients 
without compromising their individual autonomy and trust in ways that would be prima facie 
unethical.  These cases may be extremely rare, but they are not unconceivable or impossible, 
even if we assume that deceptive placebos have in general only a limited clinical effectiveness. 
Thus, while the view that I have defended is able to discriminate these rare cases from those 
in which it would be unethical to use a deceptive placebos, a categorical ban would instead 
force the psychiatrist in the above example to choose among two suboptimal alternatives: 
either to suspend altogether the antidepressant medications for the patient, or to propose an 
open-label placebo which might have a reduced (or none) clinical effectiveness.  
 
 
(6.10.b) Defending the use of deceptive placebos for diagnostic purposes 
 
The second scenario in which the use of deceptive placebos may be morally defensible is 
when they have high diagnostic utility (Kolber 2007; Rorty and Frankel 2009). While this case 
is the perhaps the least controversial, it is also the least discussed within the placebo literature. 
Consider the following scenario: a clinician is unsure about whether one of her patient has 
epilepsy–a neurological disorder that might induce seizures–or a psychological condition 
which is able to induce epileptic-like, pseudoseizures. She is aware that “[t]he cost of 
pseudoseizures misdiagnosed as epilepsy can be extremely high, from both a financial and a 
psychosocial standpoint, with repeated hospitalizations, unnecessary medications, loss of 
work, loss of driving privileges, and strain on interpersonal relationships all contributing to 
overall disability” (Slater 1995, 36). 
                                                                                                                                                          
deceptive placebo, (2) to document the use of a deceptive placebo, perhaps in hospital or patient records, (3) to 
obtain the informed consent of a relative or guardian if possible, and (4) to reveal to a patient that he was secretly 
given placebos within a reasonable time after commencing treatment.” 
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 There are two effective ways to distinguish epileptic seizure from pseudoseizures. The 
first one is electroencephalography. This method is reliable but requires the patient to be 
actually connected to the machine as s/he is having an attack. The problem is that epileptic 
seizures are unpredictable, and to monitor a patient for a long time can easily become 
prohibitively expensive. The second method, then, is to use a deceptive placebo. One study 
(Slater et al. 1995, 509) showed that it is possible to reliably induce pseudoseizures in patients 
by providing a saline injection introduced by the following script: 
With your permission, we would like to try to bring on one of your events using an 
injected medication that has been designed to lower seizure threshold. Basically, what the 
drug does is lover the natural resistance your brain has to having one of your events. It is 
similar to a medication injected into hospital patients every day, but in your case has been 
specially prepared to induce seizures. In normal people, the injection does nothing, while 
in patients with seizures the injection has a greater than 90% chance of bringing on an 
episode. 
 
 
 Knowing that researchers in that study were able to distinguish reliably all cases of 
pseudoseizures, the clinician decides to use the same procedure to diagnose the patient by 
administering with the same script an injection of saline solution, i.e., a deceptive placebo. Is 
this practice morally justifiable according to the view that I have defended? 
 
 First, we should again consider the test of veracity. In this case it is clear that if the 
objective is that of being able to identify pseudoseizures, then the deceptive placebo is the 
only plausible option available, as the truthful option of encephalography has prohibitive costs 
and an open-label placebo would not work in this case. Second, let us assume that the clinician 
concludes that it is justifiable to infringe patient’s autonomy on the grounds that a correct 
diagnosis would allow the fostering of patient’s long-term autonomy; that the placebo to be 
used has low-risk; that the patient’s caregivers and colleagues agree that it might be reasonable 
to resort to situational dishonesty given the prospective gains in terms of health and wellbeing; 
and that this patient is known to be prepared to do anything to find a way of controlling her 
episodic seizures. In principle, this is a scenario in which the proposal to use a deceptive 
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placebo can conceivably pass both the tests of veracity and of publicity. Lastly, the clinician 
should select the most appropriate technique of publicity. As in the previous case, also in this 
latter scenario the best option is likely to be a retrospective and direct disclosure of the 
deception once the diagnosis has been made.  
 
 Therefore, there are cases in which the use of a deceptive placebo in clinical settings 
for diagnostic purposes would conceivably be justifiable. Applying the ethical guidelines which 
enforce a policy of categorical prohibition on precautionary grounds would in this case forces 
the clinicians to choose between one of the two alternatives: either risking of treating a patient 
for the wrong disease with potentially great harms and costs, or provide no treatment at all. 
These two scenarios are clearly less desirable than the one in which the clinician resort to a 
one-time deceptive placebo after having properly articulated all the relevant reasons pros and 
cons this practice, and after having selected the most appropriate means to minimize the 
infringement of patient’s autonomy and the possible damage for trust. Hence, in this case, a 
clinician following the perspective that I have elaborated would take a better decision with 
respect to another clinician who instead applies a categorical ban to all deceptive placebos. 
 
 
(6.10.c) A limited plea for the adoption of negative informed consent 
 
In the two examples discussed above, the best option for the clinician was in both scenarios 
that of resorting to a direct and retrospective technique of actual publicity. In principle this is 
a suboptimal choice, as it would be better to deploy in each case a technique that is prospective 
rather than retrospective. The AMA placebo policy seems to acknowledge this point when it 
states that a placebo used for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes  
 
may still be effective if the patient knows it will be used but cannot identify it and does not know 
the precise timing of its use. A physician should enlist the patient’s cooperation by explaining that 
a better understanding of the medical condition could be achieved by evaluating the effects of 
 190 
different medications, including the placebo. The physician need neither identify the placebo nor 
seek specific consent before its administration. In this way, the physician respects the patient’s 
autonomy and fosters a trusting relationship, while the patient still may benefit from the placebo 
effect (Bostick 2008). 
 
 The idea of this quote is that patients may consent in advance to the proposal of using 
placebos for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes, while at the same time waiving the right of 
being specifically informed about the timing of the placebo administration. In this way it could 
be argued that patient’s autonomy is respected because the patient has actually consented both 
to the use of placebos and to not receive specific information about their use.77  
 
 Shaw (2009) has developed a similar view according to which placebos can be ethically 
administered to patients if those patients have previously and explicitly consented not to 
receive certain information about the chemical composition or efficacy of their prescriptions. 
Shaw’s view is grounded in Kihlbom’s proposal (2008) of complementing the framework of 
informed consent (IC) with the possibility for patients to express a preliminary “negatively 
informed consent” or (NIC). Contrary to the prevailing model in which patients need to be 
told whether or not they are receiving a placebo (see infra 6.3), in the NIC model a patient 
would instead give “his/her voluntary and explicit consent to undergo the treatment and 
express[es] his/her voluntary and explicit wish not to have more information” (Kihlbom’s 
2008).  
 
 By implementing a NIC approach, it would be possible for patients to autonomously 
decide whether they want to receive all the relevant information about their treatments, or 
                                                   
77 A similar proposal has been advanced by Miller et al. (2013) for research contexts, as they suggest the 
possibility of adopting an approach of “authorized deception”; in their words: “However, participants can be 
informed prior to deciding whether to volunteer for a study that the experimental procedures will not be 
described accurately or that some features of these procedures will or may be misleading or deceptive […] This 
approach, which we call ‘authorized deception’, permits research participants to decide whether they wish to 
participate in research involving deception and, if so, to knowingly authorize its use.  When deception of study 
participants is necessary and justified by the scientific value of the study, the use of authorized deception makes 
the process of deceptive research transparent. Participants are informed that they will be misled or deceived, 
though obviously the exact nature of the deception cannot be disclosed. They are assured that the research has 
been reviewed and approved by an ethics oversight committee that has no vested interests in the research in 
question, and that no important risks, other than the risks of the deception itself, have been concealed. Finally, 
they are informed that debriefing will occur” (Miller et. al. 2013, 272-273). 
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entrust their clinicians with the decision about what needs to be revealed in each case in to 
achieve the best balance between autonomy and beneficence. They can at any time request 
more information or withdraw their NIC in favor of the standard IC approach. The NIC 
model is appealing because it enhances patients’ autonomy in two respects: first, because it 
opens the possibility for patients to decide between more therapeutic options (e.g., standard 
or placebic ones); second, because through this choice it gives the patient more control over 
her decision-making role (Barnhill 2012, 235). 
 
 The NIC approach may thus open new diagnostic and therapeutic possibilities for 
clinicians considering the clinical use of placebos. After securing a valid NIC, clinicians could 
introduce a placebo by saying “this pill has no side-effects, but studies have shown that the 
more I tell you about how it works, the less effective it will be” (Shaw 2009, 98). If the patient 
has previously negated the NIC or she now decides to ask more information about the 
features of this pill, then the clinician would still provide a truthful disclosure, revealing that 
the pill is a placebo and perhaps explaining how it can still have some clinical effectiveness.  
 
 Shaw’s proposal of implementing the NIC to improve the way in which clinicians may 
decide over the clinical use of placebos is appealing. However, it also has important 
limitations. First, the NIC approach ought to be grounded in the trust between a physician 
and her/his clinician, and thus is more readily implemented in context in which there is a 
personal therapeutic relationship rather than in those contexts in which the doctor-patient 
relationship relies more on the “elegant anonymity of medicine”.  Second, warning in advance 
patients that they might receive a placebo may be self-defeating: the simple fact of being 
unsure about whether the prescribed medication is a placebo might reduce both the 
therapeutic and the diagnostic utility of all placebos. More importantly, suspecting than one 
might be on a regime of placebo medication may drastically reduce patients’ compliance with 
other effective medicines, as well as reducing their overall effectiveness, which is likely to be a 
function of both their specific efficacy and of placebo effects. Fourthly, there are cases in 
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which it would be in any case impossible to obtain a NIC in advance, and in which clinicians 
would be anyway forced to decide whether or not a deceptive placebo is morally permissible.  
 
 Therefore, while the NIC is in itself a interesting proposal which might sometimes 
result in the identification and implementation of better prospective techniques of publicity, 
more research is needed to ascertain how such approach would impact the therapeutic and 
diagnostic utility of otherwise deceptively administered placebos, and, in any case, it would not 
entirely solve all the moral dilemmas over the moral permissibility of deceptive placebos that 
clinicians would be required to face in clinical contexts. 
 
 
(6) Summary 
 
In this chapter I have explored the ethics of deceptive placebos, arguing that the perspective 
that I have elaborated in part (I) of this dissertation provides a better starting point to think 
about moral dilemmas involving the provision of deceptive placebos than other alternatives. 
In particular, I have defended a position for which the prima facie duty of veracity that 
clinicians have in their professional communication should be interpreted as being particularly 
strict in the case of deceptive placebos. In fact, in addition to other concerns about the respect 
of patient’s autonomy and the preservation of the trust between doctor and patient, 
deceptively administered placebos may also harm patients and society in different and 
significant ways.  
 
 Contrary to the still widely spread practice of administering impure placebos to 
patients, I have therefore argued that it is unethical to prescribe deceptive placebos in the vast 
majority of cases. In particular, administering a placebo to mollify a patient or to provide only 
some mental relief can hardly be regarded as being a justifiable practice–even if some or the 
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majority of the patient have an unexpressed preference in favor of being deceived. Other 
things being equal, clinicians should not prescribe or give deceptive placebos to patients. 
 
 In difference to categorical policies and positions, however, I have also defended the 
claim that there could be exceptional cases in which using a deceptive placebo for therapeutic 
or diagnostic purposes can be a morally justifiable practice. These cases are the cases in which 
the proposal to adopt such a deceptive technique would conceivably pass the tests of veracity, 
publicity, and of public disclosure. Finally, I have analyzed Shaw’s proposal of implementing a 
“negatively informed consent” approach to complement the standard model based solely on 
informed consent, underscoring its potentialities as well its intrinsic limitations. 
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7. The Ethics of Therapeutic Communication 
 
 
 
 
The technic of truth telling is something difficult, perhaps more difficult than the technic of lying,  
but its results make it worth acquiring. 
Richard Cabot 
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(7) Introduction 
 
In this chapter I discuss the ethics of using doctor-patient communication in non-deceptive 
ways to modulate patient’s health-outcomes through placebo and nocebo responses. Section 
(7.1) contextualizes the idea of relying on truthful verbal practices to harness the clinical 
effectiveness of placebo responses; section (7.2) defines the concept of “therapeutic 
communication” (or TC); section (7.3) provides a synthetic overview of the empirical evidence 
supporting the case for the effectiveness of TC; section (7.4) identifies in veracity, helpfulness, 
and pragmatism the three guiding coordinates for the ethics of TC; section (7.5) discusses two 
cases in which TC can be used to maximize placebo or minimize nocebo responses; section 
(7.6) analyses the possible application of TC to the case of open-label placebos. 
 
 
(7.1) From autonomy to beneficence: why therapeutic communication 
 
Compelling evidence from “open-hidden” experiments demonstrates that placebo responses 
may occur without the provision of a physical placebo (see 6.3). In this kind of experiments 
patients receive an effective medication (e.g. an analgesics) either by a clinician who explains 
the expected effects of the therapy (open administration), or through an automatic procedure 
such as an infusion machine (hidden administration) (Benedetti 2009). Both the open and the 
hidden groups receive the same amount of medication, and the only difference is the 
“informational context” surrounding its delivery. In general, open-hidden experiments 
demonstrate that, through placebo responses, the same dose of a drug may have different 
effects depending on other contextual variables such as the bedside presence of a nurse or the 
way in which it is verbally described (Pollo et al. 2001). 
 
 Since various components of the healing context may trigger significant placebo 
responses, it has been argued that physical placebos are unnecessary, as the same benefits can 
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be achieved in ways that are less controversial (Brody 1982; Miller and Brody 2011; Justman 
2013). For example the AMA–in the same “opinion” on placebos mentioned in the previous 
chapter–observes, “Physicians can avoid using a placebo, yet produce a placebo-like effect 
through the skillful use of reassurance and encouragement. In this way, the physician builds 
respect and trust, promotes the patient-physician relationship, and improves health outcomes” 
(AMA 2006). The possibility of eliciting placebo responses without placebos hints at an 
intriguing series of new empirical and ethical challenges. There are at least three main reasons 
for which the possibility of using therapeutic communication deserves more attention. 
 
 First, even if one concedes that words alone are less powerful than physical treatments 
in eliciting placebo and nocebo effects, this does not mean that they are powerless. On the 
contrary, as I will show in section (7.3), we have good reasons to conclude that the power of 
therapeutic communication can sometimes be clinically significant. 
 
 Second, unlike the provision of physical treatments–and especially of placebic ones–, 
the doctor-patient communication is ubiquitous in medical contexts. Physicians use words to 
formulate diagnoses and prognoses, to disclose the risks and benefits of medical interventions, 
and to explain why, how, and when a therapy will be administered to a patient. Likewise, 
patients communicate to describe their symptoms, to make sense of their conditions, to report 
side effects, to explore other therapeutic options, and to share their feelings. Thus, if 
clinicians’ words have a potential therapeutic effect, then harnessing such a power could be an 
important resource to improve patients’ care.  
 
 Third, so far the ethics of the doctor-patient communication has been typically 
conceived in the terms of a problematic balance between concerns of respect for patients’ 
autonomy and concerns of nonmaleficence. The typical case, discussed in the previous 
chapters, is that of an oncologist who must disclose some bad news to an emotionally 
vulnerable patient. What the new discoveries about the mechanisms of placebo effects bring 
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add to this debate is the idea that doctor’s words may also have “placebo” as well as “nocebo-
like” effects. Therefore, today doctor-patient communication can be interpreted not only as 
the primary means through which clinicians can respect patients’ autonomy but also as an 
integral part itself of the therapeutic relationship. 
 
 
(7.2) Defying “therapeutic communication” 
 
Doctor-patient communication is a primary medium through which patients attribute meaning 
to their symptoms and adjust their expectations about what is yet to come. Communication by 
clinicians has the power to turn diagnoses and prognoses into parts of the treatment, to 
influence treatment effectiveness, and to modulate the way in which patients cope with their 
conditions (Benedetti 2011; Teutsch 2003; Fong and Longnecker 2010). Throughout this 
chapter, by “therapeutic communication” (TC), I mean any deliberate use by health 
professionals of forms of communication aimed at promoting placebo responses or inhibiting 
nocebo responses for the patient’s medical benefit. Although this definition captures most of 
the cases discussed below, it requires some qualification. 
 
 First, the therapeutic effects of the patient-physician communication are not limited to 
promoting placebo (or avoiding nocebo) responses. For example, physicians may use words to 
motivate patients to adhere to a recommended treatment regimen, to choose a healthier 
lifestyle, to adopt better psychological attitudes, or to nudge their choices by framing 
information in different ways (Thaler and Sustein 2008; Miller and Colloca 2011). These forms 
of communication may (indirectly) contribute to patient benefit if they motivate patients to 
change their attitudes or behavior in ways that improve health (Street et al. 2009).  
 
 For the sake of clarity I propose to distinguish between direct and indirect effects of 
TC, and consequently between direct and indirect TC. TC is said to be direct whenever the act 
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of communication itself can be identified as the proximate and necessary cause of a 
measurable change in a patient’s health outcomes. In most of the cases I assume that direct 
therapeutic communication acts through the modulation of placebo and nocebo responses. 
TC is said to be indirect whenever communication can be identified as a necessary but not as 
the proximate and sufficient cause of changes in patients’ health-relevant outcomes.  
 
 A reassuring statement like “this medicine will make you feel better,” leading to a 
short-term decrease in the patient’s stress levels, qualifies as an instance of direct TC. On the 
other hand, structuring the doctor-patient communication to engage the patient in shared 
decision-making with the goal of enhancing treatment adherence, and thus improving some 
health outcomes, qualifies instead as an instance of indirect TC. On many occasions the same 
act of TC may elicit both direct and indirect effects. Furthermore, it is often difficult to 
distinguish between proximate and non-proximate causes. However, as I show below, there 
are cases in which it is clear that the patient-physician communication is the proximate and 
necessary cause of a change in a patient’s health-related outcomes. Though both direct and 
indirect effects of TC deserve theoretical and ethical analysis, in this chapter I focus primarily 
on the former category, i.e., on those cases in which an act of TC elicits some effects on 
health-related outcomes through the modulation of placebo and nocebo responses. 
 
 Second, TC is not restricted to words but includes non-verbal ways in which 
physicians and patients communicate. These include gestures, visual cues, body language, 
attentive listening, thoughtful silence and other sensory stimuli. Among these other 
components of the clinical encounter some are of special importance and have been subjected 
to empirical studies. These studies reveal that besides words, variables such as the doctor’s 
attitude (Thomas 1987), her perceived confidence (Uhlenhuth et al. 1966), the environment in 
which the healing takes place (de Craen et al. 2000; Thomas 1987), the ritual performed 
(Kaptchuk 2002), and the kind of medical instruments utilized (Waber et al. 2008; Johnson 
1994). All of them may influence health outcomes (Walach 2011; Jonas 2011). However, in 
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this chapter I focus especially on the verbal and conscious components of direct TC rather 
than on the non-verbal and unconscious ones.  
 
 
(7.3) The therapeutic power of communication 
 
In the previous chapter we have synthetically reviewed the controversy about the clinical 
effectiveness of placebo treatments. In this section, instead, I should focus only on the 
available evidence concerning the power of verbal practices to shape health-relevant 
outcomes. 
 
 Physicians may use words as therapeutic agents in multiple ways. In the first place, 
physicians may employ direct TC while providing diagnoses. In one study, Thomas (1987) 
tested the effect of providing a firm diagnosis together with a positive and reassuring attitude 
with 200 patients who presented in his general practice with symptomatic complaints but no 
abnormal physical signs. Half of the patients received a “positive” consultation in which the 
physician communicated a firm diagnosis and confidently asserted that the patients would 
surely get better in a few days; the others half received a “negative consultation” in which the 
doctor told them “I cannot be certain what is the matter with you.” Two weeks after the 
consultation, a significant difference was found between those patients who received a 
positive consultation compared to those who received the negative consultation. Another 
study of 100 patients with acute tonsillitis led to analogous results, finding that “a deliberate 
attempt to maximize patients’ expectations through more detailed and positive diagnostic and 
prognostic information may influence the clinical course of acute tonsillitis, recorded as the 
degree of subjective improvement” (Olsson, Olsson, and Tibblin 1989).  
 
 Receiving a firm or an uncertain diagnosis affects also how people cope with 
unexplained symptoms, which alone account for at least 40% of physical symptoms presented 
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in outpatient clinics of gynecology, neurology and rheumatology (Reid et al. 2001). There are 
many conditions for which physicians lack an explanation for persisting medical symptoms, 
including chronic fatigue syndrome, irritable bowel syndrome, chronic pain syndrome, chronic 
pelvic pain, and pseudo non-epileptic seizures. Importantly, these are all conditions that are 
known to be amenable to placebo modulation (Bendetti 2009; Enck et al. 2013). A recent 
review article concluded that patients “report less symptoms … when symptoms are properly 
explained” (Weiland et al. 2012). Similarly, providing a positive prognosis may shape patients’ 
expectations and have therapeutic effects. Egbert et al. (1964) found that patients who were 
informed and reassured about the course of their postoperative pain reported a reduction of it 
and requested significantly fewer analgesics compared to those assigned to the control group. 
A systematic review of the effects of “healing contexts” concluded that enhancing patients’ 
expectations through positive information and supportive reassurances “significantly 
influenced health outcomes” (di Blasi et al. 2001).  
 
 Engaging patients in shared medical decision-making is another way to modulate 
health outcomes and to enhance treatment effectiveness. For instance, letting people select 
between different pain coping strategies may enhance their pain-tolerance (Rokke and al’Absi 
1992). Shared decision-making may have positive therapeutic effects because it enhances 
compliance with the therapeutic regime; it allows patients to match more efficiently their 
condition with available treatment options (Swift and Callahan 2009); alternatively, it may 
reinforce the patient’s sense of “personal control”–i.e., the “belief that positive and negative 
events are determined by and are dependent upon one’s own actions” (Geers et al. 2013, p. 
550). A recent series of studies with healthy volunteers demonstrated that exercising choice 
over potential treatment alternatives for experimentally-induced pain enhances treatment 
outcomes, but only in those people who have a high desire of control, while it may be 
detrimental in people who are averse to taking control (Geers et al. 2013). This suggests that 
the very act of letting people exercise their preferences during therapeutic encounters may 
enhance therapy effectiveness. 
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 Being unsure about whether or not one is receiving a real or a placebo therapy may 
influence its effectiveness. In a recent study by Kam-Hansen et al. (2014), 66 patients with 
recurring migraine headaches were randomized using a 2 x 3 balanced-placebo design. Half of 
the participants received Maxalt (10-mg rizatriptan), a proven drug for the relief of headache 
pain; half received instead an indistinguishable placebo pill. All participants received pills 
under one of the three information conditions: “Maxalt” (positive information), “Maxalt or 
Placebo” (neutral information), or “Placebo” (negative information). Hence, among those 
who received Maxalt some were induced to believe that they had received a placebo; and 
among those who received the placebo some were induced to believe that they had received 
Maxalt. The trial found that both the kind of pill received (Maxalt or Placebo), and the kind of 
information provided (“Maxalt”, “Maxalt or Placebo”, “Placebo”), significantly correlated 
with the final outcome. Pain relief was greater under positive information, medium under 
neutral information, and lower under negative information. Maxalt was more effective than 
placebo when both were correctly labelled. However, Maxalt mislabelled “placebo” was as 
effective as the placebo mislabelled “Maxalt.” Relative to no treatment, the placebo, under 
each information condition, accounted for more than 50% of the drug effect. Changing even a 
single word can lead to dramatic differences in the effectiveness of both established therapies 
and placebos.  
 
 Importantly, a physician’s words may also induce negative or nocebo effects. A study 
by Colloca, et al. (2008) showed that telling subjects that a painful stimulation will be delivered 
shortly results in an amplification of the pain (hyperalgesia) or in the perception of pain even 
when no painful stimulus is present (allodynia). In another study by Kaptchuk et al. (2006), 
participants with persistent arm pain were randomized to receive either acupuncture or a pill. 
However, all treatments were just placebos: the pill did not contain any active molecule with 
analgesic powers, and the acupuncture was “sham” in that it was performed with retractable 
needles. Yet, many patients reported side effects, some even discontinued participation in the 
trial. Those nocebo side effects matched the descriptions that were given in informed consent 
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documents. Similar effects were found by systematic reviews of anti-migraine trials, in which a 
high rate of side effects in the placebo control group matched those of real drugs (Amanzio et 
al. 2003).  
 
 In sum, clinician-patient communication can itself be directly therapeutic and utilized 
to shape how patients react to diagnosis, prognosis, and medical therapies, or to induce 
beneficial effects when a placebo is deceptively substituted for a real medication, or even 
when the placebo is described openly. Deliberate variations in language can also enhance or 
induce negative effects. In all these cases the common denominator is that the verbal context 
acts as a source of information that patients interpret as different forms of anticipatory cues 
about what is to be expected. 
 
 
(7.4) The ethics of therapeutic communication 
 
Doctor-patient communication may have significant therapeutic effects. In the case of direct 
TC, these effects occur through the modulation of placebo and nocebo responses triggered by 
psychological factors such as modifications of expectations, anxiety, or a sense of personal 
control. If this is correct, the way in which doctors influence patients’ beliefs and attitudes 
may have direct consequences on therapeutic outcomes. This raises important ethical 
questions regarding whether it is legitimate for a physician to promote or remove a certain 
belief, or to present uncertain information in more affirmative terms, to take advantage of the 
power of direct TC. To what extent is it ethical to manipulate patients’ expectations for the 
sake of promoting placebo and avoiding nocebo effects? 
 
 In this section I shall articulate the ethics of direct TC in terms of three morally 
relevant considerations: helpfulness, veracity, and pragmatism. Before beginning, however, two 
clarifications are in order. First, while the term “manipulation” may refer to an unscrupulous 
 203 
way of exercising control over information with a misleading intent, it can also refer to a 
clever and skillful way of controlling information. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, to 
“manipulate” means primarily “to handle or control (a tool, mechanism, information, etc.) in a 
skillful manner”, and only then “to control or influence (a person or situation) cleverly or 
unscrupulously”. In its more general sense, “to manipulate information” is a morally neutral 
practice, as this manipulation can lead to good or bad outcomes and be inspired by good or 
bad intentions; in its more restricted sense, instead, manipulation means to control 
information with the intention to mislead. It is important to keep distinct these two senses in 
which manipulation can be understood because several ethical quandaries surrounding the use 
of TC stem from a failure to recognize that a deliberate act of information manipulation is not 
necessarily misleading. 
 
 Secondly, TC always takes place within a therapeutic encounter involving an 
asymmetrical relationship between, on the one hand, a professional clinician with medical 
knowledge, skills and the social authority accorded to this role and, on the other hand, a 
vulnerable patient in need of help (see 3.1). As a consequence, patients necessarily have to rely 
on trust in their clinician (Pellegrino, Veatch, and Langan 1981). As defined in the previous 
chapters, here by “trust” I shall mean the attitude that someone (the trustor) has toward 
someone else (the trustee) and that entails both an expectation as well as a positive attitude 
toward the trustee’s technical competencies and moral disposition (see infra 3.1.b). On the 
traditional beneficence-inspired model, communication within this asymmetrical relationship 
was generally governed by the capacities of the doctor to help the patient with her suffering. 
Today, however, TC ought to reflect also physician’s commitment to honesty. Patients need 
to trust that their physicians can guide them toward better health without compromising the 
truthfulness that grounds every doctor-patient relationship.  
 
 In light of these remarks, I propose to conceptualize the role of the physician using 
TC as that of a trustworthy guide able to combine helpfulness and veracity. By helpfulness I mean that 
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physicians should be committed to use their knowledge to alleviate the patient’s suffering 
and/or to promote her health and wellbeing. But even when no cure or effective treatment is 
available, a clinician may still be of help by providing compassion, empathy, and a caring 
attitude. In this respect, “helpfulness” is thus a shorthand term for the clinicians’ prima facie 
duties of beneficence and non-maleficence. By veracity, instead, I mean the physician’s 
commitment to provide patients with truthful information about their diagnosis, prognosis, 
and proposed interventions, without manipulating their beliefs in misleading ways, consistent 
with the principle of respect for patient’s autonomy and their other obligations as medical 
professionals, especially those of fidelity and truthfulness (Beauchamp and Childress 2009). 
Hence, “veracity” is simply a shorter form to indicate the clinician’s prima facie duty of veracity. 
 
 By characterizing the role of the physician engaging in TC as that of a trustworthy 
guide who must combine helpfulness and veracity it becomes possible to distinguish several 
general cases. The simplest scenario occurs whenever direct TC is clearly unhelpful. Like any 
other medical intervention, direct TC has an instrumental value and is directed at promoting 
the patient’s health. But since direct TC operates through the modulation of placebo and 
nocebo responses, its helpfulness is limited only to those health outcomes susceptible of placebo 
modulation. So far there is no evidence that placebo responses may contribute to the 
shrinking of tumors, and consequently direct TC is unhelpful for cancer. (But it could still be 
used to manage symptoms and side effects of anti-cancer therapies). However, direct TC 
aimed at promoting unrealistic beliefs and expectations may interfere with the provision of 
care (for example by delaying the use of effective therapies), hence exposing patients to severe 
harm. Thus, whenever direct TC is unhelpful it is either futile or unethical. 
 
 A different situation obtains when direct TC can be helpful but at the cost of veracity. 
Consider the case of a clinician who administers a deceptive placebo by stating: “This 
injection of morphine will reduce your pain”. Here the clinician manipulates a patient’s 
expectations in order to induce a positive placebo response; hence this statement is an 
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instance of direct TC. Since the clinician is stating a lie intended to benefit the patient this act 
of direct TC is paternalistic. The question of whether this act of direct TC is morally 
permissible is thus the question of whether paternalistic deception is justifiable in these 
particular circumstances. Accordingly, moral dilemmas that involve the use of direct TC and a 
possible violation of the clinicians’ prima facie duty of veracity ought to be interpreted and 
resolved according to the perspective that I have elaborated and defended in the previous 
chapters. 
 
 On other occasions, however, the moral issues raised by direct TC are not those 
related to a violation of the clinician’s prima facie duty of veracity. In fact, sometimes an act of 
direct TC may be both truthful and helpful, but it may be prima facie unclear how veracity and 
helpfulness have to be balanced in those specific circumstances. Since these cases constitute the 
distinctive problematic core of the ethics of TC, let us briefly characterize them. First, 
consider the case in which a clinician is disclosing to a patient the side effects of treatment 
“T”; “T” has both significant side effects that are not prone to placebo modulation (e.g., an 
increased risk of glaucoma) as well as other nonspecific side effects (e.g., anxiety and 
drowsiness). If the clinician describes these nonspecific side effects, then she will increase the 
likelihood that such effects will occur due to expectation-based nocebo responses (Cohen 
2012; Colloca and Finniss 2012; Wells and Kaptchuk 2012; Miller an Colloca 2011). 
Accordingly, the clinician is unsure about whether she ought to label those nonspecific side 
effects (e.g., “T may cause anxiety and drowsiness”), or vaguely refer to them using a general 
phrase (e.g., “If you feel something new or unusual after taking T, please call me”). The first 
formulation is more accurate than the second, but also more likely to induce the described 
side effects through nocebo responses. In this case it is prima facie unclear which of the two 
possible formulations provides the optimal balance between veracity and helpfulness.  
 
 Second, consider a clinician who, instead, decides to describe the nonspecific side 
effects of “T” but is unsure about whether to say that “T may sometimes cause effect y” or that 
 206 
“T may rarely cause effects y”. Based on her knowledge and available evidence, she concludes 
that the first formulation is slightly more accurate than the second but also more likely to 
induce self-fulfilling nocebo side effects. In this case, it is again prima facie unclear which 
formulation entails the optimal balance between helpfulness and veracity: since they are both 
helpful and truthful to different degrees, it is an open question whether they are equivalent or 
whether one is better than the other. 
 
 These problematic cases arise because, as we have seen, clinician’s commitment to 
veracity is always context-dependent and audience-sensitive (Manson and O’Neill 2007; Wells 
and Kaptchuk 2012; see 2.2). Clinicians are under the obligation of truthfully informing 
patients about their diagnosis, prognosis, available therapeutic options, and the possible 
effects of prescribed interventions. But the specific content and forms of clinical truth telling 
depend on the clinician’s personality, culture, and communicative skills and may vary in 
different contexts so as to match a patient’s features, responses and needs. Since each 
therapeutic encounter is a unique event, in each case the final decision about which items of 
information are relevant and how they should be communicated is left to the clinician’s 
judgment.  
 
 Although a commitment to veracity may partially determine which information ought to 
be disclosed (e.g., which intervention will performed), clinicians have a substantial degree of 
discretion in deciding what will be said on each occasion. Physicians’ leeway in crafting 
information disclosure is particularly relevant for direct TC, where even a single word (e.g., 
“placebo” instead of “Maxalt”) may lead to significantly different clinical outcomes. Given the 
multitude of possible alternatives that characterize the crafting of each information disclosure, 
clinicians engaging in direct TC can expect to face many cases in which it is at least prima facie 
unclear how they should balance veracity and helpfulness.   
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 How should physicians approach these controversial cases? My proposal is that 
clinicians engaging in direct TC may rely on a third moral coordinate, pragmatism, to determine 
the optimal balance of helpfulness and veracity. Unlike helpfulness and veracity, pragmatism is not a 
substantive moral value, but is rather a procedural principle useful to guide clinicians in 
deciding between different ways of disclosing information. Pragmatism can be expressed in the 
form of a general maxim of conduct stating: “Between two acts of direct TC that involve 
balancing helpfulness and truthfulness, choose the one that is anticipated to have the most 
favorable practical consequences”. In this form, pragmatism amounts to a general 
consequentialist precept that invites clinicians to ascertain what practical differences it would 
make to choose a verbal formulation over another one when attempting to balance 
helpfulness and truthfulness. Applying this general maxim, I argue, may facilitate clinicians’ 
decision-making by indicating how to interpret and resolve moral dilemmas about 
controversial cases involving non-paternalistic acts of direct TC.  
 
 Taking a pragmatic perspective entails two main procedural steps. The first step 
consists in clarifying the moral dilemma beneath each controversial case by reformulating it as 
a choice between two alternative verbal disclosures. For example, if a clinician is unsure about 
whether she should label the nonspecific side effects (“x, y, and z”) of a prescribed treatment 
(“T”), according to pragmatism the first step to take is to rephrase this moral dilemma in terms 
of two alternative information disclosures: one in which those side effects are labeled (e.g., “T 
may have effects x, y, and z. Call me if you experience any of them”) and one in which they 
are not (e.g., “Call me if you experience any new or unusual effect after taking T”). At this 
level, adopting a pragmatic perspective entails that any question or doubt about whether an act 
of direct TC provides an optimal balance between veracity and helpfulness can be expressed in 
terms of two alternative ways in which a specific piece of information could be added, 
omitted, rephrased, or framed. 
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 The second step, then, consists in determining which formulation provides the best 
balance between helpfulness and veracity by looking at their respective practical consequences. 
Given the characterization of direct TC that we have provided, there are at least two series of 
consequences that are of relevance in evaluating each act of direct TC: one concerning the 
specific health outcomes targeted by the act of TC; and the other concerning the individual 
patient to whom the act of direct TC is addressed. I shall now explain how the consideration 
of these two aspects may aid clinicians in approaching controversial cases involving direct TC 
in clinical settings. 
 
 
(7.5) Using therapeutic communication in clinical contexts: two examples 
 
In this section we shall apply the considerations of helpfulness, veracity, and pragmatism to analyze 
two cases in which direct TC is used to enhance the effectiveness of (a) proven medications 
and of (b) open-label placebos. 
 
 
(7.5.a) Using direct therapeutic communication with proven medications 
 
As open/hidden studies show, informing patients that they are about to receive a medication 
that will relieve their pain may be responsible for a substantial proportion of the pain relief 
actually experienced by the patient. This suggests that direct TC can be used to enhance the 
overall effectiveness of standard analgesics by openly reinforcing patients’ expectations during 
their administration. While several commentators have hinted at this possibility (Brody 1992; 
Miller and Colloca 2011; Justman 2013), to my knowledge a detailed discussion of the ethics 
of manipulating verbal information for the sake of enhancing the effectiveness of prescribed 
medications is yet to be provided. In this respect, applying the theoretical framework 
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elaborated in the previous sections may provide a preliminary charting of the practical and 
moral issues pertaining to these common scenarios.  
 
 Consider the case in which a hospital clinician is about to administer an analgesic to a 
patient in postoperative settings with the purpose of meeting the requirements of informed 
consent. Let us suppose that, in this case, the busy clinician states: (a) “This pill is a painkiller 
containing morphine”. Now consider the same situation from the perspective of a clinician 
using direct TC. (For simplicity, we shall assume that the drug has no relevant side effects). 
Clearly, this time the clinician would face a different question, as the goal of her disclosure will 
be to maximize the potential therapeutic effects of the analgesic drug (helpfulness) without 
compromising–and possibly fostering–patient’s autonomy and the mutual trust grounding the 
therapeutic relationship (veracity). After pondering various alternatives, she concludes that a 
viable information disclosure could be: (b) “We want to minimize your pain after surgery by 
giving you this pill called X. X contains morphine. Morphine is a very powerful painkiller. 
Thus, you can expect your pain to be relieved soon. Please let me know if you continue to feel 
pain”. Neither (a) nor (b) are misleading ways of disclosing information about the provided 
medication. Given the prior analysis of direct TC, however, we argue that the second 
formulation has the potential to enhance patient outcomes with minimal communicative 
burden on clinicians. If this is correct, then adopting TC has important implications for the 
way in which clinician-patient communication is currently conceived, regulated by ethical 
guidelines, and taught in professional schools. 
 
 To sustain and unpack this claim, let me briefly compare (a) and (b) by looking at their 
practical consequences. First, we shall compare the two disclosures as for their likely effects 
on the health outcome considered, in this case postoperative pain. Since this is a condition 
known to be highly susceptible to placebo modulation, both formulations may reasonably be 
expected to reinforce a patient’s positive expectations, hence leading to an enhanced overall 
analgesic response which is likely to be a function both of the pain-relieving properties of the 
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medication and the psychological benefits of positive expectations. However, the two 
formulations are not identical: (b) is more specific than (a) and provides the patient with 
additional cues about the reason for the administered treatment, its known efficacy (“very 
powerful painkiller”), the effect to be anticipated (“pain relief”), an approximate timing 
(“soon”), and invites the patient to seek additional help if the relief is not adequate. According 
to the empirical evidence reviewed in section (7.3), (b) has an increased likelihood of inducing 
more robust placebo responses than more generic formulations like (a). 
 
 Furthermore, while (a) is accidentally helpful (b) is deliberately calculated to maximize 
patient’s expectations of a clinical improvement. The difference between accidental and 
deliberate helpfulness becomes obvious as we compare the two disclosures over time. Patients in 
postoperative settings are likely to need more than one administration of analgesics, as pain 
management may range from hours to years. The ritual of clinical truth telling entailed by the 
use of direct TC can be iterated–with due variations– so as to enhance clinical outcomes on 
multiple occasions. Even if in each case placebo-induced responses contribute only marginally 
to the final therapeutic outcome, in the long run their aggregate effect might become very 
significant. By contrast, the accidental helpfulness of the first formulation is likely to diminish 
over time, as clinicians have no incentive in repeating the act of information disclosure once 
the requirements of informed consent has been already met (for example, they may resort to 
even more generic formulations, like “it is time to take your medicines”). Thus, direct TC may 
retain a clinical utility even when its function for the purpose of informed consent has been 
already met.  
 
 Provided that clinicians remain committed to veracity, there is no reason to see this use 
of direct TC as deceptive in view of what we know both about the pain-relieving properties of 
analgesic agents and the effects of expectations on pain relief. There is nothing misleading 
about aiming to promote positive expectations, insofar as scientific evidence and clinical 
experience supports the potential for expectation-induced benefit in the condition presented 
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by the patient. As long as the practice of telling the truth can bring about beneficial effects on 
a patient’s relevant outcomes without compromising her individual autonomy or the bond of 
trust, I contend that clinician’s use of direct TC is an ethical way of optimizing the effect of 
therapeutic outcomes. Therefore, given their potential therapeutic benefits and minimal 
burden on clinicians, I argue that clinicians should systematically adopt adjuvant techniques of 
direct TC whenever they administer analgesics in clinical settings.  
 
 Using the same argument sketched above, the case for implementing adjuvant 
techniques of direct TC can be generalized to other similar scenarios. In particular, I maintain 
that the adjuvant use of direct TC is generally ethical whenever it: 
 
i. Does not involve misleading communication; 
ii. Targets a health outcome prone to placebo modulation; 
iii. To the extent feasible, takes into account the patient’s unique clinical 
profile and agency; 
iv. Has negligible risks for patients’ health and wellbeing;  
v. Has negligible costs. 
 
 Whenever these five conditions obtain, clinicians should consider the use of adjuvant 
techniques of direct TC while administering proven therapies to optimize patient care.  
 
 Aside from pain-management, another likely area for implementing the systematic use 
of adjuvant techniques of TC is in the treatment of patients with depression. Placebo-
controlled trials suggest that most of the benefit that depressed patients receive from taking 
antidepressant medication is matched by those who receive masked placebo treatments 
(Benedetti 2011; Kelley et al. 2012). Assuming that pharmacological intervention for 
depression is judged as the best therapeutic option for an individual patient, we maintain that 
in discussing this medical intervention it will be ethical for the clinician to openly reinforce the 
positive expectations of the patient about its effectiveness–e.g. by saying: “This medicine is 
“X”. It has been proven that “X” is effective in clinical trials. Hence, I expect you to improve 
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while taking this medicine and experience a reduction of your depressive states”. If a 
pharmacological intervention is already the selected course of action for the treatment of a 
condition which is highly prone to placebo modulation, there is no reason not to enhance its 
possible beneficial effects if these results can be ethically achieved without resorting to lies or 
deception and in a way that is cost-effective and without additional risks for a patient’s health. 
 
 
(7.5.b) Using direct therapeutic communication with open-label placebos 
 
The use of adjuvant techniques of direct TC becomes controversial when it is directed at 
enhancing the effectiveness not of proven medications but of open-label placebos (OLPs). By 
definition, a placebo treatment lacks inherent therapeutic properties: it has no ingredients or 
components with the physical properties of producing beneficial health outcomes. Should 
clinicians use techniques of direct TC to enhance (or confer) clinical effectiveness to OLPs? 
 
 Before answering this question it is important to make an important distinction 
concerning the underlying mechanisms through which OLPs are supposed to operate. So far, 
we have explored the ethics of direct TC on the assumption that the primary mechanism of its 
action is the modulation of patient’s expectations and beliefs. However, as discussed in (6.3), 
once a physical treatment is prescribed along with a verbal description it can also be the case 
that other placebo mechanisms may be recruited and that the final therapeutic outcome is a 
function of their overall therapeutic effect.  
 
 With respect to the use of OLPs, for example, it has been suggested that they can be 
effectively incorporated as part of a therapeutic regime based on deliberate pharmaco-
conditioning. In these therapeutic protocols an OLP is paired with an active medication until 
the administration of the OLP alone induces a conditioned placebo response that mimics the 
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effects of the medication. Evidence from pilot studies in psoriasis (Krueger 2006) and ADHD 
(Sandler 2008) suggests that OLPs based on pharmaco-conditioning may be effective in 
maintaining therapeutic responses while reducing the side effects of active medications. If 
further studies confirm these findings, then OLPs used in therapeutic regimes based on 
pharmaco-conditioning might represent the least controversial way of incorporating placebos 
in real clinical settings. However, even in these cases in which the primary target mechanism is 
classical conditioning, researchers and clinicians have still to describe the OLPs hence providing 
a way of maximizing their effectiveness. Therefore, also in these cases it is relevant to analyse 
how adjuvant techniques of direct TC can be ethically deployed. 
 
 Let us begin by considering the trial, mentioned in section (7.3), which investigated 
whether there could be a “placebo without deception” in patients with IBS (Kaptchuk et al. 
2010). As part of the disclosure procedure, the participants in this study were presented with 
the following script: “placebo pills, something like sugar pills, have been shown in rigorous 
clinical testing to produce significant mind-body self-healing processes” (Kaptchuk et al. 2010, 
2). This script was meant to enhance positive expectations in order to measure whether the 
placing of hope and trust in a treatment known to be a placebo might still have therapeutic 
value; it was therefore an act of direct TC. But was it sufficiently truthful? In a critical 
commentary Justman (2013, 328) contends that the answer is negative because this script is  
 
[a] variant of the sale pitch that has been employed in open or semi-open or indeed 
deceptive placebo experiments (….) The impressive rhetoric of  “rigorous clinical 
testing” in the study’s script makes placebo sound like a medication in its own right, or at 
least like something of attested efficacy (…) What of the benefits attributed to the 
placebo treatment? While placebo produces reports of improvement in countless clinical 
trials (…) the claim that such improvement represents the work of “significant mind-
body self-healing processes” is arguably both tendentious and inflated. Despite the 
inspirational rhetoric of “healing,” the only sense in which the study subjects treated with 
open placebo were healed is that many of them felt better. Their IBS itself did not heal in 
the way ulcers, for example, do – with or without treatment. According to the OED, the 
first meaning of “to heal” is “to make whole or sound in bodily condition; to free from 
disease or ailment, restore to health or soundness; to cure.” Placebo treatments of IBS do 
none of this.  
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 By making use of “half-truths” and “inflated rhetoric”, the script in the IBS study, 
according to Justman, portrayed OLPs as if they were known to be “effective” and “capable 
of “healing”. However, these claims are not self-evident. First, while it is true that double-
blind administration of placebos has led to clinical improvements in rigorous testing, those 
trials did not employ OLPs for IBS. Hence it is questionable whether the script was 
sufficiently transparent as to the effectiveness of OLPs. Second, it is also questionable to what 
extent OLPs could contribute to healing given that they are just placebos with presumably no 
effects on pathophysiology. Therefore, Justman argues, the IBS trial script was not transparent 
and did not avoid deception. This conclusion, however, is dubious. While it is true that many 
disclosures in placebo research are deceptive and thus ethically problematic (Miller et al. 2005; 
Miller and Kaptchuk 2008), this may not be the case of the script of the IBS study–nor of 
other studies investigating the efficacy of OLPs.  
 
 For one thing, Justman is right in noting that the disclosure procedure reported in the 
published IBS article did not make explicit whether the participants were informed that OLPs 
were unproven interventions. Since that trial was about “placebo without deception”, a failure 
to explain in details how the information disclosure took place during the study should be 
considered a shortcoming of the published article.  
 
 Yet, from the fact that the script reported in the paper did not report that information, 
it does not follow that the participants in the IBS trial were lead to believe that OLPs were 
known to be effective for IBS. In fact, as it can be ascertained by the documentation 
submitted to the Institutional Review Board for this trial, researchers did clearly point out that 
OLPs were then unproven interventions for IBS (Kaptchuk 2014, personal communication). 
Accordingly, the provision of OLPs in that trial (and by extension their possible use in clinical 
scenarios) was not deceptive or lacking transparency in this respect.  
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 Furthermore, Justman’s second remark about the exaggerated benefit of OLP is 
problematic. The IBS trial found that 59 percent of patients who received the placebo 
reported adequate relief as opposed to 35 percent of those in the “no-treatment” control 
group. (Adequate relief was assessed through the same criteria used by the FDA to approve 
pharmacological interventions for IBS). Thus, for 24 percent of the participants, the OLP did 
make a significant clinical difference compared with no treatment. Are these improvements to 
be considered as signs of “healing”?  
 
 In the case of symptomatic conditions like IBS–where health-related outcomes like 
stress, relaxation, and quality of life are directly linked to the physical symptoms defining the 
condition–we contend that the answer is “Yes”. Not everything that falls within the domain of 
medicine and medical expertise “heals” like “ulcers do”. “Healing” is a capacious term, which 
includes symptomatic relief as well as cures.  Psychotherapy, pain-management, anxiety and 
sleep disorders, hypertension, some sexual dysfunctions, etc. are just a few examples of 
therapies and conditions for which a purely pathophysiological approach to diagnosis and 
therapy may prove to be insufficient. Therefore the interpretation of “healing” assumed by 
Justman is just too narrow to account for many medically relevant phenomena, including 
placebo effects.  
 
 Justman’s critique has thus the merit of underscoring how subtle the boundary 
between truthfulness, manipulation, and deception can be–especially when direct TC is used 
in conjunction with a placebo (whether OLP or not). However, from this recognition it does 
not follow that every instance of direct TC aimed at administering an OLP is necessarily 
untruthful. For example, in scenarios similar to the one of the IBS trial, we suggest that 
clinicians may describe OLPs in the following truthful way: 
 
“This pill is a placebo; as such, it does not contain any pharmacologically active 
ingredient. It is something like a sugar pill. However, rigorous clinical testing has shown 
that even this kind of intervention may have clinically relevant effects by inducing what is 
called a “placebo response”. Placebo responses are part of the way in which our body and 
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mind reacts to the provision of care and to salient features of the therapeutic context. 
Thus, if you regularly take these pills, you may experience some improvement in your 
condition”. 
 
 This script is meant to promote positive expectations about the effectiveness of OLPs 
without compromising veracity. Provided that the OLP does not replace a more effective 
treatment and that the patient may autonomously choose among different treatment options, 
if the efficacy of OLPs is backed up by experimental evidence (i.e., it is helpful), and if the 
nature of the intervention—e.g., a pill without any medication in it–is clearly made explicit 
(i.e., it is truthful), then it can be ethical to administer this kind of intervention accompanied 
by reasonable communication of positive expectation. 
 
 
(7) Summary 
 
In this chapter I have discussed the ethics of using forms of therapeutic communication to 
modulate patients’ health-outcome through placebo and nocebo effects. I have thus 
characterized the role of the clinician engaging in direct TC as that of a trustworthy guide able 
to combine veracity and helpfulness in the light of pragmatism. In particular, I have argued that 
pragmatism can be used to clarify and resolve controversial cases in which it is prima facie unclear 
how to balance veracity and helpfulness in specific circumstances.  
 
 Using this theoretical framework I have analysed the ethics of using techniques of 
direct TC to enhance the effectiveness of proven medications and OPLs by fostering patients’ 
positive expectations. I have thus contended that clinicians should consider the systematic 
adoption of adjuvant techniques of direct TC to enhance the overall effectiveness of 
prescribed medications (and also of OPLs–provided other conditions are met). Embracing 
this proposal would result in a cost-effective and low-risk way of providing superior care to 
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patients who are already taking medications for highly prevalent conditions such as pain, 
depression, anxiety, insomnia, irritable bowel syndrome, and recurring migraine.   
 
 Implementing direct TC in clinical settings, however, calls both for more empirical 
research and for a global reconsideration of the way in which doctor-patient communication is 
currently practiced in clinical settings. Moreover, clinicians should start to reconsider the way 
in which they communicate with patients as one of the primary means at their disposal for 
modulating patients’ overall therapeutic experience in significant ways. 
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Conclusions. 
 
 
There’s one way to find out if a man is honest–ask him. If he says “yes”, he is a crook. 
Groucho Marx 
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Doctor-patient communication is key to clinical medicine. Clinicians’ words may modulate 
health-outcomes through placebo and nocebo responses, communicate diagnostic and 
prognostic information, aid patients with difficult decisions, or preserving hope and autonomy 
in the most desperate of the situations. In any case, clinicians’ words have the power to 
transform the lives of those to whom they are addressed in significant and irreversible ways. 
 
 In exchange for this power, clinicians are entrusted by society with a series of moral 
responsibilities and duties disciplining, among other things, also the veracity of their 
professional communications. In order to protect patients from harm and exploitation as well 
as to be able to deliver the best quality of care, today it is assumed that clinicians have a duty 
of telling the truth to their patients. Abiding to this duty, however, entails two difficulties. 
First, sometimes it is clear that a clinician should tell the truth to patients, but doing so can be 
very difficult. Veracity and honesty can sometimes be painful for those who have the right to 
know as well as for those who have the duty to inform. 
 
 Other times, instead, it is not clear what a duty of veracity entails. Should a clinician 
tell the truth to a vulnerable patient? Is it justifiable for a doctor to lie about the suffering of a 
beloved one out of compassion? Among the different ways in which the truth about medical 
relevant information can be disclosed, which one is to be preferred for its likely impact on 
patient’s health and well being? In this dissertation I focused my attention mostly on this latter 
kind of problems concerning the ethics of truth-telling in clinical and oncological settings, 
suggesting that the first approach that we ought to endorse is one for which there is no a-
priori categorical answer to any of the above questions. Medicine is not an exact science; 
rather, it is a pragmatic activity in which different individuals who may hold diverse values and 
beliefs must often decide between competing alternatives while having inadequate knowledge. 
 
 To cope with these difficulties, I have suggested that a promising way of 
conceptualizing clinicians’ duty of truth telling is by adopting the Rossian distinction between 
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prima facie and actual duties. Prima facie duties correspond to moral obligations that ought to be 
considered binding unless one has compelling reasons to do otherwise. In medicine, these 
other compelling reasons are likely to refer to other prima facie obligations to which clinicians 
are expected to abide. Thus, other things being equal, clinicians must tell the truth to their 
patient. However, sometimes things are not equal, as sometimes prima facie obligations may 
legitimate conflict. Whenever a conflict of this kind occurs, we have to identify and weight the 
reasons supporting one obligation against those supporting the other, thus determining which 
one should override the other and be our actual duty in these circumstances. Actual duties are 
those prima facie obligations that we have to respect after all things have been considered. 
 
 The view that clinicians have a prima facie duty of veracity is per se not controversial in 
today medical ethics. However, in difference to the vast majority of other accounts endorsing 
this view, throughout this dissertation I have defended two original claims. First, I have 
maintained that the negative presumption against violating clinicians’ duty of veracity should 
be regarded as being very strict: it is morally permissible to violate this duty only in exceptional 
cases. These exceptions are even sparser, I have suggested, in the case in which the deceptive 
act entails the use of a physical intervention such as a pure or an impure placebo.  
 
 The other distinctive feature of my view is the idea that other accounts 
conceptualizing clinicians’ duty of veracity as a prima facie duty are, in absence of further 
qualifications, likely to lead clinicians to take suboptimal moral decisions because of three 
reasons. First, the extension of the prima facie duty of veracity may be unclear at the outset. 
Although we are all to some extent familiar with lying, deception, concealment and the telling 
of half-truths, these concepts require some theoretical work before they can be clarified as to 
determine how someone may not respect an obligation of veracity. Drawing on the existing 
literature, I have distinguished these concepts, proposing to conceptualize clinicians’ prima facie 
duty of veracity as the conjunction of two other prima facie obligations: the negative obligation 
to refrain from lying and deceiving (i.e., the “duty of truthfulness”), and the positive obligation 
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to provide patients with all the relevant information needed to respect their autonomy (i.e., 
“the duty to inform”). 
 
 A second reason for which other accounts may not be satisfactory resides in their 
under-theorization of the morality of using deception in clinical communications. For one 
thing, those who deceive are generally prone to deceive even more, and this is both because 
duplicity may contribute to “corrupt” our moral character, and because it might requires the 
deceiver to use more lies in order to shore up those that have already been said. While we tend 
to conceptualize the morality of lying and deception by focusing on single episodes, they 
rarely occur as such: concealment and deception may easily “spill over” into a lie and 
dishonesty may always have long-term consequences. For another thing, instead, lying, 
deceiving and concealment do not have intrinsically different moral weights, as it is sometimes 
mistakenly claimed, but their moral status is always context and audience dependent. Lies are 
usually more culpable than evasive answers, but this is not a given in all circumstances. 
 
 More importantly, other accounts do not take into adequate consideration the 
discrepancy of the perspectives, which may lead the deceiver and the deceived to appraise in 
two very different ways–each one biased and limited–the moral implications of the same 
deceptive act. Like a court of law in which only the reasons of the indicted or those of the 
victim are weighed in the final verdict, without controlling for the biases introduced by the 
discrepancy of the perspectives, the final moral judgment over the moral permissibility of a 
deceptive act is likely to be skewed in one sense or the other. This aspect is particularly 
relevant in clinical contexts for two complementary reasons. First, because there exists a 
power asymmetry between physicians and patients, with the latter depending on help and 
knowledge of the former to recover their health. Second, because clinicians are often in the 
best possible position to profit by the free-rider status of being the deceivers, as they can 
propose, evaluate, and enact deceptive acts in full secrecy.  
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 In light of these considerations, I have argued that other accounts fail to provide a 
satisfactory normative theory for thinking about the ethics of truth-telling and benevolent 
deception in clinical contexts. On the one hand, perspectives like Beauchamp and Childress’s 
one are inadequate because they overemphasize the respect of patient’s autonomy over the 
preservation of the bond of trust and ignore the biases potentially introduced by the 
discrepancy of the perspectives. On the other hand, categorical positions equally fail because 
they provide a suboptimal trade-off between their ability to enforce a strict ban on dishonesty 
and the undesirable and counterintuitive consequences that follow from such a ban. 
 
 To overcome these limitations, I have proposed a normative solution based on the 
concept of publicity. Building and extending upon Bok’s original proposal, I have thus 
elaborated and defended a procedural theory for justifying benevolent deception in clinical 
contexts based on three passages–which have been phrased as three tests that clinicians ought 
to take before reaching the conclusion that an act of deception may be morally permissible. 
These are the test of “veracity”, “publicity”, and “public disclosure”. A proposal to resort to 
deception would pass these three “moral safety-checks” if and only if those supporting it 
would: be able to argue that there are no other truthful and plausible ways of achieving the 
desired end; be ready to defend their reasons in front of a public jury composed of their peers, 
other reasonable persons and those who share the perspective of the deceived; select the best 
techniques of actual publicity to publicly disclose, either prospectively or retrospectively, that 
an exception to the duty of veracity was or will be made. Whenever these three conditions are 
met, I argued, resorting to benevolent deception might be morally permissible.  
 
 The view that I have proposed has several advantages, as it allows clinicians evaluating 
the moral permissibility of clinical deception to: (a) refine and correct their argumentations; (b) 
reduce the fallibility of their moral judgments; (c) achieve less biased conclusions about what 
their actual duties should be in each particular case; (d) reinforce patient’s and society trust in 
clinicians’ professional trustworthiness; (e) facilitate internal and public discussion on how 
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doctors can best cope and be prepared to face certain scenarios. This view, however, has also 
some limits, such as the one of being potentially quite demanding in terms of time and 
cognitive resources, and thus of being applicable only in those cases in which a deception is 
planned rather than in those cases that require a quick decision. To reduce this drawback, I 
have adapted and modified a decisional flowchart first proposed by Sokol (2007) to aid 
clinicians in taking better real-decisions on moral dilemmas about truth telling. 
 
 Equipped with this general normative theory, in the second part I have explored the 
recent debate prompted by new empirical discoveries over the mechanisms of placebo 
responses. Compelling empirical evidence demonstrates that, inasmuch as different variables 
of healing contexts may serve as anticipatory cues of future clinical improvements, inert 
placebos–or even just the doctor’s words–may contribute in shaping a plethora of patient’s 
relevant outcomes through the promotion or inhibition of placebo and nocebo responses.  
 
 I have then analyzed both the current debate over the moral permissibility of 
administering deceptive placebos in clinical contexts, as well as the newer strands of the 
placebo debate, which deal with the moral implications of administering placebo without 
deception, or with the ethics of promoting and inhibiting placebo and nocebo responses 
without administering any physical treatment. I have thus argued that my perspective provides 
a superior theoretical starting point to think about the moral implications of administering 
deceptive placebos in clinical contexts, as it is able to distinguish those very few exceptional 
cases in which this practice is desirable and morally permissible given its potential therapeutic 
and diagnostic value, from all other cases, which represent by far the greatest majority, in 
which the use of deceptive placebos should instead be considered unethical.  
 
 Finally, I have inquired into the relatively unexplored issue of how clinicians should 
decide between different truthful statements if their aim is that of maximizing placebo 
responses (or minimizing nocebo ones) without resorting to paternalistic deception. After 
 224 
having introduced and defined the concept of “direct therapeutic communication”, I have 
then provided a first analysis of the ethics of therapeutic communication based on the three 
moral coordinates of veracity, helpfulness and pragmatism. The view that I have defended is that 
clinicians and oncologists should already strategically implement within their daily practices 
techniques of direct therapeutic communication with the adjuvant function of maximizing the 
overall effectiveness of proven medications–especially analgesics. This would allow clinicians 
to capitalize on the therapeutic power of placebo responses in a way that is not deceptive, 
low-risk, and highly cost-effective, hence providing patients with a superior quality of care.  
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